The Fractured Phalanx

[hoplite14gr]

Paul is right. If phalangites have to defend themselves with the sword its over.

Some points. Close order drill with weapons is something that (non mentally challenged)people learn in maximum of 2 weeks. (ask ant sargent)

:!: Note: A phalangited needs to overcome "the fear of the large weapon during" the drill
It took 2 days for me.
Poorly trained troops afraid of their weapon is in my opinion the reason why Mithridatic phalangites "cut and run" in Chaeronia (2nd Cheronia that is)

Closly packed phalanxes coming together head on: Hoplites versus pike men.
1. First mistake: we tend to assume that fine horzontal lines of shafts coming in contact with the enemy. Wrong :!: Let me tell you that they come in contact at various angles.

Which means that rear rankers can attempt to cause wounds among the down openings of the synaspismos while their comraids hold the hoplites "pinned" with their pikes.
Hoplites cannot reach pike men and as normal human beings they will stop trying to futilely endure the pike jabs and run away. Trying to disengage from synaspismos (lots of fun :twisted

2. Second mistake: enemies come in contact gradually while marching at each other. Wrong:!: You can attack at a jog. The war cry "A-li-la-li-la-li-lai" helped... a lot!.
I have tried it. It works. That means pike men can gain momentum against hoplites

Hoplites can better resist the pikemen and suffer more heavily because of that.


Battle of Atrax: Legioneries entering from a breeched wall decided to get out as fast as possible rather than engaging a pike phalanax covering the road with its flankes secured from the buildings.

3 major battles od swordsmen vs pikemen. In two cases we have turned flank and by roman allies (Aetolians). In the 3rd case we have an incompetent commander who created gaps in his line on his own (Magnesia 191)

Kind regards

[PMBardunias]

2. Second mistake: enemies come in contact gradually while marching at each other. Wrong:!: You can attack at a jog. The war cry "A-li-la-li-la-li-lai" helped... a lot!.
I have tried it. It works. That means pike men can gain momentum against hoplites

Have you done this in files of 8? Have you actually hit something at the end of the charge? How you keep from stabbing the men behind you with your sauroter? You'd either have to be be very close within the file or pretty far apart. If you jog into a collision, don't you pile up and foul each other if you are formed in close files?

There is a misconception that a phalanx could not pull-up out of a charge in good order, but that is false. It is based though on what probably would happen if close files collides with something. Normally in pulling up, the second man simply has to match his decrease in speed to the front man, etc. He only needs enough space between them to allow him to mentally process the change in speed of the man in front and respond accordingly. You do this in your car at every red light. But if the first man is abrubtly stopped, the second man cannot match this deceleration on his own and usually collides.

[Ghostmojo]

... But if the first man is abrubtly stopped, the second man cannot match this deceleration on his own and usually collides

Which might not have been such a problem with the Theban Sacred Band! :lol:

[Paullus Scipio]

Paul B. wrote:

Have you done this in files of 8? Have you actually hit something at the end of the charge? How you keep from stabbing the men behind you with your sauroter? You'd either have to be be very close within the file or pretty far apart. If you jog into a collision, don't you pile up and foul each other if you are formed in close files?

Peter Connolly performed experiments with 16 sets of pelta and sarissa he had made up for the purpose, utilising some English Civil War 'pikemen'.(published in JRMES 11, 2000 pp103-112).
His results support much of what Stefanos refers to, and to answer your questions( save actually charging into something, which probably never happened anyway):-
1. The sauroter to the rear was never a problem, at the standard distances prescribed in the manuals, incuding 'synaspismos' of one cubit.
2. It is very doubtful if 'collisions' took place - men ( unless they are berserkers of legend only) instinctively pull up, as do horses.Connolly's pikemen were able to individually thrust hard for about a cubit/18"/45 cm.
3. The most difficult thing to do was 'wheeling', and they concluded it would have required intensive drill to wheel a 'speira'.

