Ancient Logistics and ancient warfare

[Tomenable]

This is not relevant really. The number of males who fought for Wehrmacht during the years 1939-1945 were about 18,000,000.

Males and females (yes, some did serve in the Wehrmacht - which included Army - Heer*, Navy - Kriegsmarine, Air Force - Luftwaffe, Waffen SS and various services).

*Army - Heer - further divided into Feld Heer (operational army / field army) and Ersatz Heer (reserve army / spare army - which was just sitting in Germany training conscripts most of the time).

And not "who fought" - who served - huge part of them never fired a bullet, as they were in rear services of the Wehrmacht, not on the actual frontline or even on garrison duty or defending the air over Germany in a plane or with an AA gun from the ground, etc.

Plus you do realize that we are talking about dozens of age groups and that those 18,000,000 men were mobilized as the result of maximum war effort of a state which numbered over 100,000,000 inhabitants (after annexing various territories - and of course these 100,000,000 do not include occupied territories, just annexed).

And of course never such a number of men served at one point in time.

And Wehrmacht campaigned and occupied from Norway to North Africa and from France to Stalingrad - in occupied countries they also had soldiers, not just on the frontlines, as well as for defence of actual German Reich.

Regarding age groups those 18,000,000 included men as old as born before year 1900 and perhaps before 1890 (Landwehr and ater Volkssturm Germany became more desperate) and as young as born in 1933 (the youngest of Volkssturm / Hitlerjugend were just kids).

So this 18,000,000 included something like over 40 different age groups (ca. 1890 - ca. 1933).

Taking into account that the German population in 1939 was about 80 million

That was before they annexed Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland.

And actually more than 80 million already in 1939, IIRC.

And also I wonder why you count population from 1939, when the number of mobilized which you quoted was the number of all mobilized not just in 1939 but from 1939 to 1945 - so you should count the population from all these years (which of course provided a much bigger base of potential soldiers since a guy who was just a 9 years old kid in 1939, was already 15 years old in 1945 - which means he could get a Panzerfaust and try to stop Soviet onslaught on the streets of Berlin... :roll: )

The rest were non-combatants which means women, children, whores, slaves, servants, but also countless merchants and traders from any conceivable ethnicity within and without the empire, even Greeks.

Non-combatants are also MEN who provide logistical backbone of the army.

Whores and children and women are even less than non-combatants - you just invented a new category. I don't think that all armies had whores and other women and children with them, but surely all had non-combatants responsible for logistics.

Your very effort to reconcile the given numbers with what you deem realistic shows that you accept the possibility that the quoted numbers may have been from a source the ancients respected or just what they believed for the truth.

Yep - I have "optimistic" approach to sources. :mrgreen:

[Jugibar]

Peter and Macedon,

Not enough time for a detailed reply today but one thing I would like to touch on. In no way do I support the idea that the Persians had an army of 4,200,000 men. What I wanted to highlight is that the many methodologies modern authors use to estimate the Persian army size can be misleading or as Macedon puts it, "The problem with many historians is that they follow the lead of men who wrote in the late 1800s, early 1900s, when there was a feeling that the world had a linear evolution regarding technology, populations etc."

Matt

[Sean Manning]

4,200,000 is more than the number of Axis troops which invaded the Soviet Union in "Fall Barbarossa" of 1941, along the entire frontline from Murmansk to the Black Sea... :roll:

Touche!

The numbers are clearly ridiculous.

Also, one reason that military historians tend to be very skeptical of Herodotus' Persian numbers is that from experience in other places and times, they know that army strengths in narrative histories are almost never approximately correct (especially strengths for the other side's army). For example, Anne Curry notes that most early narratives of the Battle of Agincourt put the French army at 50-150,000 men, but after studying the documents she prefers 8,000 men at arms and 4,000 crossbowmen (this leaves out the "gross valets," armed and mounted servants who might add another 8,000 effectives). In the case of Herodotus, at several points the type of story he is telling demands that the Persian numbers be incomprehensible. Sometimes in later periods, its possible to come to a pretty good guess by reading 5-10 narratives and picking the one or two which are best for a given side, but with Xerxes' Greek War we only have Herodotus and Aeschylus (plus later numbers which are even less likely to be connected to the truth).

Being generous to Herodotus consists of taking his figures for Free Greek soldiers and ships as a starting point, not trying to defend or rationalize his Persian strengths. There might have been records of the former when he was doing his inquiries, and he might have had access to them and been willing to use them.

[Jugibar]

To all,

I keep on trying to copy paste my reply from a document but I keep on getting a 403 error. Can somebody help me with this?

Matt

[Jugibar]

Reply as I promised.

But what is wrong with Prussian marching methods?

The problem with Prussian marching methods is that the space a certain army size occupies has no correlation with what was used in the ancient age, specifically the Greek campaigns. To quote exactly what he said..

The army that Xerxes led into Greece is given by Herodotus as numbering exactly 4,200,000 men, including the trains. An army corps of 30,000 covers, in the German march order, some 14 miles, without its supply train. The march column of the Persians would therefore have been 2,000 miles long, and when the head of the column was arriving before Thermopylae, the end of the column might have been just marching out of Susa, on the far side of the Tigris. A German Army corps is accompained by artillery and ammunition caissons, which take up much room, and in this regard an ancient army would require less space. On the other hand, a Persian army certainly had only a very loose march discipline, that quality which can only be attained through a very exact articulation of the army organization, with constant attention and effort.Without march discipline columns very quickly stretch out to double or triple the normal length.

