Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Hanny]

How do you imagine that Paulinus got his army to Anglesey, with all those thousands of men and mules and wagons?

I dont need to imagine, we have T* telling us how they went ashore under P and later under Agricola. There is no mention of wagons or mules going to Angelsey. Wagons is an asumption of yours that reduces movement rate even further.
T* in view of the shallow and variable channel, constructed a flotilla of boats with flat bottoms. By this method the infantry crossed; the cavalry, who followed, did so by fording or, in deeper water, by swimming at the side of their horses.

The revolt began while Paulinus was on Anglesey. Unless you believe that a Roman commander would undertake a full-scale campaign involving a sea crossing in winter, or some time in early spring, that puts the revolt in summer. Since he had just concluded his operations when he heard about what was happening, late summer is most likely.

Only if you push everything into a single year and ignore T account thats he is detailing 2 years events. P could just have easily moved over most of a campaign season building roads, to launch an attack on Angelsey ending the year there, only for the Iceni to rise
in next years spring time when they know of the events and have lost their control of their own lands.

I've made the point repeatedly that the main crop was sown in the autumn in this period (quoting Varro and Pliny). Your single spring emmer crop was prehistoric - by the 1st C AD southeastern Britain was using the same agricultural calendar as the rest of northwest Europe.

Repeating mistakes and refusing to accept your ignorant, is indeed what you have done, it however does not change reality, which is your wrong to say so and wrong to say i say so and wrong to say Pliny and Varro say so and wrong to say Butser says so as they all say emmer, as do authors writing to inform people who want to know what cereals crops were grown and when, https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=yhld...at&f=false

Slower than Orbis's estimate, and slower than our sources indicate, as I said. But let's move on..

No your timeline is faster, you have 37 days, from london to Rome to Rhine and back to channel, Orbis at the theoretical 250 courier speed comes out at 42 or 44 depending if its fastest or shortest route.

Optimal is the important word here. Marshall (pp.24-27) also claims that legionaries carried 80lbs on the march, as did US troops landed at Normandy, French troops in the Crimea carried 72lbs, British redcoats 80lbs, etc. The number and variety of calculations of how much soldiers could or should carry throughout history is so great as to indicate no definite rule.

No, the FM contains Regulations, based on data.https://watermark.silverchair.com/milmed.169.1.45.pdf?token=AQECAHi208BE49Ooan9kkhW_Ercy7Dm3ZL_9Cf3qfKAc485ysgAAAtMwggLPBgkqhkiG9w0BBwagggLAMIICvAIBADCCArUGCSqGSIb3DQEHATAeBglghkgBZQMEAS4wEQQMZoRK6H5kXSFZFL4uAgEQgIIChopighSZQQp77BZCJA0EJQ6Naiqv2DJBEFPr2rwnFh_7Gptqc0o9pVjyOh3v-1ZQyX4TmjEehzMh3Gd2h5lGZSGPqgwrtAqJV0471spnR_mF1vWmvuzoVMQn0l_c39BVtQyRuMSWJHeOBLBXOM6G7jEPCYwWVQ1wY6_ASApMiFANMyrhZokp2ZyfbU4uvQsJhqrXQ-c-h4YkLKdREd-buuYFjKiYGuHcEoQwbDDptQKWSv5kvE5fw44LcSG4bZ72QraoS9vNS8HfpDmBvkRH9MjMlHDJ9UhuvffI2PyLxaFbZVvj76cbZVzdKcU7zquoutQ11Oxs5Z2P1ybI7tuY1TLAgDAxDx303wkqKNVRWE2ddJpqy76f8uzIwBrC_NZIzDMIyAHt4rNqU-TgVbnv3OVlruETagnKTPtJ_uWOORqvUksdt4WZxlVSPp4Jl7Lli01oLn8wnb7DbOsBQGpXXh5teMmBoS7T-cd7OaayoGLvgOPPiy-b0e_de3LlhxWCEr5KfykxowZXP2xA_ZPSfrL7mOdujw1JkaAj8DVQMtHxJfzovMJZ-726tpKhwnlA7wIIliKbXlrCNDjOZsY8wLWmK8slzNuDRbZBXkfbRlRB2hmK1mVCPkTjCk7f186Xv66LSRLgwf5WH-DhZE5OOfDqQI3hhzNga2iFYuXB811LxbwIx6uvbnetR7Dal0PVwCPJQsgiCGIdBjqMP8wsz0CRL7p26ObsX-Uly1ItUf_iuu73ybnNaiShmdE-MaSV-CkZMFvkEkE0jiEukOH5ms2Qw9xXDDt9N79YX8rCWvAaFX5flNthZKY2wi-v-BIpxnodVLMI3hZgmBWNcbVZ5VcuqhI0-lw gives the outcomes from load bearing rates, US D day was for a 3 day period. France in Crimea, did carry 72 lbs, because, the entire French stock of bread and biscuits had been destroyed by fire at Varna in August 1854 along with the mobile bread ovens. Maréchal Saint-Arnaud only had stores of biscuits for ten days During the autumn and winter of 1854, French regiments lost between forty and fifty men per week from starvation and exposure, an unsustainable level of attrition, and averaged 10 mpd carrying the entire French stores of 10 days with them. UK did have 80lbs on their backs, here's is one example of why, Camden campaign was fought over ground, "was by nature barren, abounding with sandy plains, intersected by swamps, and very thinly inhabited," so they had to take with them what they wanted as it was not possible to live of the land due to pop levels being to low, and gates wanted the element of surprise from attacking through an unexpected direction a 19 day campaign saw them March 9mpd and then attack.

