09-24-2022, 09:47 PM
Owein Walker wrote
I have always thought this post, from the beginning !, has understated the difficulties Boudicca must have faced trying to keep her 'army' in the field and united during the campaign, how Suetonius would have used it in his advantage.
On one side we have fit disciplined soldiers, well led, with supplies and food, who really have nowhere else to go to, and on the other a thrown together mix of farmers, their families and some warriors
As I have said before I think that when SP heard of the uprising his immediate thought was to finish off the garrisoning of Anglesey and visit retribution on the Iceni and the Trinovantes for rebelling, by the most direct route and join with half of the Ninth taking the Fourteenth and half of the Second (possibly already with him) and lay waste the rebels homelands.
Normally where tribes had towns this was easy as the enemy was all in one place and a commander would march directly and destroy the town or an attacking army. This is what Cerialis did and was ambushed and overwhelmed, as the Brythons were expecting an immediate response from Rome and only had to wait by the Roman Roads to wait for a response.
As far as I am aware the Brythons never beat a Roman Army on the Battlefield, typically would use hit and run tactics and were only successful when using guerrilla tactics in ambuscades. Against a formal organised force they were defeated but unless trapped, dispersed and re-emerged later.
The tribes could put a lot of warriors in the field and certainly some would have been farmers in this type of conflict an d land repossession but although Tacitus mentions wives in the wagons this is unproven and they may have been single women driving the wagons therefore the association with families is also unproven, This was not a migration.
My conjecture is that when SP reached Wroxeter he heard of the loss of the Ninth and possibly the loss of Colchester or at least a request from Catus for troops.
It would seem logical that by going down Watling Street he could take his army to St Albans and protect the Roman Citizens there and also go down to London to protect Roman assets and get the latest information from Catus who unfortunately in the meantime had decamped to Gaul by ship/s so must have been aware of the carnage in Colchester.
SP marched down Watling Street depleting the food stocks at each Roman fort as he went through.
On arrival at St Albans he rested the majority of his troops, garrisoned the town and took the cavalry and some mounted troops to London to gain information and try to understand the situation in the East and to add troops to Catus’ force before marching on the Iceni and Trinovantes.
The Brythons were not there even though it had been many days since they had destroyed Colchester because London was not that important to them as they did not rely on trade with Rome from London but from the port near Colchester at Fingringhoe.
So after the sacking of Colchester the tribes went back to their homelands as they wanted to eject the people who had taken their lands and to be prepared for the attack on their homelands that they had every right to expect as a standard Roman tactic by SP.
Once they realised that SP was in London with a small force, they fully mobilised their army but SP retreated to St Albans taking grain and weapons with him and burning the warehouses at Southwark and burning the bridge before going back to St Albans.
Why wouldn't SP go South over the Thames?
His information that he relied on was faulty and he had been caught out by the Iceni and the Trinovantes and really did not know who he could rely on as allies. Could the Cantiaci be trusted, were the Atrebates still on Rome’s side? How would the Catuvellauni react? Could he be ambushed (Tacitus makes it clear that SP was concerned over this).
30,000 of his troops were north of the Thames and to the West and on the northern edge of the Midlands, he needed to get back to strength but also needed to understand how Boudica was going to react.
Would she be content to stay in her homelands or want to exact revenge on Rome.
In turn Boudica could not move until she saw what SP was going to do and once she saw him retreat from London was able to move her forces to attack him as he no longer posed a threat to her lands.
Her forces moved into London and in their disappointment at missing SP and not able to get food when they reached London, they destroyed it as they had Colchester and after a couple of days pursued SP to St Albans but again missed him as he left with the civilians.