Bolded part is my emphasis. This kind of speculation is common in Delbruck's work without consulting the standard deployment of the Persian army. Yes, there was no such thing as artillery back then but there was archers who needed to be supplied with arrows, where would they get the arrows in his model? Where would the cavalry or infantry be posted in the column, and does it conform to German corp marching methods? Does he allow any space for foragers, since 14 miles would be without the supply train? Without march discipline, why would columns stretch to two or even three times the size? Speaking of his concept on the Persian army, let's see what he had to say of their organization..

The Persian army was of a type completely opposite that of the Greek army; it was composed of mounted men and archers. Aeschylus, the only contemporary whose report on the Persian wars is directly available to us, sings and speaks again and again (in his drama The Persians) of the combat of the spear against the bow.
Even the Persian mounted men were armed with the bow.
The swords or short spears that are mentioned seved only as auxillary weapons.
Since the bow formed the principal weapon, the protective armor was only light-for the dismounted troops, probably only a shield of woven straw that the archer could place in front of himself while firing....
It is not only the difference in arms, however, that distinguishes the Persians from the Greeks. The power of the phalanx rests, in addition to the courage and equipment of the individual soldier, on the steadfastness of the whole of the tactical formation. We have seen that, even when one side has a much larger number of warriors, they influence the decision not by their weapons, but through the fact that in the rear ranks of the phalanx they exercise a physical and moral pressure. The Persians do not form a tactical body; marksmen lend themselves but little to it. By their very nature they tend to spread out rather than to form a unit..
Marksmen cannot be employed in large masses against hoplites, If they are drawn up in a deep formation, the rearward ranks no longer have the capability of shooting effectively. If they spread out, before long their arrows will no longer be able to reach the enemy.
The Persian Empire was composed of the Persian national nucleus and the numerous subject people. The Persian kings drew no warriors from these latter groups. The Mesapotamians, Syrians, Egyptians, and inhabitants of Asia minor were, for them, the unwarlike, tribute-paying masses, with the exception of the Phoenician and Greek sailors, who naturally manned the fleet. When Herodotus enumerates the huge masses of people who appeared in the Persian army, we consider that as pure fantasy. Persia itself, embracing present-day Persia, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, and large portions of Turkestan, was and still is today, for the most part, still steppes and desert, with numerous small or fairly large oases and a few very large ones. Persians, Medes, and Parthians are branches of the same people, somewhat as Saxons, Franks, Swabians, Bavarians in medieval Germany. What held them together was not just then nationality but also their common religion, the revelations of Zarathustra. The truly warlike elements was naturally the nomadic branches rather than the agricultural ones.

Herr Delbruck viewed Persia as a medieval society, where numbers didn't constitute any real importance rather that other tasks such as economic or cultural factors overtook fielding large amounts of men. However, historians such as J.F. Verbruggen have challenged these claims because of his distinction between cavalry and knights, that his connection made between Persia and Medieval society isn't necessarily true.

Anyway - you do realize that an army of 4,200,000 would require a territory with some 20,000,000 inhabitants to be mobilized from, and only in case if you mobilize EVERY MAN who is capable of participating in a military campaign (ca. 20% - 25% of population - but some part of this percentage are men who are just "barely" capable of service).

On the population estimates for the Persian empire, if you take JFC Fuller's estimates he gives 50,000,000 (IIRC?) which is well above the 20,000 proposed here. Given that I am not a demographic, but I do know the main limiting factor on populations is density perhaps you can factor in other things and figure out the population for each satrap? Also why wouldn't the Persians be able to mobilize even a million people?

Now check the estimates of population of the Roman Empire at its demographic peak (which was of course during the times of economic prosperity and political coolnes of the Principate - with the final imperial borders already established after years of conquest - later population began to decrease):

www.unrv.com/empire/roman-population.php

A big problem with that article is the assumptions it makes regarding what census fielded what figures. It takes the population of the world around AD 1 and tries to correlate it with Augustus's census that gives figures from 28 Bc, 14 Ad, 8 Bc rather than 1 AD. Keeping track of the world population is a huge task and I'm certain there were some parts of the world that didn't have the kind of census methodlogies that Rome had so it was all conjecture to think that it was 300 million at the time. Comparing the Claudius census with Augustus's also shows a huge interval between the population only possible through a massive population boom.

As far as Delbrueck is concerned, he was a pioneer insofar as he understood the need to further investigate before blindly accepting sources. His line of thinking is, to me, problematic and he often falls victim of very important mistakes, but then even Polybius did... His calculation of the length of the Persian train, SHOULD IT BE EXTENDED ALL AT THE SAME TIME is not problematic, Herodot actually fully confirms it when he records that the Persians needed 7 days and nights to cross the two bridges over the Hellespont. which, at a moderate speed of 3 km/h and assuming that on the road, the train would have a frontage as wide as both bridges together, gives a total of 3x7x24=504km. Of course the train would never extend that long. Each contingent would be ready at a given time throughout the day, so that, for example, the Persians would have to be ready to start marching at 7.00 and the Lydians at 10.00 (of course times are random in this example). So, when the first contingents would start making camp at a pre-ordained place, probably pre-measured, pre-scouted, prepared etc, other contingents would still be preparing for their march in the initial camp. The most probable course of action would be that each camp would be reused by the following column (the ground being already leveled, the water sources checked, etc). This means that at least 6 such main camps would be used upon the marching path, maybe 10-20 kms apart - most probably, there would be even more campsites prepared along the way to accommodate stragglers, provide water and fodder etc. So, to me, the rear would in reality be some 60-120 km away from the van. And of course all this assuming that the march was made in one column, which is, again to me, highly unlikely. I think that moving in two columns, one, the most swift and versatile more inland to secure that the seaward column would not fall into mishaps, would be more understandable. This column would be necessity be lighter, mostly cavalry and light infantry, with few baggage since it would be supplied from the first column. This would make the marching column even shorter, maybe 50-100 km. but at any given time, less than 50%, maybe some 30% of the army would be on the move. And of course, all this if we assume that the Persians did indeed march into Greece with such huge numbers. Of course I assume that there was adequate organization. If there was not, then distances would be greater (maybe 50-100% greater) but still not anything like Delbrueck suggests.

