02-12-2023, 11:38 AM
Hello Allan,
Thanks again for supplying this military perspective on the Boudican campaign. I would like to make it clear that I have enjoyed thinking of the summary provided and I do appreciate the effort involved. Thank you again.
I expect some of the following questions and points might be answered in the larger paper I hope you do make available.
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
1) Suetonius assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. You don't say what news triggered this event but I assume it to be because the Iceni, "kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory ", i.e. the Iceni revolt.
2) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and besiege them in their forts.
3) The Iceni start to muster the levy.
4) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
5) Meanwhile Suetonius, with his field army, marches to London via St. Albans.
6) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so.
7) Suetonius arrives in London.
8) Only the Trinovantes are now marching on London.
9) The Iceni muster is now complete and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th. Suetonius marches north again to contest this (the counterstroke?)
10) Suetonius arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica.
11) The Iceni are defeated somewhere "not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged ".
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their territory, or borders, while the Trinovantes aggressively prosecute the revolt? Surely combined aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
Now for some other points.
a) The summary says that Tacitus writes that Boudica had 120,000 at the final battle but I cannot find such a figure. There is only mention of 80,000 dead rebels.
b) The summary has the Roman force at the battle, "drawn up in at least two maybe three lines". This may be problematic. Given 5,000 legionaries (a common supposition), and each occupying a line width of c. 1 m, then the Roman line in the defile would be 2.5 to 1.66 km long. Those are long and thin lines for facing a charging horde because there are probably insufficient men in the rear ranks using their shields to brace those in front - the line may be breached on the first, massed charge. This issue is important because it helps define the size or width of the defile and could/has been used to search for likely battle sites.
c) The idea that the 'wives' etc. were at the final battle because the Iceni were, or had been, thinking of migrating is interesting. My assumption has been that the wagons and carts etc. were to support the many warriors with provisions because the horde's ability to sustain itself by scavenging would be quite limited. Plus, if the Iceni were intent on migration then they had an opportunity after the 9th was driven back to its forts - the way was then open to the north where they probably would still have starved because I don't expect the locals would have food reserves sufficient to feed themselves and their new guests. But, maybe the Iceni were intent on migration and conquest, thinking they could more easily defeat another tribe rather than the Romans - but then why besiege the 9th? In conclusion, I'm sceptical.
This seems a good point to stop scribbling.
Regards, Steve Kaye
Thanks again for supplying this military perspective on the Boudican campaign. I would like to make it clear that I have enjoyed thinking of the summary provided and I do appreciate the effort involved. Thank you again.
I expect some of the following questions and points might be answered in the larger paper I hope you do make available.
It seems that your sequence of events differs from that which is commonly accepted (barring some details). Have I interpreted the following correctly?
1) Suetonius assembles his field army to march on the Iceni. You don't say what news triggered this event but I assume it to be because the Iceni, "kill or besiege the Procurator’s force somewhere in Iceni territory ", i.e. the Iceni revolt.
2) The Iceni household troops destroy the 9th as a field unit and besiege them in their forts.
3) The Iceni start to muster the levy.
4) The Trinovantes now - separately - attack and destroy Colchester.
5) Meanwhile Suetonius, with his field army, marches to London via St. Albans.
6) Simultaneously, the 2nd Legion and Cogidubnus should march to London. Only Cogidubnus does so.
7) Suetonius arrives in London.
8) Only the Trinovantes are now marching on London.
9) The Iceni muster is now complete and is preparing to destroy the remains of the 9th. Suetonius marches north again to contest this (the counterstroke?)
10) Suetonius arrives at his chosen battle site and awaits/lures Boudica.
11) The Iceni are defeated somewhere "not far from St Albans or between St Albans and the Northern Frontier forts (Lincoln?) if they were being besieged ".
If I have understood your sequence then you have the 9th destroyed before Colchester is sacked. But, Tacitus writes, "The victorious enemy [having already destroyed Colchester] met Petilius Cerialis, commander of the ninth legion, as he was coming to the rescue [of Colchester], routed his troops, and destroyed all his infantry." That is, Colchester was destroyed before the 9th was attacked and, by textual implication at least, by the same rebels that attacked Colchester. In addition, it seems improbable that Cerialis would march south other than to aid Colchester, unless he was ordered to London by Suetonius and started too early. I think you may have an incorrect sequencing of events but I do agree that the Iceni alone might have routed the 9th.
In your account [my points 2 and 9 above] the Iceni besiege the 9th but Tacitus writes, "for the barbarians, who delighted in plunder and were indifferent to all else, passed by the fortresses with military garrisons, and attacked whatever offered most wealth to the spoiler, and was unsafe for defence.". Admittedly this is written after the account of the destruction of London and St. Albans but I think it may apply to the general conduct of the rebel forces. Can you explain why you think the Iceni besieged the 9th, and so anchored themselves to their territory, which also implies that you think only the Trinovantes attacked London [my point 8 above].