Renatus wrote:
When it became clear that the rebels were advancing towards him (at St Albans) , he withdrew westwards abandoning the Akeman Street junction and would allow the rebels to block troops coming from the west. Taking a position there would still allow troops from the north to reach him, depending upon how far down Watling Street they had progressed. They could branch off on to the Icknield Way at Dunstable, which would bring them to Aston Clinton just west of Tring, or they could turn on to the Fosse Way at High Cross and thence to Cirencester and on to Akeman Street or they could turn on to Ryknield Street at Letocetum (Wall) and join the Fosse north of Cirencester. He would still be within scouting distance of the rebels as they approached St. Albans. If the rebels advanced further towards him along Akeman Street, as I believe they did, he could withdraw further westwards towards Alchester. This would mean abandoning the Aston Clinton junction but the northern troops would still have the Fosse Way and Ryknield Street options.
This explanation is, as Michael says, a re-iteration of Nathans statements and placing the battle site near Tring which allows access from “surrounding stations”.
By choosing his battle position next to the Icknield Way SP, forces Boudica to attack him as she cannot leave him there to threaten her lands if he stays, gets re-inforcements and is re-supplied ready to march up the Icknield way straight into Iceni heartlands
In his turn SP needed to confront the Brythons whilst they were all in one place to inflict as much damage as he could with his limited resources on the rebels.
He has already waited for them to follow him and now has chosen the battle site in the Chilterns.
I have spent a considerable amount of time looking at the valleys and defiles in the area on Google Earth and have visited the area around Tring.
My original placements were at Chivery and Hastoe and the surrounds but although it is possible after considerable debate here, I feel that it is not feasible so I have looked at a number of other sites in the area as follows including:
Wendover, Aston Clinton, The Gade valley near Frithsden, The vale below Ivinghoe Beacon, Aldbury and NewGround (Nathan’s preferred site) and
Pitstone Hill
Surprisingly although from Tacitus’ description of the site there would appear to be a number of options, his description is remarkably specific from a topographical point of view.
It is that access to the battle field is by a defile or a strip of land from a plain and on the other side of the battlefield there is a defile with woods behind it, that was large enough for 10,000 men and horses to charge out of.
Of all the sites that have been listed, the one at Pitstone Hill is the only one that fits the topography in this area (and most other proposed sites) and that doesn’t totally depend on the wagons being the only reason why the outcome was a military success for SP.
At Pitstone Hill there is a natural ampitheatre with two entrances, one that is like a tongue of land entering and the exit in a valley reaching up to 180 feet above the valley floor, that even today is wooded at the rear.
As this is a natural ampitheatre there are hills surrounding the battle site and there are only two ways off the battleground either past the Roman lines or back down the spit of land to the Aylesbury plain.
As Tacitus makes clear, SP is wary of an ambush (after what happened to the Ninth and also what had happened to Varus). It is my contention that SP did not go down Akeman Street but left St Albans and travelled up the Gade Valley, to avoid the roman road network, where there is plenty of water and which links to the Icknield Way.
At Ivinghoe Beacon he turned west along the Icknield Way towards Aston Clinton and went up into the valley at Pitstone Hill and prepared the site from which he could see that there were no enemies behind him and he had the whole of the battlesite and the plain to observe the enemy following him.
It was rare that the Brythons were brought to a formal battle and it was key that SP was able to cripple the Brythons with a heavy defeat otherwise they would only disperse, re-group and continue to harass him, as was normal, when he was on the road back to Cirencester.
At the ampitheatre at Pitstone, the hills surrounding the battlefield effectively means that once a few thousand Brythons enter, the entrance becomes a bottle neck if the Brythons performed their usual tactic of retreating back through it to fight another day. SP would have understood this and chosen the site carefully.
This may have been why he delayed to find the right site and also to ensure that Boudica would follow him.
The Brythons in their turn would have been wary but as they were pursuing what looked like a defeated Roman column that was holed up in a valley that they knew and not in the most favoured position, where the Roman army was at the base of a long slope, they were probably confident.
SP on the other hand was at the base of the slope so that when the two armies met at the charge it would be difficult for the Brythons to retreat quickly and chaos would ensue when they were charged.
It was the hills surrounding the battlefield that trapped the Brythons and funnelled them back to the entrance as SP planned but it was made worse by the baggage train that was pulled up around that battlefield, from where they were expecting to see the defeat of the Roman army.