Very informative and interesting post here. So the bridges together are 24 kilometers long, but why are you multiplying the speed times days needed times bridge frontage to get the train length, since that's a matter of depth as well? In your scenario, the marching was leveled so that each column would have a different camp to rest in on each day, eventually until it reached its destination at Thermopylae and 10-20 kilometers apart, which gives a head to tail column 60-120 kilometers in length. Yes it's unlikely such a size would invade in only one column first because the Greeks or any nearby force could employ hit and run tactics successfully (this is related http://garyb.0catch.com/march1/march_intro.html ) but also because it would be slow and very predictable. Two columns ok, but now we have to consider the geography of where the invading force was descending from, what roads would it take to link with the column along the ocean? The force inland has cavalry and light infantry so it could move at a faster rate, would the cavalry be at the front of the column and since this column can march faster than the other separation can become a major problem and leaves it to defeat in detail...

[Jugibar]

He also has major problems calculating distances... The distance from the bridges in the Hellespont (let alone Susa!!!!! or even Sardis, since he obviously mixed up the cities...) to Thermopylae would be some 700 kms on the map, which would mean double that in reality (due to natural winding of roads and elevation). Even today, the distance from Alexandroupolis to Thermopoylae is some 700-750 kms on straight highways... Add to that the distance from the Hellespont as well as the natural roads of the time and you come to my calculations...

So Hellespont to Thermopylae is 700 kilometers on a map, is this the shortest route or the one that would've been taken according to Herodotus? Certainly this was thousands of years ago so the roads probably aren't as well paved as they were today and topography has significantly changed. I'm not well versed with ancient geography but Strabo may be of help here as well as Stanford's recent project http://orbis.stanford.edu/ on transportation in Rome. Canakkale (which is very close to the crossing points) to Alexandroupolis is 801 km (is that right?) using the following routes on Google map which I don't think consider crossing the Hellespont

1. Head southwest on Yasemin Sk toward Tuna Sk: 20 m
2. Turn left onto Tuna Sk: 110 m
3. Take the 1st right onto Velibey Sk: 150 m
4. Take the 1st left onto Piri Reis Cd/D200/E87. Continue to follow D200/E87: 3.6 km
5. Take the ramp onto Bursa Çanakkale Yolu/D200/E90. Continue to follow D200/E90. Go through 1 roundabout: 159 km
6. Slight right onto D200: 42.1 km
7. Take the ramp onto Balıkesir Bursa Yolu/D200/E90. Continue to follow D200/E90: 9.3 km
8. Turn right to stay on D200/E90: 3.4 km
9. Turn right to stay on D200/E90: 1.3 km
10. Take the 1st right to stay on D200/E90: 6.9 km
11. Turn right to stay on D200/E90: 1.8 km
12. Take the 1st right to stay on D200/E90: 16.8 km
13. Take the ramp onto Bursa Çevre Yolu/O-33/E90: 26.7 km
14. Exit onto Bursa Çevre Yolu Demirtaş Bağlantısı (Balıkesir İzmir Yolu)/E881: 1.7 km
15. Keep left at the fork and merge ontoBursa Yalova Yolu/D575/E881: 34.5 km
16. Turn right toward Bursa Yalova Yolu/D575/E881: 31 m
17. Take the 1st left toward Bursa Yalova Yolu/D575/E881: 33 m
18. Slight right onto Bursa Yalova Yolu/D575/E881. Continue to follow D575/E881: 24.5 km
19. Turn right onto Atatürk Blv/D575/E881. Continue to follow D575/E881: 12.6 km
20. Turn right to stay on D575/E881. Continue to follow E881: 24.7 km
21. Turn right toward İzmit Yalova Yolu/D130/E881: 28 m
22. Take the 1st left toward İzmit Yalova Yolu/D130/E881: 54 m
23. Slight right onto İzmit Yalova Yolu/D130/E881. Continue to follow E881: 27.4 km
24. Take the ramp onto İstanbul İzmit Yolu/D100: 7.6 km
25. Continue onto Anadolu Otoyolu İzmit Batı Bağlantısı (İstanbul İzmit Yolu). Partial toll road: 1.8 km
26. Continue onto İzmit Tüneli (Anadolu Otoyolu). Toll road: 550 m
27. Continue onto İzmit Batı Girişi-K11 (Anadolu Otoyolu). Toll road: 1.0 km
28. Continue onto E-80. Partial toll road: 73.2 km
29. Continue straight onto O1-O2 Çamlıca Bağlantısı: 3.2 km
30. Continue onto Çamlıca Girişi-K13 (İstanbul Çevre Yolu): 3.6 km
31. Merge onto O-1: 16.6 km
32. Continue onto O-3: 9.1 km
33. Merge onto E-80. Partial toll road: 62.3 km
34. Exit onto Avrupa Otoyolu Kınalı Bağlantısı/E84. Continue to follow E84. Partial toll road: 60.6 km
35. Keep right at the fork. Continue to follow D110/E84: 89.3 km
36. Keep left at the fork. Continue to follow D110/E84. Go through 1 roundabout. Entering Greece: 29.0 km
37. Continue onto Synoriakos Dromos/Συνοριακός Δρόμος/A2/E90. Continue to follow A2/E90: 41.6 km
38. Take exit 41 toward Αλεξανδρούπολη/Alexandroupoli: 700 m
39. Merge onto Komvos Alexandroupolis/Κόμβος Αλεξανδρούπολης: 90 m
40. Continue onto Egnatias Odou-Alexandroupolis/Εγνατίας Οδού-Αλεξανδρούπολης: 1.7 km
41. Continue onto Irodotou/Ηροδότου: 1.0 km
42. At the roundabout, take the 2nd exit onto Mitropolitou Iakovou Kavyri/Μητροπολίτου Ιακώβου Καβύρη: 550 m
43. Turn left onto Fylis/Φυλής: 78 m

