02-16-2012, 03:45 AM
Without ever supporting that numbers are not inflated , as is my standard position in this discussion and only exploring the mechanics and capabilities of ancient logistics and the possibility (NOT certainty) that they COULD, IF THEY CHOSE TO, field really huge armies I will make a synopsis of how, in my knowledge, supplying an army worked.
1. Huge armies demanded huge manpower available to be mustered under a common banner. Thus, only huge unified political entities would be able in the first place to field huge armies. Persia was one, Rome was one, Greece certainly was not, not until much later, when certain empires were established that could potentially find the unified manpower.
Any state with a population of 20 mil+ could potentially muster 1 mil soldiers (10% of the total male population, some 15-25% of all male population of military age) to use in a single area IF IT CHOSE TO and IF all adequate provisions were made.
Ability to do so does not mean it was done.
2. In order to analyze supply capabilities we have to first establish if the campaign was :
A. landbound
B. coastal with maritime supply capability or along navigable rivers
Manners a force was supplied and efficiency thereof (as long as enough supplies were somehow gathered):
1. Beasts of burden can carry an unlimited volume of supplies BUT, they also have to consume some themselves, which makes supplies only last a limited amount of time. There is no maximum force size that can be supplied in this way, there is a maximum time that ANY force can be supplied. Some more time can be gained if the beasts themselves are consumed or allowed to perish, but that time is also limited. So, a force of 50 men, one of 50,000 or one of 500,000 can actually feed itself practically the same time if it is only fed through supplies carried by beasts of burden and carriages.
2. Ships were most efficient. They could carry a huge amount of supplies with practically no loss because of self-consumption. A single cargo ship could carry 50-150 tons of supplies, totally replacing the need of hundreds of carriages, beasts, drivers etc and even securing the ability to move the army at greater speeds.
3. Forage was also efficient although limited. The distance that forage parties would put between them and the main force was not unlimited. they still had to return and of course the further away they went, the more vulnerable they were to enemy attacks. Forage was very efficient not because they would only gather the produce of the land but because they would gather the stock of the unfortified settlements, which would hold provisions for their populations for several months. Thus, a village of 100 people that had provisions for only 6 months (beasts included) would provide 1 month supply for 600 men or a week's supply for 2,400 men. A territory that was inhabited by a mere 10,000 peasants that was thus raided, that was able to produce the numbers I mentioned above (quite conservative in my opinion), would feed 60,000 men for a month or 240,000 for a week. Foraging (when not caring about the population) was very effective and this is why scorched earth strategy was so efficient in such circumstances. This is how 13,000 Greeks for example found supplies abundant on the mountains of Armenia.
4. Markets
All the texts stress the importance of "markets" This was a controlled forage. In order for an army to not resort to raids, states would provide it with markets where it would obtain the resources it needed for a "just" price. A city with a population of 20,000 and a supporting peasantry of another 50,000 would be able to easily provide for an army of 42,000 men for a month if it only offered them a conservative 10% of its provisions to buy.
5. Being outright presented with gifts in exchange of a harmless march through one's territory. A small state or kingdom of just 200,000 inhabitants giving up a 10% of its provisions (again taking a very moderate stock of supplies that would only last for 6 months) would be able to support 120,000 men for a month.
6. Sacking cities
Sacking a city would work wonders in terms of supplies. A simple city of 30,000 men would procure huge quantities of supplies.
7. Beating the enemy in battle and sacking their camp
Self-explanatory.
So, big armies had to keep moving to feed themselves from the land (also attested in many sources) but of course, huge armies would require supply lines or proximity to great supply centers. There is no reason to believe that a huge army, regardless its size could not supply itself as long as it had a supply train large enough AND a supply center nearby (some days away) or if supply by the sea was available regardless of the distance to the supply center.
The next question is : "Could actually the ancient states amass a huge volume of supplies to feed a huge army?"
The provisions were available (the men would be supplied if they stayed home, so there were supplies). That leaves the question of whether there was a mechanism that would allow the provisions to be collected and stored. For me, the answer is again "yes". The sources are very clear that huge quantities of provisions were indeed collected by officials to :
A. store in cities that acted as supply centers for the army or the population
B. sell en mass to buyers, like the Greeks did from Sicily or the Black Sea. The Athenian food imports were not inferior to any supply mechanism that would have been used to cover the needs of a really huge army and was running for decades.
C. Send to states as parts of tribute or a "forced" sale, like the Egyptian grain was shipped to Italy for decades if not centuries.
This only serves as proof that there were official mechanisms that were able to collect and store huge amounts of supplies (able to feed huge armies for a substantial period of time - food enough to feed 200,000 people for 1 year is enough to feed 1,200,000 people for 2 months)
In conclusion, the mechanism to support a huge army existed. Whether huge armies were employed or not is open to debate. In my opinion they must have just because they could. Which of those attested were in reality huge armies is another question.
