Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[MonsGraupius]

The standard Roman response when attacked was to get behind a secure wall.

That would be the standard response when defeated. Paulinus had yet to be attacked.

Sorry, I seem to recall, that the Romans built an encampment wherever they stopped. Even at Mons Graupius, there is mention of spending the night in a camp ... this must be another of those "Tacitus lies"?

And clearly, Tacitus lied about defeating the Caledonians and the Antonine wall is what ... a long duck pond or the line of forts at the Antonine wall, are they holiday villas?

And, as for all those forts and encampments through Britain and the empire ... are you suggesting they are not forts? Clearly we have to rewrite all Roman history and archaeological interpretation to ensure it fits the "fact" that Romans only had their walls when they were attacked.

the Thames offered a line that could be easily secured by a very small number of troops.

There were multiple fords of the Thames in the vicinity of London, from Cliffe in Kent up to Lambeth and Brentford, and all were well known to the Britons. Holding the river as a defensive line would have required a large army broken up into many small detachments.

No there were not. The Thames was extremely difficult to cross to such an extent the Anglo Saxons specifically tell us that Wallingford was the lowest crossing point. However, having studied the hydrology of thames, probably in more detail than anyone else, I can say that is not strictly true. It may have been the only reasonably reliable crossing point, but the Thames could be crossed in other places, but there are only a handful of sites up to Goring where there is any historical evidence for their use. London bridge is one of the few and this is typical of large rivers, that they often have a place where the river can be crossed "where the tide meets the river".

To give you an example, there is a possible crossing point at Vauxhall. This was crossed by someone a few years ago ... but that is someone well over six foot. He also waited till a very low tide and a very low river. He also had hydrological maps of the crossing, so knew where to go. I checked, and the "route", of the lowest water is not at all "as the crow flies", but instead goes a long way down river. All that would be needed to stop anyone crossing in force, is a few stakes in the water and at the exit, and a small force ... and it would be extremely easy to slow down the crossing so that the small window of lowest tide was missed.

no sane General abandons their supply line

Indeed he does not. And as many of us have said, Paulinus's supply lines led north and west, towards his legion fortresses at Usk and Exeter, his campaign base at Wroxeter and the rest of his army in north Wales.

His supply lines, with the north up in revolt, can only be from the south. A supply line comes through land that is controlled by the Romans. That is how the Romans worked. That is what a supply line is. If the supply line is to the north, then you are saying the Romans controlled the country to the north ... which might be problematic, given what happened to the ninth and St.Albans.

That secure base is the SE of England.

There were no Roman fortresses in south east England. There were very few troops either. Unless Paulinus was intending to evacuate his army and flee to Gaul the only effect of going that way would be to surrender the province to the enemy and lose all contact with his main army and supplies.

"There were no Roman fortresses in south east England." ... which proves that Romans only had fortresses where they had friends? Or are you saying the Roman fortresses were used as brothels and for entertainment of their friends in the north?

So, the whole of the SE, is an area friendly to the Romans, where it was incredibly easy to raise troops in support of the Romans, from the Belgae elite (as in those Belgae who came from Gaul about 150BC), who were just as much an enemy of the Britons as the Romans, which is why they didn't need fortresses in the SE.

he is in a perfect sandwich between the Welsh Iceni and Belgae... IT IS TOTAL MADNESS!

The Welsh who?

And weren't the Belgae Roman allies a minute ago?

I never suggested the Belgae were allies.

any sane general knows that Boudica will almost be expecting that and almost certainly be waiting in Ambush. That is totally dumb!!!

But the sane general also has scouts to determine the position and movements of the enemy, who he knows are moving slower than he is, and who he also knows cannot leap fifty miles across country to fall unexpectedly upon his line of march!

That would work, if the Romans controlled the area. But they did not. You only send out patrols to maintain control, not to gain to control of an area. When Paulinus gets to London, we are told that he cannot hold it as a "seat of war". That means he does not have control over the area around London, nor does London have the defences necessary to patrol the area around London to keep that control.

Paulinus when he gets to London, finds he needs to move to a secure defensive location where he is able to control the area around and his logistic supply lines. With the SE being friendly, if he cannot control the area of London, with the ninth defeated and confined to their camp (so unable to control the area), it is clear that Paulinus cannot control any of the country to the north of London. He therefore has no supply lines through this area, he cannot send out Scouts without them likely being taken. He cannot send out messages northwards, he cannot contact his army. ... unless he sends messages westward behind the barrier of the Thames and then up the east side of the Severn toward where his army is leaving Wales and coming south.