801 km plus 700 km is 1501 km, an estimate considering the routes used above but they can be adjusted.

The problem with many historians is that they follow the lead of men who wrote in the late 1800s, early 1900s, when there was a feeling that the world had a linear evolution regarding technology, populations etc. They regarded medieval and early renaissance more advanced than classical, Hellenistic or Roman times, which is a grave mistake. Food production is considered to have been lower, urbanization too, the logistical ability of armies inferior, population lower etc. Yet, this, in my opinion, is a mistake regarding the Mediterranean basin. The urbanization observed in Greece, Central and Southern Italy, Sicily, Egypt, Anatolia, Syria and Mesopotamia cannot be compared to anything before renaissance. The population of the area was not as low as often quoted and as far as I know, recently, scholars do indeed make much higher assumptions than 20-50 years ago, even for places more "barbaric" like Britain. The same applies for food production, especially in Mesopotamia, where the desert has actually today reclaimed lands that were irrigated and well exploited agriculturally. And the higher the indigenous population, the larger an army can be sustained through forage, markets, tribute etc.

Yes the methodologies were very different, which was a point that I tried to make. Thing about Delbruck and the Europeans back then was that, in the early 1900's, attrition was king in that not much importance was placed on achieving a battle of annihilation but that wearing the opposing army through strength was the way to go. This in part influenced his themes of the two strategies and historical evidence. Regarding food production in the two eras, remember that medieval governments were feudal and that the majority of society was considered peasant, about 90% so that much is allocated to food production in exchange for protection and payment by the government. Classes weren't mobile like they were in the ancient age, and thus food production may possibly have been larger. Forage was common, but relying on it too much would cause corruption in the army and desertion, some places were suitable for foraging and others weren't.

Yes and no. During the campaign season, such storms can occur at most any moment. This is the case throughout the Mediterranean, the Aegean being particularly dangerous because of the many isles and little open sea.

Lanes are tight I was aware of, so there is no pattern with the storms?

Macedon, from the previous thread the Persian fleet was discussed and the following post caught my eye for the numbers it gave.

First I am happy that somebody can see the logistic approach of Persians. Then let us move to see the rough numbers mentioned by the 2 ancient writers Herodotus-Diodorus = roughly 300,000 men, 3000 cargo ships, 200 war ships - and let us analyse the logistics.

3,000 cargo ships and 200 war ships, cargo ships were certainly huge but what ports would they use to embark at and how much labor would each requre? Slaves? Do Herodotus and Diodorus give any contradictory figures since they see events and numbers differently? During the Second Punic war Sicily was a major battleground. 200 big ships of 150 men each would be 30,000 men, 1000 average of 100 men would be 100,000, and 1800 small of 50 men gives 90,000, so in total this requires 220,000 laborers. Divide by 2 for horse and food stock and 2.5 goes to get 275,000. It was common to bring family on campaigning, so add that as well. Slaves could account for the majority of people, but I'm certain they're not the only ones and others have to be paid a salary. They also had to be fed daily.

[Macedon]

why are you multiplying the speed times days needed times bridge frontage to get the train length, since that's a matter of depth as well?

What do you mean? The depth of a column is its total length. If my army needs 5 hours to pass through a certain point in column, then that column, provided that there was continuous flow was hours x speed kms long. A moderate speed of 3 km/h would make it 15 kms long. 7 days are 7x24 hours. If 3kms of men pass every hour then the column is 7x24x3 kms long. I just think that it is more probable that the total breadth of both of the bridges would be closer to the width of the column, for somehow I do not see the bridge be more than 5-10 m wide resting on 10-20m long ships. Of course, if the army was smaller, then less time would have been needed. It is possible that Herodot saw the numbers somewhere as he supports but made this specific calculation himself, so the fact that it fully supports his numbers, in my opinion, should not be taken as proof thereof.

In your scenario, the marching was leveled so that each column would have a different camp to rest in on each day, eventually until it reached its destination at Thermopylae and 10-20 kilometers apart, which gives a head to tail column 60-120 kilometers in length. Yes it's unlikely such a size would invade in only one column first because the Greeks or any nearby force could employ hit and run tactics successfully (this is related http://garyb.0catch.com/march1/march_intro.html ) but also because it would be slow and very predictable.