I have always thought this post, from the beginning !, has understated the difficulties Boudicca must have faced trying to keep her 'army' in the field and united during the campaign, how Suetonius would have used it in his advantage.
On one side we have fit disciplined soldiers, well led, with supplies and food, who really have nowhere else to go to, and on the other a thrown together mix of farmers, their families and some warriors
As I have said before I think that when SP heard of the uprising his immediate thought was to finish off the garrisoning of Anglesey and visit retribution on the Iceni and the Trinovantes for rebelling, by the most direct route and join with half of the Ninth taking the Fourteenth and half of the Second (possibly already with him) and lay waste the rebels homelands.
Normally where tribes had towns this was easy as the enemy was all in one place and a commander would march directly and destroy the town or an attacking army. This is what Cerialis did and was ambushed and overwhelmed, as the Brythons were expecting an immediate response from Rome and only had to wait by the Roman Roads to wait for a response.
As far as I am aware the Brythons never beat a Roman Army on the Battlefield, typically would use hit and run tactics and were only successful when using guerrilla tactics in ambuscades. Against a formal organised force they were defeated but unless trapped, dispersed and re-emerged later.
The tribes could put a lot of warriors in the field and certainly some would have been farmers in this type of conflict an d land repossession but although Tacitus mentions wives in the wagons this is unproven and they may have been single women driving the wagons therefore the association with families is also unproven, This was not a migration.
My conjecture is that when SP reached Wroxeter he heard of the loss of the Ninth and possibly the loss of Colchester or at least a request from Catus for troops.
It would seem logical that by going down Watling Street he could take his army to St Albans and protect the Roman Citizens there and also go down to London to protect Roman assets and get the latest information from Catus who unfortunately in the meantime had decamped to Gaul by ship/s so must have been aware of the carnage in Colchester.
SP marched down Watling Street depleting the food stocks at each Roman fort as he went through.
On arrival at St Albans he rested the majority of his troops, garrisoned the town and took the cavalry and some mounted troops to London to gain information and try to understand the situation in the East and to add troops to Catus’ force before marching on the Iceni and Trinovantes.
The Brythons were not there even though it had been many days since they had destroyed Colchester because London was not that important to them as they did not rely on trade with Rome from London but from the port near Colchester at Fingringhoe.
So after the sacking of Colchester the tribes went back to their homelands as they wanted to eject the people who had taken their lands and to be prepared for the attack on their homelands that they had every right to expect as a standard Roman tactic by SP.
Once they realised that SP was in London with a small force, they fully mobilised their army but SP retreated to St Albans taking grain and weapons with him and burning the warehouses at Southwark and burning the bridge before going back to St Albans.
Why wouldn't SP go South over the Thames?
His information that he relied on was faulty and he had been caught out by the Iceni and the Trinovantes and really did not know who he could rely on as allies. Could the Cantiaci be trusted, were the Atrebates still on Rome’s side? How would the Catuvellauni react? Could he be ambushed (Tacitus makes it clear that SP was concerned over this).
30,000 of his troops were north of the Thames and to the West and on the northern edge of the Midlands, he needed to get back to strength but also needed to understand how Boudica was going to react.
Would she be content to stay in her homelands or want to exact revenge on Rome.
In turn Boudica could not move until she saw what SP was going to do and once she saw him retreat from London was able to move her forces to attack him as he no longer posed a threat to her lands.
Her forces moved into London and in their disappointment at missing SP and not able to get food when they reached London, they destroyed it as they had Colchester and after a couple of days pursued SP to St Albans but again missed him as he left with the civilians.