Battle of the Alama, 6 days to march 26 miles to attack, so 4/5 mpd.

Roman roads cuts both ways, if a Roman force can use the road to go 18mpd, then an Iceni chariot force moving at 20mph, can put 4000 fighting men down a Roman road in the same space and time, small Iceni forces can use the Roman road network to advantage.

German panning for war was predicated on resting 1 day in seven for both men and horses which were still essential to logistical supply and Divisional movement, there training manual otoh, was to get men fit enough to achieve these operational plans, just as Roman training for legions was to get them fit, to days armies basic training ( Uk adding extra week couple of decades back as the general pop got fatter and less fit) is to transition you towards what the Army wants you to become.


MARCH SPEEDS. (1) The average speeds of division marches in miles per hour are as follows:
By day Infantry division . . . . . 3
(2) The average speeds of march columns in miles per hour are as follows:
Infantry (long marches) . . . . . 3
Infantry (short marches) . . . . . 4
c. MARCH DISTANCES. The infantry division normally can march about 20 miles in a day; under adverse weather or road conditions the rate of march may fall to 10 miles a day.

German Schlieffen War Planing.https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a491685.pdf

The First Army under Gen Kluck, which would serve as the famous IVerwasserung' or far right-wing army in Schlieffen's wheeling movement, was the most significant, because the 1st Army was projected to travel nearly 400 miles in the forty-two day swing below Paris, creating the encirclement Schlieffen planned for.

So (400/420) 10 mpd.


Marcks planning document for Barborossa, again 1 day in 7 is a rest day, the reason by now that 6 of 7 days can be used to march is that motorisation of the supply services allows it, in teh age of muscle no one could bring enough in on wagons and mules to allows 6 days a week movement rates.

1. Time Phasing. The most favorable season for the campaign was from mid-May to mid-October. After a mild winter, it might be possible to start as early as the beginning of May. It was anticipated that all units needed for the initial operations would be assembled before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of an unexpected outbreak of fighting, the forces scheduled to be assembled in the Army Group North area would need approximately 10 days to arrive in their designated areas and those in the south 9 days. During the initial phase of the German offensive the Russians would probably fight delaying actions over distances of up to 250 miles, until they reached their prepared positions. The German infantry divisions would take three weeks to cover this distance. The panzer divisions would have to advance so rapidly and penetrate so deeply that the Russians would be unable to man a continuous defense line. The issue of the entire campaign would depend on the success of the armored thrusts. The struggle for the forest areas and river courses would dominate the second phase. Since the depth of this zone was 60-120 miles, it would take 2-4 weeks to cross it. At this stage the German forces would either achieve a decisive breakthrough or destroy the previously shattered Russian forces individually. During the third phase Moscow and Leningrad would have to be seized and the drive into the eastern Ukraine initiated. The distances to be covered were 250 and 200 miles respectively. Whether this phase could be executed immediately after the second would depend upon the condition of the railroads, the serviceability of the track-laying and wheeled vehicles, and the degree of success hitherto achieved. If the Russians were beaten, a few armored or motorized divisions would suffice to keep them off balance, and to seize Moscow and Leningrad and thrust deep into the eastern Ukraine. This would require one or two weeks if sufficient tanks and motor vehicles were available. If, however, the bulk of the Red Army was still capable of offering organized resistance, the start of the third phase would have to be delayed until sufficient supplies were brought up to support the continuation of the offensive. In this case it might be 3-6 weeks, depend ing on the time needed for the supply buildup. The fourth and last phase of the offensive would see the Germans pursuing the Russians to the Don, the Volga, and the Severnaya Dvina. The distances to be covered were 250 miles in the south and up to 500 in the center and north. After the Germans had captured Kharkov, Moscow, and Leningrad, the Soviet command would have lost control over its forces but complete occupation of the territory acquired during this phase would be neither possible nor necessary. Motorized forces and rail-transported infantry would be responsible for this operation. The time needed for this phase was estimated at 2-4 weeks. The total time required to attain the designated objective would therefore vary between a minimum of 9 and a maximum of 17 weeks. In the event that the Soviet government did not collapse or make peace, the offensive might have to be continued to the Ural Mountains. After the destruction of their armed forces and the loss of their most valuable European territories, the Soviets would probably no longer be capable of conducting military operations but could still set up a government in Asia and maintain a state of war for an indefinite period.