The Persian army did not cross any hostile lands. All were by this time allied or vassals to the Persians, so there was no major action possible against them. A second, lighter column on the inland would ensure that no raiders from the north would harass the coast for fear that if not checked before the attack, they would surely be caught after it as they would carry any loot they would get their hands on. Of course there would be scouts, a cavalry van etc. The march was slow and Xerxes did nothing to conceal its movement. On the contrary, he did what he could so that the Greeks were actually fully informed on the proceedings and numbers, sure that they would be scared to submission. More than one major column is very unlikely to have been utilized because the vast percentage of supply was transported by sea. The land is anyways very narrow and there is no alternative route for Greece proper anyways.

Two columns ok, but now we have to consider the geography of where the invading force was descending from, what roads would it take to link with the column along the ocean? The force inland has cavalry and light infantry so it could move at a faster rate, would the cavalry be at the front of the column and since this column can march faster than the other separation can become a major problem and leaves it to defeat in detail...

As I mentioned, there are no real alternatives in northern Greece. The geography actually forces you to not march in many columns and if you need to stay at the coast, the alternatives are even less. Also, the cavalry column I mentioned as a possibility would not march at a different rate. It would be like a cover force that would each day expand back and forth, sending scouting parties everywhere around a strong reserve. It would not just march forward.

[Jugibar]

Macedon I can reply to your recent comment tomorrow but I worked this up when you posted.

When analyzing the information we have on Herodot, his account comes from later sources such as Nepos, Pausanias, and Suda so an analysis of them would be necessary here. I forgot to mention in our logistical calculations that it is totally possible Persian divisions weren't at full strength due to previous engagements at e.g. seiging the Eretrians. At Thermopylae, Leonidas had his Phocians occupy the pass but they were very soft and the Persians could easily exploit them.

Tracking back a few years to Marathon, Herodotus claimed that the Athenians ran 200 meters to engage the Persian lines, although such a charge with the amount of equipment on the hoplites is hard to envision. Is it really possible for soldiers carrying 50lbs of weight to cross 1 mile at a speed of 4.5m/h and be in a condition to fight?

“In Peter Krentz's reconstruction, the reason why the Athenians run was to deny the Persians the opportunity to properly deploy their cavalry, which if intercepted them in the middle of the plain would turn them into sitting ducks for the archers. If the Persian cavalry camped in the valley of Trikorinthos near the lake, as Hammond and Leake have suggested, it would have taken at least an hour for them to cross the narrow road between Mt Stavrokoraki and the Makaria spring (as an indication in single file with only 5 seconds per horse to pass the spring, a cavalry force of just 600 would have taken 50 minutes to ride through the chokepoint). Miltiades could have easily observed how much time it took for the Persians to array themselves in battle order in the several days of lull before the battle.

As for the Persian archery, the Athenians could have halted just outside range of Persian bowshot (maximum 200m) to catch their breath and then charge as fast as they could to minimise their exposure. Even in Herodotus' acount the order of the Athenian phalanx seems to have evaporated by the time they crashed on the Persians: they arrived all together (athrooi), not necessarily in orderly fashion.”

-Timeleon of Korinthos at TWC

Herodotus gives us deployment of the armies here in book 6.111-113

“111. And when it came round to him, then the Athenians were drawn up for battle in the order which here follows:-- On the right wing the polemarch Callimachos was leader (for the custom of the Athenians then was this, that the polemarch should have the right wing); and he leading, next after him came the tribes in order as they were numbered one after another, and last were drawn up the Plataians occupying the left wing: for ever since this battle, when the Athenians offer sacrifices in the solemn assemblies which are made at the four-yearly festivals, the herald of the Athenians prays thus, "that blessings may come to the Athenians and to the Plataians both." On this occasion however, when the Athenians were being drawn up at Marathon something of this kind was done:--their army being made equal in length of front to that of the Medes, came to drawn up in the middle with a depth of but few ranks, and here their army was weakest, while each wing was strengthened with numbers.

112. And when they had been arranged in their places and the sacrifices proved favourable, then the Athenians were let go, and they set forth at a run to attack the Barbarians. Now the space between the armies was not less than eight furlongs: and the Persians seeing them advancing to the attack at a run, made preparations to receive them; and in their minds they charged the Athenians with madness which must be fatal, seeing that they were few and yet were pressing forwards at a run, having neither cavalry nor archers. Such was the thought of the Barbarians; but the Athenians when all in a body they had joined in combat with the Barbarians, fought in a memorable fashion: for they were the first of all the Hellenes about whom we know who went to attack the enemy at a run, and they were the first also who endured to face the Median garments and the men who wore them, whereas up to this time the very name of the Medes was to the Hellenes a terror to hear.

113. Now while they fought in Marathon, much time passed by; and in the centre of the army, where the Persians themselves and the Sacans were drawn up, the Barbarians were winning, --here, I say, the Barbarians had broken the ranks of their opponents and were pursuing them inland, but on both wings the Athenians and the Plataians severally were winning the victory; and being victorious they left that part of the Barbarians which had been routed to fly without molestation, and bringing together the two wings they fought with those who had broken their centre, and the Athenians were victorious. So they followed after the Persians as they fled, slaughtering them, until they came to the sea; and then they called for fire and began to take hold of the ships.”