Connolly had not intended on his first outing to "charge" with his 'sarissaphoroi', but the pikemen found all the evolutions of the manuals easy to perform, readily 'doubling' from 'normal' formation of four cubits/6'/180 cm to 'pyknosis'/close order of two cubits per man, then again to 'synaspismos'/locked shields at 1 cubit per man. However the pikemen, having formed into pyknosis, then advanced and spontaneously broke into a run and charged in formation.

[Astiryu1]

Have you done this in files of 8? Have you actually hit something at the end of the charge? How you keep from stabbing the men behind you with your sauroter? You'd either have to be be very close within the file or pretty far apart. If you jog into a collision, don't you pile up and foul each other if you are formed in close files?

Um... a downward strike at the end of the charge is one way to avoid "friendly fire". The sarouter would be angled above the head of the man behind you and so on. The men that couldn't reach(if any) could hold their spear vertically so as not to harm their allies. I would also say they could plant their sarouter in the ground for a better base but all of this is theory regardless.:grin: So I will stop now.

Sorry! I got ahead of myself. I was meaning for a Hoplite Phalanx not a Macedonian one.:oops:

[Paralus]

A rather intriguing thread about a rather intractable subject! Macedon’s lament with respect to the many theories is shared by myself. The ancient sources are never really interested in describing the minutiae of phalanx warfare with standard literary topos in the ascendancy (“cut to pieces in hand to hand combat” or “fell upon them heavily” are two favourites).

Similarly, the idea that later Macedonian phalangites were somehow less capable than Philip or Alexander's is also an over-simplification. To begin with, few armies campaigned as constantly as Alexander's army (335-323 BC) and gained the experience ( or rather the survivors of them, as Paralus has pointed out to me) of constant warfare for a dozen years. Hellenistic armies reverted to part-time militias, with only elite Guards units being full-time. Even so, the later phalanxes performed just as well as earlier ones […]I am of the belief that factors in combat are so complex that one has to examine any given army in a given campaign, even a given battle, to analyse the myriad factors affecting combat power, or the outcome of a particular battle or skirmish.......

This plays into training that Stephanos/hoplite14gr mentioned earlier. Whilst I do not discount re-enactment, it needs to be remembered that no one is planning to run anyone through with a sarissa: the re-enactment is not combat and things will likely have been rather different with the pointy end of a sarissa aimed at one’s vitals!

The point above about Alexander’s constant campaigning is most pertinent. Added to that is the fact that a good percentage of the troops he took east had fought under Philip (the hypaspists certainly). The descriptions of this army from about 330 onwards – most particularly the Bactrian / Soghdian rebellion and the invasion of India – reveal an army frighteningly adept at slaughter and, in the Malli case, near extermination. This is evidence of a “cold” or “comfortable” attitude to killing – one of those “myriad factors”. Armies possessing soldiers with that calm matter of fact attitude are difficult to defeat. Antigonus’ fresh levies from Macedon found this to their cost over 317/16.

The point about “part time militias” is largely true and explains the attitude adopted by Ptolemy Philopater at Raphia: his army had not been used in anger for near a generation and had just undergone a crash-course in drill and training over the winter. Still, his generals felt it better to adopt a more defensive posture against a Seleucid force that had been in serious action.

Later actions between Philip's pikemen and hoplites do seem to have had a tendency toward stalemate along the heavy-armed front, with the spearmen perhaps now being held more effectively at bay by longer (15-foot?) pikes. In these actions, resolution fell upon the cavalry (Thessalian light-horse at Crocus Plain for example) or was achieved by an unusual infantry maneuver (the false retreat at Chaeronea fits here). This was a pattern that seems to have persisted through Alexander's engagements against hoplite opposition and quite possibly for a while into the Successor Wars as well (though those not in favor of the significant presence of Macedonian hoplites would no doubt argue against the latter).

The notion of stalemate and hoplite / Macedonian phalanx battles being a long contested struggle more likely than not comes from the literary topos referred to above. Chaeronea is a classic example: “…the battle was hotly contested for a long time and many fell on both sides, so that for a while the struggle permitted hopes of victory to both” (Diod. 16.86.2). Thus the impression is conveyed that the allied hoplites contested and killed for a considerable period of time. This may be true but it is well to bear in mind Diodorus’ lexicon of lines:

13.8.1 (Syracuse) “…and although many were slain on both sides, victory lay with the Athenians.”

