10-03-2022, 03:55 PM
Nathan refers to the literal translation by Michael.
34. At this time, the 14th legion, with the veterans of the 20th, and auxiliaries from the nearest, almost 10,000 soldiers, were with Suetonius, when he determined to abandon delay and to join battle. And he chose a “position in” a narrow defile and closed at the rear by a wood, with sufficient knowledge there to be none of the enemy unless in front and an open plain, without fear of ambush. Therefore, the regular legionary stood in ranks, the light-armed all around, the massed cavalry on the wings.
The issue here is that other translations state :
34. Suetonius had the fourteenth legion with the veterans of the twentieth, and auxiliaries from the neighbourhood, to the number of about ten thousand armed men, when he prepared to break off delay and fight a battle. He chose a “position approached by” a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest, having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front, where an open plain extended without any danger from ambuscades.
There is a world of difference between “position in” and “position approached by”.
It is also interesting when Tacitus describes the defiles in separate places he does not use the same expression or words.
I agree that the Roman line was indeed in a defile as it gave the army a limited front on which to be attacked but I find it equally difficult to think that SP (one of the greatest generals of his generation) would have relied on blind luck to defeat this rebellion.
We have said many times that SP was cautious and thorough and unlike Cerialis not impulsive.
The wagons encircling the plain was a lucky co-incidence which helped delay the retreat but without the wagons being in a particular formation, SP would have failed.
Yet we know that SP had to inflict a serious and crippling blow and I am convinced that was his intention, not just as a survival mechanism because he could have retreated to Cirencester easily before the Brythons arrived at St Albans even with the refugees from London and St Albans.
This was also a once in a lifetime opportunity to have so many Brythons in one place and not scattered throughout the lands. An opportunity to defeat them once and for all.
As SP had great experience of fighting in mountainous regions (having crossed the Atlas Mountains with an army previously) I maintain that he would have used the topography to help him defeat his enemy.
If the Brythons were just to inhabit an open plain even with the wagons surrounding it, the vast majority of warriors would have escaped as they typically did in most of the engagements with all generals from Caesar to Seutonius unless they were trapped as with Caractacus and the recent success at Anglesey where the Brytons could not get disperse.
Pitstone Hill fits the topography and the description with no need for inclusion of the wagons and this cannot be said of many other sites.
34. At this time, the 14th legion, with the veterans of the 20th, and auxiliaries from the nearest, almost 10,000 soldiers, were with Suetonius, when he determined to abandon delay and to join battle. And he chose a “position in” a narrow defile and closed at the rear by a wood, with sufficient knowledge there to be none of the enemy unless in front and an open plain, without fear of ambush. Therefore, the regular legionary stood in ranks, the light-armed all around, the massed cavalry on the wings.
The issue here is that other translations state :
34. Suetonius had the fourteenth legion with the veterans of the twentieth, and auxiliaries from the neighbourhood, to the number of about ten thousand armed men, when he prepared to break off delay and fight a battle. He chose a “position approached by” a narrow defile, closed in at the rear by a forest, having first ascertained that there was not a soldier of the enemy except in his front, where an open plain extended without any danger from ambuscades.
There is a world of difference between “position in” and “position approached by”.
It is also interesting when Tacitus describes the defiles in separate places he does not use the same expression or words.
I agree that the Roman line was indeed in a defile as it gave the army a limited front on which to be attacked but I find it equally difficult to think that SP (one of the greatest generals of his generation) would have relied on blind luck to defeat this rebellion.
We have said many times that SP was cautious and thorough and unlike Cerialis not impulsive.
The wagons encircling the plain was a lucky co-incidence which helped delay the retreat but without the wagons being in a particular formation, SP would have failed.
Yet we know that SP had to inflict a serious and crippling blow and I am convinced that was his intention, not just as a survival mechanism because he could have retreated to Cirencester easily before the Brythons arrived at St Albans even with the refugees from London and St Albans.
This was also a once in a lifetime opportunity to have so many Brythons in one place and not scattered throughout the lands. An opportunity to defeat them once and for all.
As SP had great experience of fighting in mountainous regions (having crossed the Atlas Mountains with an army previously) I maintain that he would have used the topography to help him defeat his enemy.
If the Brythons were just to inhabit an open plain even with the wagons surrounding it, the vast majority of warriors would have escaped as they typically did in most of the engagements with all generals from Caesar to Seutonius unless they were trapped as with Caractacus and the recent success at Anglesey where the Brytons could not get disperse.
Pitstone Hill fits the topography and the description with no need for inclusion of the wagons and this cannot be said of many other sites.
Deryk