Now, the most probable deployment of the center was 4 deep while the wings were 8 deep, according to multiple authors. Athenians and Plataeans together most likely numbered 10,000 as Nepos claims. Constructing the Persian army size is rather difficult, If I remember correctly Herodotus implies that Persian archers were very effective so they were at the most about 200 meters away from the phalanx due to their range, and the question of cavalry is also problematic. Duncan Head gives a plausible account that I could quote later. This thread is related: http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat.html?fu...&id=168948

[Macedon]

801 km plus 700 km is 1501 km, an estimate considering the routes used above but they can be adjusted.

This is also my opinion of the actual distance that had to be covered.

Lanes are tight I was aware of, so there is no pattern with the storms?

Not one that one can depend on during the campaign season. Storms tend to appear at random during the summer, rare but pretty strong.

First I am happy that somebody can see the logistic approach of Persians. Then let us move to see the rough numbers mentioned by the 2 ancient writers Herodotus-Diodorus = roughly 300,000 men, 3000 cargo ships, 200 war ships - and let us analyse the logistics.

3,000 cargo ships and 200 war ships, cargo ships were certainly huge but what ports would they use to embark at and how much labor would each requre? Slaves? Do Herodotus and Diodorus give any contradictory figures since they see events and numbers differently? During the Second Punic war Sicily was a major battleground. 200 big ships of 150 men each would be 30,000 men, 1000 average of 100 men would be 100,000, and 1800 small of 50 men gives 90,000, so in total this requires 220,000 laborers. Divide by 2 for horse and food stock and 2.5 goes to get 275,000. It was common to bring family on campaigning, so add that as well. Slaves could account for the majority of people, but I'm certain they're not the only ones and others have to be paid a salary. They also had to be fed daily.

?? According to the sources, there were 3,000 cargo and transport ships (IIRC) and 1,200 triremes, not 200... Also, triremes had a standard crew of 200 men not 150. Transports and cargo ships would have few sailors on board, 5-10. It would be impossible to find a single port to accommodate them (the triremes mainly, since the rest would have been scattered in numerous fleets) A shore 1 km wide, would accommodate about 50-100 ships, another 50-100 if another line would remain in the shallows but in the sea. Of course, should a storm hit, ships in the sea would create havoc and so, to me, it is highly unlikely that the Persians would dare do so unless there was no other alternative. Anyways... This means that they would need a favorable shore length of maybe 20 kms. Favorable shores are not rare in mainland Greece, sometimes they are on the islands, but yet, they had to be dispersed in something like 10 different bays over a shore distance of maybe 50-100 kms, which would be a sea distance of maybe 30-70 kms from "van" to "rear". Of course these are my estimations relied on my (considerable as a Greek) knowledge of the region and some substantial generalizations, but I think they are quite reasonable and realistic calculations. They also show that it should be possible for the Persians to assemble most of their fleet in less than 4-5 hours on a normal summer day.

[Macedon]

Macedon I can reply to your recent comment tomorrow but I worked this up when you posted.

When analyzing the information we have on Herodot, his account comes from later sources such as Nepos, Pausanias, and Suda so an analysis of them would be necessary here. I forgot to mention in our logistical calculations that it is totally possible Persian divisions weren't at full strength due to previous engagements at e.g. seiging the Eretrians. At Thermopylae, Leonidas had his Phocians occupy the pass but they were very soft and the Persians could easily exploit them.

What do you mean by his account coming from later sources? Herodot's work is not lost. The numbers Herodot mentions are those supposedly crossing the Hellespont. Attrition, logistical difficulties later met, garrisons left or strengthened in Thrace, Macedonia and/or Thessaly etc would certainly have thinned the numbers a little but I cannot say how much. Again, ASSUMING (and not agreeing -why do I feel obliged to keep repeating that?-) that Herodot's numbers are correct to just have something as a basis, it would be no wonder if less than 80% of the initial train reached Thessaly. (About a mil less than those initially on the march).

Tracking back a few years to Marathon, Herodotus claimed that the Athenians ran 200 meters to engage the Persian lines, although such a charge with the amount of equipment on the hoplites is hard to envision. Is it really possible for soldiers carrying 50lbs of weight to cross 1 mile at a speed of 4.5m/h and be in a condition to fight?

Not 200 m, about 1,500 m. 4.5km/h might have been possible, more certainly not. There is no chance that any troops, no matter how disciplined or hardy they are, can actually RUN such a distance and reach their target battle ready and in relatively orderly. 4.5 km/h, a slow, orderly run is not that problematic. I have "run" much longer distances at such speeds with comparable loads after 1-2 months of hard military training, so I do not see how problematic that would be for the bulk of the ancients. Yet, a full run (as some might claim) over a one mile distance is, to me, a total absurdity.

“In Peter Krentz's reconstruction, the reason why the Athenians run was to deny the Persians the opportunity to properly deploy their cavalry, which if intercepted them in the middle of the plain would turn them into sitting ducks for the archers. If the Persian cavalry camped in the valley of Trikorinthos near the lake, as Hammond and Leake have suggested, it would have taken at least an hour for them to cross the narrow road between Mt Stavrokoraki and the Makaria spring (as an indication in single file with only 5 seconds per horse to pass the spring, a cavalry force of just 600 would have taken 50 minutes to ride through the chokepoint). Miltiades could have easily observed how much time it took for the Persians to array themselves in battle order in the several days of lull before the battle.

To me there is no way for the Persians to have posted their cavalry at a position from which it would be impossible to co-operate with the infantry. It sounds much more probable to me that they did not use their cavalry because there was no room to. The plain is not wide and the Greeks deliberately extended their line "to match that of the Persians". A fully extended line with psiloi and some heavy infantry in irregular bands at the foot of the hills and the marshes or the coast would be enough to make cavalry action more problematic than helpful. Do not forget that we do not actually know much about where exactly the lines deployed and with what facing.