15.55.4 (Leuctra) “As they met in hand-to hand combat, at first both fought ardently and the battle was evenly poised…”

15.86.4 (Mantinea 362) “As the battle raged severely for a long time and the conflict took no turn in favour of either side…”

16.4.6 (Philip / Bardyllis) “And at first for a long while the battle was evenly poised because of the exceeding gallantry displayed on both sides, and as many were slain and still more wounded, the fortune of battle vacillated first one way then the other, being constantly swayed by the valorous deeds of the combatants.”

17.11.5 (Thebes) “Many were wounded in both armies and not a few fell facing the blows of the enemy…”

2.18.4 (The fictitious Semiramis) “The struggle raged for a long time and both sides fought spiritedly…”

17.33.5 (Issos) “By now the rest of the cavalry on both sides was engaged and many were killed as the battle raged indecisively because of the evenly matched fighting qualities of the two sides. The scales inclined now one way, now another, as the lines swayed alternately forward and backward…”

19.30.5 (Paraetecene) “…it so happened that the infantry for a considerable time had been engaged in a battle of phalanxes, but finally, after many had fallen on both sides…”

The overall tone of these “standard” descriptions is of long / hotly contested battles where many were killed on both sides during what is, to all intents and purposes, a “stalemate” of kill and counter-kill. Whether or not this reflects reality is problematic: there is definitely a “rote” tone to the standard Diodoran language.

On the length of sarissae, I do not know of any compelling evidence that the sarissa was lengthened for India. Other than Lane-Fox, who assumes the sarissa was never used in India (contrary to the evidence), I don’t know that anyone has suggested a lengthening. The only direct evidence is the mention by Alexander that the long Macedonian spears (sarissae) would never suit the Macedonians better than in this battle (Curtius from memory). That does not mean that these weapons had been spefically lengthened for the campaign. The only mention of different weaponry is that of Curtius who notes (from memory) “axes” and curved swords for the elephants.

Chaeronea, Granicus, and Issus are but three examples (involving the Great Alexander himself) where a Hoplite phalanx and a pike phalanx were fairly evenly matched, and in all three cases it was tactical advantage that decided the issue, not 'superior' weaponry.

Not certain of Granicus: the Greek mercenaries were surrounded by the Macedonians and put to the sarissa and kopis in something of a prelude to Hydaspes.

As I think you noted, all the “grand battles” probably deserve to be looked at individually – certainly Issus. Although there is still debate about the river involved, what is clear is that the phalanx centre-right had to cross a particularly difficult stretch. The “charge” of the hypaspists, cavalry and light troops of the right left them behind somewhat. Into the fractured phalanx streamed the mercenary Greeks. The Macedonian casualties are certainly glossed by Callisthenes and possibly underestimated by Curtius. The “professionalism” of the Macedonian right – hypaspists and cavalry – swinging left (clearly planned) won the day. It was, as best can be restored from the descriptions, run again at Gaugamela where the “wedge” of hypaspists, cavalry and light troops (possibly Coenus’ brigade as well) drove into the Persian lines and almost certainly made for Darius to their left.

It might have been interesting to see what the Greeks of Issus might have done on a field such as Gaugamela.

My views on the employment of the hypaspists under Alexander are well aired. As Paullus notes, they were no flank guard but an integral part of the phalanx battle line. A common view is that these troops formed the “link” to the cavalry and that may be so.

What is clear – and here Heckel’s “Macedonian Cursus Honorum” is the go to – is that two distinct groups existed within this corps: the “regular” hypaspists and the agema. The smaller agema, a unit of the sons of the nobility, are the “king’s hypaspists” or guard and are the hetairoi that took the breach at Tyre with Alexander. My suspicion – for some time – is that these are the hypaspists in the immediate vicinity of the king (“the young noblemen who formed his usual retinue” as Curtius 8.2.35 describes) and “hoplite armed” whilst the regular hypaspists (the argyraspids), in the phalanx line, were normally sarissa armed.

