Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[dadlamassu]

I am not an academic and so do not consider myself qualified to argue or comment on the sources and various translations. I am an interested amateur. I am, however, a retired military professional educated at Staff College and with practical experience of warfighting and other operations over 41 years and so feel qualified to discuss the possible (conjectural) military operations. What we probably need is a latter day Tony Clunn to find the battlefield.

I take several of your points. However, you keep saying things like "beggars military logic" without actually explaining your reasoning in terms of warfighting.

For example why with his main forces west and north does he go away from them?

I agree that SP wants to buy time. Crossing a river, even by a bridge, with 5-6,000 men, equipment and baggage is slow (even now) and since SP takes civilians with him, even slower. If SP, as you seem now to indicate, fought the "final" battle in the Chilterns he must have taken his army there somehow (or are you now saying it was there all the time and there really was a "cavalry dash"?) Are you saying that going south and placing a river and the enemy between you and your own reserves is "logical"? If SP does not have the strength to hold London then he logically does not have the strength to carry out one of the most difficult military operations - an opposed assault river crossing.

I also agree that crossing the Thames gives him a defensible line but only if he intends to stay and defend it. Military logic (and tactical/strategic doctrine that I have studied at Staff College and applied for over 40 years) is that an undefended obstacle is no obstacle. So unless SP defends it the enemy will cross it unopposed by whatever means available. I am pretty sure the Ancient Britons had crossed rivers, including the Thames, before the Romans put up their bridges. Even if he does defend it with his small force military logic on the other side (please do not forget the enemy) is that fixing him in place with part of the force then outflanking him at some unopposed point is a fairly obvious ploy.

I have not seen your proposed time line for this campaign so please supply (or reiterate) your version so that we can discuss military logic in context.
Glibly quoting "military logic" without explaining it in the context of warfighting is not helpful to your argument and indeed weakens it. When citing military logic you really should first state your assumptions:
What is SP's ultimate aim and outline plan of campaign?
What are SP's immediate aims?
What and where are his forces?
Where are his supply bases and arsenals?
What time, terrain, weather, threats, morale, routes, logistics and forces available analyses has SP considered?

How reliable are his intelligence assets?
What are his political aims?
and much more. And what are his deductions? Basically what is his campaign appreciation which leads to his plan? This process is military logic. I have spent many long hours on this process at Staff College, in exercises and on operations and as an introduction you might like to read this Australian pamphlet (228 pages). The tactical version is shorter. I do not have a link to the UK version but though not identical it is similar https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=...4RTq1l-W0u
SP will have done something similar but no doubt shorter.

Regardless how convincing we are (or not) we should remember that all this is conjecture. I know I will not change anyone's notion that their conjecture is better than everyone else's version. But I hope that I can encourage participants to think about how BOTH armies and their commanders (and sub commanders) fought this campaign and the factors that affected them.

I will bow out now and leave the field to the academics.