As for the Persian archery, the Athenians could have halted just outside range of Persian bowshot (maximum 200m) to catch their breath and then charge as fast as they could to minimise their exposure. Even in Herodotus' acount the order of the Athenian phalanx seems to have evaporated by the time they crashed on the Persians: they arrived all together (athrooi), not necessarily in orderly fashion.”

True, although order was crucial to hoplite warfare. Aristophanes in the Wasps describes the Athenians fighting an orderly battle (man by man), Herodot does not give more details. I personally do not see them sacrifice order, which actually also protected them from missiles (disordered opponents are much more vulnerable to mass missile discharge). To fend off missiles you don't only want to shorten the exposure but also keep as tight and protected by shieldwall as possible.

[Tomenable]

Matt:

A big problem with that article is the assumptions it makes regarding what census fielded what figures. It takes the population of the world around AD 1 and tries to correlate it with Augustus's census that gives figures from 28 Bc, 14 Ad, 8 Bc rather than 1 AD.

Population of the world in either 28 BC, 14 AD or 8 BC was not significantly different than in 1 AD. In Antiquity both short and long term population growth rates were very small, due to very high mortality among infants & children, and due to the fact that any period of uninterrupted, peaceful population growth - no matter how long - was eventually being disturbed and hampered by wars and epidemies, after which population was taking long to recover to pre-war and pre-epidemy level.

Keeping track of the world population is a huge task and I'm certain there were some parts of the world that didn't have the kind of census methodlogies that Rome had so it was all conjecture to think that it was 300 million at the time.

You can estimate population also using other methods.

Comparing the Claudius census with Augustus's also shows a huge interval between the population only possible through a massive population boom.

Both the Claudius' census and Augustus' census count only Roman citizens - not entire population. And the increase in Roman citizens (5,984,072 in 48 AD compared to 4,063,000 in 28 BC, 4,233,000 in 8 BC and 4,937,000 in 14 AD) can be attributed to a number of people being granted Roman citizenship, rather than to a massive population boom. Basing on the fact that number of Roman citizens increased you cannot assume that number of non-Roman citizens and slaves also increased. Actually regarding that last category - slaves - they tended to have negative population growth, so their number was decreasing, unless there was constant influx of new slaves captured during recent wars.

Also large cities - like Rome - typically experienced negative population growth rates. The fact that population in cities was actually increasing could be attributed only to the constant influx of new people from the countryside and from smaller towns, moving to those large urban centers.

[Jugibar]

The Persian army did not cross any hostile lands. All were by this time allied or vassals to the Persians, so there was no major action possible against them. A second, lighter column on the inland would ensure that no raiders from the north would harass the coast for fear that if not checked before the attack, they would surely be caught after it as they would carry any loot they would get their hands on. Of course there would be scouts, a cavalry van etc. The march was slow and Xerxes did nothing to conceal its movement. On the contrary, he did what he could so that the Greeks were actually fully informed on the proceedings and numbers, sure that they would be scared to submission. More than one major column is very unlikely to have been utilized because the vast percentage of supply was transported by sea. The land is anyways very narrow and there is no alternative route for Greece proper anyways.

So I'm guessing that Thrace was friendly to the Persians? Do you have any reference on the allies or vassals to the Persians? They would still have to keep garrisons to ensure the supply system you propose that Herodotus mentioned (Thrace and Macedonia as you mentioned). Where were the suitable places to put Xerxes's garrisons?

As I mentioned, there are no real alternatives in northern Greece. The geography actually forces you to not march in many columns and if you need to stay at the coast, the alternatives are even less. Also, the cavalry column I mentioned as a possibility would not march at a different rate. It would be like a cover force that would each day expand back and forth, sending scouting parties everywhere around a strong reserve. It would not just march forward.

So if the cavalry column has to go all along the column to act as a cover force, but you said earlier that “The land is anyways very narrow and there is no alternative route for Greece proper anyways.” how are they going to travel back and forth as you propose? It would probably just be better to put them in the transport ships here.

?? According to the sources, there were 3,000 cargo and transport ships (IIRC) and 1,200 triremes, not 200...

I didn't post the 200 number it was a quote from Nikantor. He categorized the ships by what size they were, which is neccesary because the invading fleet was diverse.

Also, triremes had a standard crew of 200 men not 150. Transports and cargo ships would have few sailors on board, 5-10.

So you're saying that 205 to 210 men total were on each trireme, right? Since there was 1,200 triremes, 1200*(205-210)=246,000 to 252,000 crewmen in total. Does that sound right, or is it false and there were less trireme? At the Battle of Salamis, the Persians had attacked the Greek fleet in the straits of Salamis. Supposedly they had numerical superiority, but the Greek ships were of better quality. I have a hard time believing that Xerxes and Mardonius agreed to the attack because the Allies feigned rifts in the command system and Sicinnus reported Themistocles had wanted to join the king. Based off the engagements at Artemisium, storms at Magnesia and Euboeia, and potential reinforcements it's possible that the size was smaller. Your thoughts?