If Heckel and Habicht are correct in their interpretation of IG II² 561, then Alexander IV and Philip III were voted somatophylakes at Triparadeisos – the former three and the latter four. This would indicate that as well as the paides basilikoi attested for Alexander IV, both he and Philip had the full Macedonian “protectorate”. Thus, at Triparadeisos, the regular hypaspists (the argyraspids) are “demobbed” to satrapal duties and the noble agema will have stayed with the kings whilst a new corps of regulars are appointed one suspects.

[PMBardunias]

My suspicion – for some time – is that these are the hypaspists in the immediate vicinity of the king (“the young noblemen who formed his usual retinue” as Curtius 8.2.35 describes) and “hoplite armed” whilst the regular hypaspists (the argyraspids), in the phalanx line, were normally sarissa armed.

If we accept, and I think many do, that sarissaphoroi were a means of creating cheap hoplite-equivalents out of the mass of Macedonians, jumped up peltasts that could stand against hoplites, then it is reasonable that there was a core of rich men who could afford hoplite panoply and fought as such. This would naturally have been an elite unit.

[Ghostmojo]

Speaking of grand battles, specifically between hoplite and phalangite formations, of this period; I can't help but wonder about one of the greatest encounters in terms of numbers, and yet something that is so little known about - that being the Battle of Megalopolis in 331BC between Antipater and Agis III. It was one of the last great land battles of old Greece, in old Greece; with considerable forces deployed by either side. Although the Makedonian/Allied force of around 40,000 (possibly higher) almost doubled its Spartan/Elian/Arkadian opponents; the restricted nature of the field seemed to have neutered the numerical advantage of the former somewhat. Again it appears to have been a long and drawn out affair, but with casualties relatively speaking, only slightly higher on the defeated side. The most well known facts about this battle seem to be the valiant end of Agis himself, and Alexander's typically dismissive and arrogant response upon hearing of it...

"It seems, my friends that while we have been conquering Darios here, there has been a battle of mice in Arkadia"

Does anybody know anything about an earlier encounter when the Makedonian commander at Corinth - one Corrhagos - was defeated by Agis, thus necessitating Antipater's journey southwards from Thrace?

[PMBardunias]

The battle was the culmination of Spartan/persian combined action against Alexander's line of supply. Initially the focus of the conflict was in Crete,and probably Agis recruited heavily there. The persian side evaporated with the loss of the Persian coast, but by then the Spartans held sway in the peloponnese and probably much of Crete.

Had the Spartans won, things would have gotten very hot for Alexander, but even if those poleis that were reluctant to join the revolt, like Athens, now did so, its hard to imagine that the coalition would have the political will to stay united long enough to do much. It would be interesting to see how Alexander reacted though.

I have a file of papers on the revolt and Agis because I plan on writing an article at some point. Contact me if you'd like them.

[Ghostmojo]

I agree, these confederate Greek coalitions didn't last very long on any occasion. The epithet my 'enemy's enemy is my friend' didn't amount to much when they changed their pals almost monthly. I believe most of the Greek mercenaries who escaped Alexander's Issos battle also joined up with Agis. Megalopolis sounds a bit like a Greek Waterloo - a damn close run thing ...

[Paralus]

The battle was the culmination of Spartan/persian combined action against Alexander's line of supply. Initially the focus of the conflict was in Crete,and probably Agis recruited heavily there.

The Persians may well have seen matters this way. They will have been happy for any assistance in their attempts to divert Alexander’s attention to a front closer to home. Whilst their direct attention was rather more focussed on recapturing the Ionian coastal littoral as well as the Aegean islands, money for Sparta’s Balkan ambitions also suited their purpose.

Although Agis campaigned in Crete mercenaries (as noted) and, more so, Persian money were the object. Agis was to be disappointed in the value of the latter.

The most well known facts about this battle seem to be the valiant end of Agis himself, and Alexander's typically dismissive and arrogant response upon hearing of it...