1. Huge armies demanded huge manpower available to be mustered under a common banner. Thus, only huge unified political entities would be able in the first place to field huge armies. Persia was one, Rome was one, Greece certainly was not, not until much later, when certain empires were established that could potentially find the unified manpower.
Any state with a population of 20 mil+ could potentially muster 1 mil soldiers (10% of the total male population, some 15-25% of all male population of military age) to use in a single area IF IT CHOSE TO and IF all adequate provisions were made.
Ability to do so does not mean it was done.
2. In order to analyze supply capabilities we have to first establish if the campaign was :
A. landbound
B. coastal with maritime supply capability or along navigable rivers
Manners a force was supplied and efficiency thereof (as long as enough supplies were somehow gathered):
1. Beasts of burden can carry an unlimited volume of supplies BUT, they also have to consume some themselves, which makes supplies only last a limited amount of time. There is no maximum force size that can be supplied in this way, there is a maximum time that ANY force can be supplied. Some more time can be gained if the beasts themselves are consumed or allowed to perish, but that time is also limited. So, a force of 50 men, one of 50,000 or one of 500,000 can actually feed itself practically the same time if it is only fed through supplies carried by beasts of burden and carriages.
2. Ships were most efficient. They could carry a huge amount of supplies with practically no loss because of self-consumption. A single cargo ship could carry 50-150 tons of supplies, totally replacing the need of hundreds of carriages, beasts, drivers etc and even securing the ability to move the army at greater speeds.
3. Forage was also efficient although limited. The distance that forage parties would put between them and the main force was not unlimited. they still had to return and of course the further away they went, the more vulnerable they were to enemy attacks. Forage was very efficient not because they would only gather the produce of the land but because they would gather the stock of the unfortified settlements, which would hold provisions for their populations for several months. Thus, a village of 100 people that had provisions for only 6 months (beasts included) would provide 1 month supply for 600 men or a week's supply for 2,400 men. A territory that was inhabited by a mere 10,000 peasants that was thus raided, that was able to produce the numbers I mentioned above (quite conservative in my opinion), would feed 60,000 men for a month or 240,000 for a week. Foraging (when not caring about the population) was very effective and this is why scorched earth strategy was so efficient in such circumstances. This is how 13,000 Greeks for example found supplies abundant on the mountains of Armenia.
4. Markets
All the texts stress the importance of "markets" This was a controlled forage. In order for an army to not resort to raids, states would provide it with markets where it would obtain the resources it needed for a "just" price. A city with a population of 20,000 and a supporting peasantry of another 50,000 would be able to easily provide for an army of 42,000 men for a month if it only offered them a conservative 10% of its provisions to buy.
5. Being outright presented with gifts in exchange of a harmless march through one's territory. A small state or kingdom of just 200,000 inhabitants giving up a 10% of its provisions (again taking a very moderate stock of supplies that would only last for 6 months) would be able to support 120,000 men for a month.
6. Sacking cities
Sacking a city would work wonders in terms of supplies. A simple city of 30,000 men would procure huge quantities of supplies.
7. Beating the enemy in battle and sacking their camp
Self-explanatory.
So, big armies had to keep moving to feed themselves from the land (also attested in many sources) but of course, huge armies would require supply lines or proximity to great supply centers. There is no reason to believe that a huge army, regardless its size could not supply itself as long as it had a supply train large enough AND a supply center nearby (some days away) or if supply by the sea was available regardless of the distance to the supply center.
The next question is : "Could actually the ancient states amass a huge volume of supplies to feed a huge army?"
The provisions were available (the men would be supplied if they stayed home, so there were supplies). That leaves the question of whether there was a mechanism that would allow the provisions to be collected and stored. For me, the answer is again "yes". The sources are very clear that huge quantities of provisions were indeed collected by officials to :
A. store in cities that acted as supply centers for the army or the population
B. sell en mass to buyers, like the Greeks did from Sicily or the Black Sea. The Athenian food imports were not inferior to any supply mechanism that would have been used to cover the needs of a really huge army and was running for decades.
C. Send to states as parts of tribute or a "forced" sale, like the Egyptian grain was shipped to Italy for decades if not centuries.
This only serves as proof that there were official mechanisms that were able to collect and store huge amounts of supplies (able to feed huge armies for a substantial period of time - food enough to feed 200,000 people for 1 year is enough to feed 1,200,000 people for 2 months)
In conclusion, the mechanism to support a huge army existed. Whether huge armies were employed or not is open to debate. In my opinion they must have just because they could. Which of those attested were in reality huge armies is another question.