Important bits from Marcks coneptual planning are:

1/During the initial phase of the German offensive the Russians would probably fight delaying actions over distances of up to 250 miles, until they reached their prepared positions. The German infantry divisions would take three weeks to cover this distance.

2/The struggle for the forest areas and river courses would dominate the second phase. Since the depth of this zone was 60-120 miles, it would take 2-4 weeks to cross it.

3/During the third phase Moscow and Leningrad would have to be seized and the drive into the eastern Ukraine initiated. The distances to be covered were 250 and 200 miles respectively. In this case it might be 3-6 weeks, depending on the time needed for the supply buildup.

4/The fourth and last phase of the offensive would see the Germans pursuing the Russians to the Don, the Volga, and the Severnaya Dvina. The distances to be covered were 250 miles in the south and up to 500 in the center and north. Motorized forces rail-transported infantry would be responsible for this operation. The time needed for this phase was estimated at 2-4 weeks.

German plans therefore rest on assumptions of marching rates for the Inf at;
1 (250/21) at 12mpd.
2 (60/14 and 120/28) at 4mpd.
3 (200/21) 10mpd.

And mechanized Inf and Panzers at (500/28) 18mpd.

Who needs Panzers when Romans can do 18mpd?.

Training, and campaign location and season, apply too many variables.

Only to those who are innumerate. Training is to get you ready to become fit fit enough to perform what planners then plan for you to achieve.

Vegetius (1.19) says that Roman soldiers were trained to carry a load of 60 Roman pounds (43lbs, or 20kg) on the regular march, in addition to their arms and armor - 'cruelly laden', as Virgil has it. He has already told us (1.9) that the regular march was 20 miles (18 modern miles).

No he does not.
"Recruits should very frequently be made to carry a burden of up to 60 lb.(4 Note 4 note 4 converts that to 43 imp lbs) and route-march at the military step, since on arduous campaigns they have necessarily to carry their rations together with their arms."

he goes on to tell us 3 of these are done a month in the 4 months initial training period.

With the cooking equipment, entrenching tools, stakes and tent carried on the contubernium mule, most of the individual soldier's load would comprise rations. 14 days ration at 2.5lbs per day would total 35lbs, well within Vegetius's load limit. We know that Roman soldiers could routinely carry more than fourteen days (Cicero), seventeen days (Historia Aug, Ammianus) or greater (Caesar, Livy) amounts of personal rations on the march.

Why miss of the 3 days ration carried that precedes that list?. Who is caring the 40lbs tent? its not a part of the training kit, and on its own weighs 40lbs, so that 5lbs more to each mans weight because you went without mules. Who carries the medical supplies?, what weight does personnel equipment have or is that gone as well?, who carries the corn grinders that onlay a mule can carry?, so you cant even use the grain.....why are you still ignorantly using 17 days when the document says its a 20 day load carried for 3 days?.

First you already moved the goal post to claim they had it on their backs and were moving without mules, now you rely on V for the 43 lbs kit ( different age with different kit weights) training weight, to say actually lets put another 35lbs on top of that and forgot V training route does not include water, so thats another 10lbs, or 16lbs if you wantb to avoid it completely and replace all water lost in the march, making in the field the march weight 88lbs to 96lbs plus a tent taking you over 100lbs, using your figures of kit not used in the 1 cent AD, and is still twice what he trained with at a min.