It likely pays not to put too much store in Alexander-centric sources painting the dashing young conqueror as blithely – near arrogantly – unconcerned. Our sources are much to be criticised – and here I refer particularly to Arrian – for the distinct lack of interest shown in what was clearly a matter of importance. Clues do exist that indicate Alexander’s concern. Amphoterus’ mission, much “lost in translation”, cries out for a coherent explanation. However it is cast, it indicates that the Spartan agitation in the Peloponnese was anything but a matter concerning “mice” to the king. The 3,000 talents sent to Antipater also speaks to this. Just on the derisory description, it is quite possible that later views of the House of Antipater colour this put-down of the Old Rope.

That the sources, including Arrian, devote little to this whilst preferring to shine the spotlight upon the world conqueror serves to minimise its importance and ramifications in the scheme of things. The lacuna in Curtius is much to be regretted.

Had the Spartans won, things would have gotten very hot for Alexander, but even if those poleis that were reluctant to join the revolt, like Athens, now did so, its hard to imagine that the coalition would have the political will to stay united long enough to do much. It would be interesting to see how Alexander reacted though.

Well that depends upon just exactly where the Spartans were taking this. Athens showed little interest: the missing city to her northwest, like a missing molar in an upper jaw, served as a constant reminder of the consequences. Sparta’s rhetoric was soaring but not quite so snow-white as to convince a majority of Greeks.

Just how far Sparta’s anti-Macedonian interest went is not easy to gauge. Her immediate, if not medium term, interest may not have been dissimilar to Aratus in the third century: the removal of Macedon from the Peloponnese and a “league” securely under her aegis. Certainly her advance upon Megalopolis and siege thereof indicated local priorities. It might be countered that this city, left alone, would be in her rear should Sparta move out of the Peleponnese. This view rests on the supposition that Megalopolis would mobilise against the anti-Macedonian “alliance” of Peloponnesian states which, surprisingly, included Tegea. That seems an unlikely event – particularly given the anti-Macedonian sentiment whipped up by Sparta. Sparta had left Megalopolis in her rear before and would do so again in the third century.

Demosthenes, although speaking in 353/2, will have summed up many a Greek view still pertinent twenty years later (Dem:16.20):

Now I know, as far as reasoning and conjecture can teach me, and I think that most of you will agree with me, that if the Lacedaemonians take Megalopolis, Messene will be in danger; and if they take Messene also, I say that we shall find ourselves in alliance with Thebes.

In the end Agis fought with an army of some 20,000. He may have lost some adherents as Antipater’s recruitment grew and his army marched but, even so, it is hard to see that Sparta thought to march beyond the Isthmus and destroy Macedonian sovereignty in Greece with such an army. The coalition of 338, against a pre anabasis Macedonian host to be certain, failed with 30,000. My view is that Sparta’s immediate to medium term aims were Peloponnesian.

I have a file of papers on the revolt and Agis because I plan on writing an article at some point. Contact me if you'd like them.

I look forward to reading it.

It was one of the last great land battles of old Greece, in old Greece; with considerable forces deployed by either side. Although the Makedonian/Allied force of around 40,000 (possibly higher) almost doubled its Spartan/Elian/Arkadian opponents; the restricted nature of the field seemed to have neutered the numerical advantage of the former somewhat. Again it appears to have been a long and drawn out affair, but with casualties relatively speaking, only slightly higher on the defeated side.

Antipater’s infantry figure is certainly a “global” one and the number of Macedonian phalanx troops is now irrecoverable. They cannot have been any large proportion of the troops and were more likely a smaller nucleus. Alexander is attested as having received significant infantry reinforcements of which 9,000 are unarguably Macedonian; 6,000 of whom Amyntas had just led into Asia Minor at this time. If any of the other reinforcements noted by Curtius and Polybius are Macedonian then Antipater is most unlikely to have been swimming in sarissa-armed Macedonians.