Renatus wrote:
When it became clear that the rebels were advancing towards him (at St Albans) , he withdrew westwards abandoning the Akeman Street junction and would allow the rebels to block troops coming from the west. Taking a position there would still allow troops from the north to reach him, depending upon how far down Watling Street they had progressed. They could branch off on to the Icknield Way at Dunstable, which would bring them to Aston Clinton just west of Tring, or they could turn on to the Fosse Way at High Cross and thence to Cirencester and on to Akeman Street or they could turn on to Ryknield Street at Letocetum (Wall) and join the Fosse north of Cirencester. He would still be within scouting distance of the rebels as they approached St. Albans. If the rebels advanced further towards him along Akeman Street, as I believe they did, he could withdraw further westwards towards Alchester. This would mean abandoning the Aston Clinton junction but the northern troops would still have the Fosse Way and Ryknield Street options.
This explanation is, as Michael says, a re-iteration of Nathans statements and placing the battle site near Tring which allows access from “surrounding stations”.
By choosing his battle position next to the Icknield Way SP, forces Boudica to attack him as she cannot leave him there to threaten her lands if he stays, gets re-inforcements and is re-supplied ready to march up the Icknield way straight into Iceni heartlands
In his turn SP needed to confront the Brythons whilst they were all in one place to inflict as much damage as he could with his limited resources on the rebels.
He has already waited for them to follow him and now has chosen the battle site in the Chilterns.
I have spent a considerable amount of time looking at the valleys and defiles in the area on Google Earth and have visited the area around Tring.
My original placements were at Chivery and Hastoe and the surrounds but although it is possible after considerable debate here, I feel that it is not feasible so I have looked at a number of other sites in the area as follows including:
Wendover, Aston Clinton, The Gade valley near Frithsden, The vale below Ivinghoe Beacon, Aldbury and NewGround (Nathan’s preferred site) and
Pitstone Hill
Surprisingly although from Tacitus’ description of the site there would appear to be a number of options, his description is remarkably specific from a topographical point of view.
It is that access to the battle field is by a defile or a strip of land from a plain and on the other side of the battlefield there is a defile with woods behind it, that was large enough for 10,000 men and horses to charge out of.
Of all the sites that have been listed, the one at Pitstone Hill is the only one that fits the topography in this area (and most other proposed sites) and that doesn’t totally depend on the wagons being the only reason why the outcome was a military success for SP.
At Pitstone Hill there is a natural ampitheatre with two entrances, one that is like a tongue of land entering and the exit in a valley reaching up to 180 feet above the valley floor, that even today is wooded at the rear.
As this is a natural ampitheatre there are hills surrounding the battle site and there are only two ways off the battleground either past the Roman lines or back down the spit of land to the Aylesbury plain.
As Tacitus makes clear, SP is wary of an ambush (after what happened to the Ninth and also what had happened to Varus). It is my contention that SP did not go down Akeman Street but left St Albans and travelled up the Gade Valley, to avoid the roman road network, where there is plenty of water and which links to the Icknield Way.
At Ivinghoe Beacon he turned west along the Icknield Way towards Aston Clinton and went up into the valley at Pitstone Hill and prepared the site from which he could see that there were no enemies behind him and he had the whole of the battlesite and the plain to observe the enemy following him.
It was rare that the Brythons were brought to a formal battle and it was key that SP was able to cripple the Brythons with a heavy defeat otherwise they would only disperse, re-group and continue to harass him, as was normal, when he was on the road back to Cirencester.
At the ampitheatre at Pitstone, the hills surrounding the battlefield effectively means that once a few thousand Brythons enter, the entrance becomes a bottle neck if the Brythons performed their usual tactic of retreating back through it to fight another day. SP would have understood this and chosen the site carefully.
This may have been why he delayed to find the right site and also to ensure that Boudica would follow him.
The Brythons in their turn would have been wary but as they were pursuing what looked like a defeated Roman column that was holed up in a valley that they knew and not in the most favoured position, where the Roman army was at the base of a long slope, they were probably confident.
SP on the other hand was at the base of the slope so that when the two armies met at the charge it would be difficult for the Brythons to retreat quickly and chaos would ensue when they were charged.
It was the hills surrounding the battlefield that trapped the Brythons and funnelled them back to the entrance as SP planned but it was made worse by the baggage train that was pulled up around that battlefield, from where they were expecting to see the defeat of the Roman army.
Deryk