At that point is army also knows that north of London is no longer in Roman control. So, again, they have to pretty insane to walk into the area they do not control, without their calvary support, without the ability to know what is happening, and without secure supply lines.

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What the MonsGraupius hypothesis fails to recognise is that the established Roman response to a revolt was not to retire behind a line of defence but to march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum. 

Which they did. The ninth went out challenged the Iceni and got massacred. Are you suggesting the standard response after being massacred is to "march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels" ... could you explain why the ninth, who still had forces in their camp, didn't adopt your supposed "it can't be denied response?"

Any course such as that proposed would have been seen as a sign of weakness and serve only to encourage the rebels. 

I'd have thought what happened to Colchester wasn't seen as a weakness? What happened to the Ninth wasn't seen as a weakness. I see the mistake of those in Colchester! They should have: "march[ed] out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum." That would have shown the Iceni who was boss.

We know from Suetonius' reprisals after the revolt had been put down that there were tribes that had not joined the rebels but had been wavering in their loyalty.  Had Boudica been seen to be in the ascendancy and Suetonius cowering in the south-west (as it would have been portrayed), these tribes would almost certainly have joined her. 

He set up the SE as his base for war. He still had considerable forces, and very quickly secured the SE, and almost certainly the West. Then, when he (and not Boudica, and certainly not you) thought he had made the necessary preparations and HE was ready, he did "march out with the forces available and and challenge the rebels in order to attempt to scotch the revolt before it gained momentum."

War is not a two hour session on Rome Total war. It is a long drawn out affair taking months. And, it is certainly not a mad dash up the M1.

Suetonius would have been acutely aware that, in that event, there was a danger that the whole area north of the Thames would be lost to Rome

As soon as the Ninth, London and St.Albans were lost it was already lost to Rome. You are stating what happened. You cannot argue that Paulinus didn't do something because the area that was lost might be lost.

and that, if the Welsh tribes joined in, as they were likely to do, his army in North Wales would have been cut off and he would have been completely isolated. 

I suppose you think, they could all get on their mobile phones and post on Icenibook of the riot, they then drove down to the local "pet holiday home" with all their cattle and paid them to look after them, they then drove to where the big meet up had been posted of "Riots-R-Us.com" and there took out their Britbay purchased weapons and chariots and could slaughter the Romans.

Or, perhaps it took months to gather an iron-age army, because iron-age people didn't have mobile phones, couldn't just drop their farms and take to the hills, probably needed to make the weapons & carts to travel all that way, they needed time to gather the food that could be kept for the months of campaign, they didn't have icenibook, to talk through the politics, to work out who was paying for it all, etc.

Hence the necessity of placing himself in a position to call the army down to reinforce him as quickly as possible, while still being able to monitor the actions of the enemy.

Gulliblus ... you have been ordered by the Big Boss to get on your horse, and to ride through the midst of all those iceni killing any Roman that moves to meet the army hundreds of miles away ... although to be fair, we don't know if they are still there, and ... if you make it there, you are to tell them that Paulinus is going to make the same stupid journey, through the same area where the locals have all been forewarned by you that Paulinus is coming up ... oh and by the way, if they torture you, don't tell them that Paulinus is just behind you ... as it will be pretty obvious anyway that the idiot is galloping to his death. And, when Paulinus gets there ... oops he too doesn't know there's an army still there.

Let me talk to the big boss ... Gulliblus, the order now, is for you to ride up to the army, find out if there is any army still left in Wales, having alerted everyone to your journney, you are to ride back the same path, so you can join us to ride back with us up the same road into the ambush that they will obviously have for us.

Gulliblus? Gulliblus ... you don't have the message ... YOU'RE HEADING THE WRONG WAY, THE ARMY IS NORTH!

Anyone who has taken the trouble to read through this thread (something of a task, I must admit) will know that neither I nor anyone else here has proposed 'the mad dash up the M1/6'.  The furthest north anyone has suggested is the site at Church Stowe favoured by John.  I have suggested a strategic withdrawal of 25 miles to St Albans and then a further withdrawal of 16 miles west along Akeman Street to Tring.  If a further withdrawal yet were necessary, I have suggested that it could have been less than 25 miles in the direction of Alchester.  By no stretch of the imagination can this be characterised as a 'mad dash up the M1/6'.

Paulinus went south.