The casualties are intriguing. Diodorus gives the same number of Lacedaemonian dead as Curtius (5,300) but differs with the Macedonian (3,500 / 1,000). Both are suspiciously neat; Curtius’ the more so. Although Curtius, who gives our only expanded description, claims that “the narrow terrain to which the fighting had been confined would not permit a full-scale engagement of the two forces, so there were more spectators than combatants and those beyond the range of missiles shouted encouragement to their respective sides” (6.1.10), he later states that “hardly anyone returned to camp unwounded” (6.1.16). The suspicion of a marvelously wrought and florid description for his Roman audience intrudes. Clearly if only a fraction of the forces engaged (and this rings true) then the great majority will have returned unwounded one thinks.

( Have you read my account of the battle in "Ancient Warfare magazine"? :wink: )

Indeed I have. In the words of Yoda, “there is another Sell...a...siaaaa...” *nod*

[Ghostmojo]

I absolutely agree Sparta's interests (as usual) were confined to the Peloponnese. She was after all distinctly noticeable by her absence at Chaironeia. I think the general rule that whatever happened north of the Ithsmos of Corinth was of only passing interest, was still at play here. I would hazard the guess that Sparta was delighted by the thrashing handed out the Athenians and Thebans in particular, since again it was the divide and conquer mentality; except of course Sparta didn't want to conquer so much, as just be left alone, and one (or two) less belligerents to worry about, was very welcome. Both Philip and Alexander had left the Spartans alone - preferring not to trouble themselves in that region, although they didn't forget the snub to the invite to join the Makedonian-led PanHellenenic foray against Persia. Alexanders' dedications often (pointedly) were from all the Greeks - except the Lakedaimonians.

[Paralus]

She was after all distinctly noticeable by her absence at Chaironeia. I think the general rule that whatever happened north of the Ithsmos of Corinth was of only passing interest, was still at play here. I would hazard the guess that Sparta was delighted by the thrashing handed out the Athenians and Thebans in particular...

Of Thebes? Absolutely. It likely played a good part in her not joining the "allies" at Chaeroneia; notwithstanding the fact she would not have "led".

The real point is that Sparta, recalcitrant to the end, failed to understand the lesson of 338: the day of the city state - of Laconia or Attica as hegemon of the Greeks or Greek "world" (a la the Athenian Empire) were well gone. The royal "nation-state" with its attendant resources was the new world order. Later it would be the filthy, Daric-rich Diadoch kingdoms.

The irony is that Macedonia's days, like Alexander's, were now numbered: the fracturing of empire and the demands on her manpower over the two decades covering the anabasis and after would see her very much relegated to the second tier of successor kingdoms often struggling to survive let alone asserting her dominance of the Greek mainland. And some wonder at the possible friction between Alexander and his European regent. That, though, is to anticipate.

[Old Husker]

Paralus' comments that Diodorus had certain tendencies in his language regarding drawn-out melees in a number of battles are well taken, but don't, I think, invalidate the idea that such extended actions actually did take place. We all tend to fall back on terms endemic to our individual literary styles, so mere repetition of word patterns isn't all that significant other than to illustrate the extent (or lack thereof) of an author's vocabulary. I suspect that Diodorus was for the most part relating in his own manner an impression gained from eyewitness accounts available in his sources(even if those might be so many times removed as to have become little more than heresay at the late date of his repeating them).

Even then, such personal estimates of duration would have been unavoidably subjective and relative. Subjectivity is a great enemy of accurate time estimation and what seems to be and what is (or, more accurately here, what was)are definitely different animals. Think of the mental impression that half an hour in the dentist's chair leaves compared to 30 minutes of enjoying your favorite novel in a comfy lounger at home. And then there's relativity. Clearly, any claim that something lasts a "long time" implies a duration that is 'unusual' relative to some norm. Thus, if battles normally lasted less than an hour in an observer's experience, then a combat of over an hour would be reported as a "long" one.

What I suspect that we're seeing in the ancient record is a recognition that most battles came to conclusion quickly(though setting up for action might often have been a very lengthy process). This was due to a variety of factors such as asymetric manpower, a major terrain advantage, a surprise maneuver, or some other element that might not be obvious from our limited sources; however, stalemating of a sort was not unusual on those occasions when everything added up to a fairly even match. Yet our record of actual combat results would seem to indicate that such a stalled state of affairs was normally still temporary (probably spanning a period of minutes rather than hours, though those minutes might surely have seemed endless for the harried participants). This reflected that it must have been the rare battlefield indeed where balance was near-perfect, as even a very minor advantage would generally lead to a final decision in favor of one side or the other given enough time.