Even so, with arms and armor too each soldier would start out carrying something around 80lb (36kg). But this load would decrease steadily with every passing day, as they consumed their rations. I have already cited Junkelmann's experiment showing that relatively untrained men can carry 43-46kg on lengthy marches.

No you have done away with the mules and had them cross country for 60 miles to get to a road, then on to london, total 250 miles in 14 days, there is the international 4 Day Nijmegen March that attracts the world mil and others to do 4 25mile marches with 10kg rucks, 10% cant finish the 4 day event on average, and it has killed people trying it. Yes the load goes down as you consume it, but the water intake goes up due to the doubling of weight carried, so now you need to carry more water, so your worse of not better off.

It comes down to whether you choose to believe the sources and the studies that have been done on them, or not.

[REMOVED BY MOD]

Ah, the return of the totally and thoroughly debunked cavalry dash theory! [Image: smile.png]

Not at all, its your timeline that he goes to london, as he has to do so as its the only place to eplenish his supplies he has consumed to get there, its your timeline and loss of logistical supply that make him go there, only to leave again with supplies to do anything else.

I wondered if something like that might lie at the root of your thinking.

Three questions: if Suetonius Paulinus knew, as you suggest, that 'he cant get back to london and defend it, there is simply not enough time', why would he ride all the way down to London, in person, at enormous risk to himself and his command? Why would he, as Tacitus says, have wondered 'whether he should choose it as a seat of war' if he knew his troops could never reach it? And how could the refugees from London possibly have kept up with him if he was traveling at speed, on horseback?

Since none of that is anything to do with your timeline and logistics i leave that alone.

Spelt had been introduced to Britain long before, so this 'new administrative policy of Rome' is solely your own invention. And nobody would try using a horse to pull a plough until the middle ages - oxen were the draft animals, and oxen pulled the wagons that the Iceni brought to the final battle, so any ideas of rapid dashing fleets of chariots should be considered purely imaginary too!

Nope, spelt is not found in the Rhine which provided london with its grain, Boudica: The British Revolt Against Rome AD 60 Graham Webster says on the grain burnt in in London, "it was mainly emmer" Iceni did not use the manorial open field 3 field system requiring heavy oxen, and if the horses are not in the fields then they are still pulling chariots. Farro is what tehyn romans called emmer, and was the grain of choice in the legions for a thousand years.

As for wine - Dio has Boudica claim that the terrible Romans drink unmixed wine, rather than diluting it like civilized people. But we should probably take his ideas on life in Britain as seriously as his claim that the Iceni made their bread out of grass...

University of warrick:
Before AD 60, the Iceni seem to have lived relatively prosperously. However, unlike their neighbors*, they believed that imported wine and other goods undermined traditional values. Their reluctance to have any such dealings must have increased the culture-shock inflicted by the Roman occupation.

* For instance, the Trinovantes, (the tribe neighboring Boudica's people,
the Iceni) had been importing amphorae of wine, olive oil and grape syrup, and fish sauce from
Spain.

---

It will be a lot easier and less fractious if you simply accept the site was Church Stowe and then reverse engineer the campaign from there. Deep down y'all know that's the truth

https://www.academia.edu/1280170/Battle_..._Stowe_CP1

A compelling argument.

---

You make a good point.  David Breeze make a similar point at the Roman Army School at Durham a few years ago.  I don't remember how the question arose but recall that he took the Jewish revolt as an example.  In our case, there would seem to be a tension between Cerialis' characteristic urge for action and Suetonius' natural caution.  However, with the fate of the colony at stake, it is possible that even Suetonius would regard it necessary to follow traditional Roman practice.  I can see a message being sent along the lines of, ' You try to nip it in the bud.  I won't be far behind you.'  It may be that, although Tacitus criticised his temeritas , Cerialis avoided censure because he did exactly what was expected of him.

See also https://www.academia.edu/5365731/No_quar...t_of_Wales

and https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcon...text=curej

With all this chat about Roman logistics nobody is answering the question of how Paulinus would prepare the battlefield, being several days ahead of Boudicca.

Depends if he was being chased and had to do so due to logistical and time pressure, or if he wanted to be in the way of where he knew the Iceni wanted to go.