All of which raises a further question. Why in your account do the Iceni behave differently to the Trinovantes? If I have correctly understood your account then it is the Trinovantes alone who destroy Colchester, London and St. Albans; meanwhile the Iceni rout the 9th and then behave passively by besieging the 9th within, or nearby, to their own territory. Meanwhile the Trinovantes are marching aggressively on London, possibly knowing Suetonius is there with his field army. And why do the Trinovantes not continue to march after Suetonious once he leaves London/St. Albans and attempt to link up with the Iceni (or maybe they do but it's not written of in this summary)?
The last question raises another aspect, namely, in your account Suetonius eventually destroys only Boudica and the Iceni at the main battle. Most accounts of the final battle have both the Iceni and Trinovantes at the last battle in part because Tacitus writes of Boudica's speech before the battle when she, "went up to tribe after tribe", i.e. the Iceni were not alone.
Is it your estimation that had both the Iceni and Trinovantes been at the final battle then the Romans would have been defeated by the combined tribal numbers (200,000 according to your figures)?
Much of the above troubles me less than the psychological differences between the Trinovantes and the Iceni hinted at in your assessment and which leads to very different actions by both. What is it in the Combat Estimate that creates this difference? Why are the Iceni pinning themselves into their territory, or borders, while the Trinovantes aggressively prosecute the revolt? Surely combined aggression to destroy Suetonius is the only outcome that offers the tribes a chance of success, i.e. to live in land they own and control.
Furthermore, their own history should have taught the Iceni that a passive strategy when in revolt against the Romans leads to defeat; in 47 AD the Iceni and surrounding tribes revolted, formed a defensive position, probably in Iceni territory, and were then defeated by Roman auxiliaries. They probably were then forced to disarm. Surely that was a recent lesson in passivity that the Iceni would have absorbed. Maybe the Trinovantes did.
Talking of psychology, I'd like now to consider how the Combat Estimate decides that Suetonius, while in London, decided to march on the Iceni.
My civilian mind assesses the loss of both the 9th and 2nd and concludes that prudence dictates any move other than marching with the intention of engaging the rebels. And, would not Suetonius want to give himself time to take control of the 2nd, amongst a host of other desires, and bring that unit into the field army before any battle with the rebels? Instead your account states, "Hearing that the Iceni have completed their muster and may now be moving to destroy the 9th Legion he heads north again." But there is circularity here! The ability and desire to move north and engage the Iceni is predestined by the passivity of the Iceni in besieging the 9th. If, instead, in the Combat Estimate the Iceni were given the aggression of the Trinovantes, then the modelled Suetonious might not have marched north - he probably would not have the option!
Furthermore, Tacitus relates that Suetonius took within the field army any London civilians who could keep up, but, as a civilian, I find it very difficult to envisage these civilians wanting to march towards the enemy and a likely battle. And, why would Suetonius, under the circumstances outlined in the Combat Estimate, burden his army in this manner. Plus, I cannot think of any historical event where civilians purposefully march towards enemies, even if accompanied by allies.
As most who will be reading this already know I have written reams of reasons - cons and pros - for nearly all marching directions out of London, so I'll stop discussing it here.
A non-specific question: does the 21st Century Combat Estimate methodology assess the outcomes of the Boudican revolt/campaign based on a 21st century modern/mechanised army (say British) dealing with a 21st century tribal insurrection (say Afghan)?
Now for some other points.
a) The summary says that Tacitus writes that Boudica had 120,000 at the final battle but I cannot find such a figure. There is only mention of 80,000 dead rebels.
b) The summary has the Roman force at the battle, "drawn up in at least two maybe three lines". This may be problematic. Given 5,000 legionaries (a common supposition), and each occupying a line width of c. 1 m, then the Roman line in the defile would be 2.5 to 1.66 km long. Those are long and thin lines for facing a charging horde because there are probably insufficient men in the rear ranks using their shields to brace those in front - the line may be breached on the first, massed charge. This issue is important because it helps define the size or width of the defile and could/has been used to search for likely battle sites.
c) The idea that the 'wives' etc. were at the final battle because the Iceni were, or had been, thinking of migrating is interesting. My assumption has been that the wagons and carts etc. were to support the many warriors with provisions because the horde's ability to sustain itself by scavenging would be quite limited. Plus, if the Iceni were intent on migration then they had an opportunity after the 9th was driven back to its forts - the way was then open to the north where they probably would still have starved because I don't expect the locals would have food reserves sufficient to feed themselves and their new guests. But, maybe the Iceni were intent on migration and conquest, thinking they could more easily defeat another tribe rather than the Romans - but then why besiege the 9th? In conclusion, I'm sceptical.
This seems a good point to stop scribbling.
Regards, Steve Kaye