With regard to elongating Macedonian pikes in India to counter elephants, I'll have to go back and see if I can find the precise reference for that in my notes. Indeed, this was proposed by another author (believe me, I wouldn't have come up with that one on my own, especially as I don't think that it's true).

[Paralus]

I suspect that Diodorus was for the most part relating in his own manner an impression gained from eyewitness accounts available in his sources(even if those might be so many times removed as to have become little more than heresay at the late date of his repeating them).

Well that, I think, is true. For his best battle descriptions I don't believe that Diodorus worked directly from Hieronymus (rather from an intermediary) and if anything is clear about him it is his repetitive use of language or forms. In almost all cases, though, that repetition is grouped within a space of chapters or a book - a certain writing time-frame so to speak. The difference here is that he utilises these rote descriptions over many books and with respect to many a battle; even cavalry actions. Diodorus has a predilection for noting the virtues of men, laws and even the virtues of combatants (see, for example, his description of Docimus et al escaping from incarceration by Antigonus) and this commendatory attitude to the martial valour of each combatant plays into that. The soldiers are "noble" and fight with appropriate valour and skill before submitting. I'm not certain that each of his sources utilised such or described each military encounter as being contested for a long time / many falling on both sides / evenly poised et al. We'll never know though.

Even then, such personal estimates of duration would have been unavoidably subjective and relative [...] Think of the mental impression that half an hour in the dentist's chair leaves compared to 30 minutes of enjoying your favorite novel in a comfy lounger at home. And then there's relativity. Clearly, any claim that something lasts a "long time" implies a duration that is 'unusual' relative to some norm. Thus, if battles normally lasted less than an hour in an observer's experience, then a combat of over an hour would be reported as a "long" one.

That is very true.

Yet our record of actual combat results would seem to indicate that such a stalled state of affairs was normally still temporary (probably spanning a period of minutes rather than hours, though those minutes might surely have seemed endless for the harried participants). This reflected that it must have been the rare battlefield indeed where balance was near-perfect, as even a very minor advantage would generally lead to a final decision in favor of one side or the other given enough time.

I'd think that largely true as well. There will have been the regulation haranguing and wind up (much yelling and noise making as Paullus Scipio once remarked to me) and then the initial "contact". I sometimes think that, like a rugby scrum, this was an important phase in deciding an initial advantage: it is here that those who (as remarked in an earlier post) kill "comfortably" will have already won their battle (Paraetecene and Gabiene) much like the fellow who talks the fight whilst the other simply belts him in silence. It then is a matter of how long one side withstood the other. Recounting that time years later might be a fraught exercise.

With regard to elongating Macedonian pikes in India to counter elephanst, I'll have to go back and see if I can find the precise reference for that my notes. Indeed, this was proposed by another author (believe me, I wouldn't have come up with that one on my own, especially as I don't think that it's true).

The references to sarissae in the sources, with respect to the Indian campaign, are not legion.

(17.84.4) The Macedonians thrust with their long spears through the light shields of the mercenaries and pressed the iron points on into their lungs...

hoi gar Makedones tais sarisais anarrēssontes tas tōn barbarōn peltas tas akmas tou sidērou tois pneumosin enēreidon...

(17.88.2) They used their long spears to good effect against the Indians stationed beside the elephants, and kept the battle even.

tōn de Makedonōn eurōstōs hupomenontōn to deinon kai tous ana meson tōn thēriōn tais sarisais anairountōn isorropos ēn hē makhē

(Curt. 8.14.16) Our spears are long and sturdy; they can never serve us better than against these elephants and their drivers.

There is also the description of Corrhagus' defeat by Dioxippus which both Diodorus and Curtius tell. Still, nothing - aside from special pleading based on Curtius - in those descriptions would lead one to conclude that Alexander had the sarissa lengthened. I'd like to see the fellow's argument too!