It would be impossible to find a single port to accommodate them (the triremes mainly, since the rest would have been scattered in numerous fleets) A shore 1 km wide, would accommodate about 50-100 ships, another 50-100 if another line would remain in the shallows but in the sea. Of course, should a storm hit, ships in the sea would create havoc and so, to me, it is highly unlikely that the Persians would dare do so unless there was no other alternative. Anyways... This means that they would need a favorable shore length of maybe 20 kms. Favorable shores are not rare in mainland Greece, sometimes they are on the islands, but yet, they had to be dispersed in something like 10 different bays over a shore distance of maybe 50-100 kms, which would be a sea distance of maybe 30-70 kms from "van" to "rear". Of course these are my estimations relied on my (considerable as a Greek) knowledge of the region and some substantial generalizations, but I think they are quite reasonable and realistic calculations. They also show that it should be possible for the Persians to assemble most of their fleet in less than 4-5 hours on a normal summer day.

Most of the ships were stationed in the Nile, and Tyre as well. Do you have a source for why 50-100 ships would need a space of 1 km assuming that it was in one line? I don't live in Greece, so do you know where islands can be found to support even a little section for the fleet? Wikimedia has this map here: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/co...try-fr.jpg So what about the Cyclades or the Dodecanese?

What do you mean by his account coming from later sources? Herodot's work is not lost. The numbers Herodot mentions are those supposedly crossing the Hellespont. Attrition, logistical difficulties later met, garrisons left or strengthened in Thrace or Macedonia, attrition etc would certainly have thinned the numbers a little but I cannot say how much. Again, ASSUMING (and not agreeing -why do I feel obliged to keep repeating that?-) that Herodot's numbers are correct to just have something as a basis, it would be no wonder if less than 80% of the initial train reached Thessaly. (About a mil less than those initially on the march).

Yes, I know his work isn't lost. Ok, let's assume Herodotus' numbers are correct, and that 4 million men were fielded in the marching column. 4,000,000*.8=Less than 3,200,000 men reaching Thessaly. Nowadays, Thessaly is a huge agricultural area, lots of cattle and sheep I hear. But I don't think it was until recently that flooding was controlled. Do you think the Thessaly region can supply the army with about 50% of its food required?

Not 200 m, about 1,500 m. 4.5km/h might have been possible, more certainly not. There is no chance that any troops, no matter how disciplined or hardy they are, can actually RUN such a distance and reach their target battle ready and in relatively orderly. 4.5 km/h, a slow, orderly run is not that problematic. I have "run" much longer distances at such speeds with comparable loads after 1-2 months of hard military training, so I do not see how problematic that would be for the bulk of the ancients. Yet, a full run (as some might claim) over a one mile distance is, to me, a total absurdity.

Actually yes you're probably right. I recall that the distance between the Persian and Greek line was about a mile. At what point did they charge?

To me there is no way for the Persians to have posted their cavalry at a position from which it would be impossible to co-operate with the infantry. It sounds much more probable to me that they did not use their cavalry because there was no room to. The plain is not wide and the Greeks deliberately extended their line "to match that of the Persians". A fully extended line with psiloi and some heavy infantry in irregular bands at the foot of the hills and the marshes or the coast would be enough to make cavalry action more problematic than helpful. Do not forget that we do not actually know much about where exactly the lines deployed and with what facing.

Yes, but there was a standard deployment method for the phalanx and cavalry, we know the topography of Marathon then, and although the Persians had no standard deployment we can calculate precisely where the Persian were based on how accurate the archers were, since they deployed behind the infantry and needed the infantry to amass in a small depth and large frontage for the archers to be within effective range.

[Macedon]

So I'm guessing that Thrace was friendly to the Persians? Do you have any reference on the allies or vassals to the Persians? They would still have to keep garrisons to ensure the supply system you propose that Herodotus mentioned (Thrace and Macedonia as you mentioned). Where were the suitable places to put Xerxes's garrisons?

It was subdued years before the invasions. They were forced allies as were the Macedonians. Both unwilling according to the sources. The Thracians wreaked havoc to the forces that retreated through their lands after Plataea having learned of their defeat. As for the garrisons, I see them securing safe harbors only. No other place was really of real strategical value. These could be temporary stations built by the Persians in the multitude of small and large bays along the Greek coastline or certain Greek cities with organized harbors. I did not yet speak of any actual supply system, just that it was based on naval superiority. About the Persian expeditions into the Balkans before the invasion of Greece you can read Herodot.

So if the cavalry column has to go all along the column to act as a cover force, but you said earlier that “The land is anyways very narrow and there is no alternative route for Greece proper anyways.” how are they going to travel back and forth as you propose? It would probably just be better to put them in the transport ships here.

You can try google earth to get an idea of Greek, Balkan and Anatolian geophysical peculiarities. These are very mountainous regions with many woods, swamps, rivers and streams. The task of the secondary column I am proposing -there is no evidence of it in the sources- would be to screen the main column that had to stay by the sea. The tactical doctrines for a secure march are analyzed by Xenophon in his Anabasis. They include preoccupation of strong points, scouting etc. All columns, especially one as long, are vulnerable during their march, especially their rear. A covering force adds much to its security. I repeat, no such evidence occurs in the texts. They would be traveling back and forth through the countless valleys, small roads, fields and hills, practically patrolling the area. The roads and routes along the coast where most cities were located were much more favorable and better known. IF a covering column did exist, I doubt that it would march further than 10-15 kms inland. Sometimes, when an equally favorable alternative route was at hand, I am certain that the Persians would take both, effectively forming two columns. Of course this would not make the march quicker. It would just double the amount of troops reaching the specified position for the next camp at any given time.

I didn't post the 200 number it was a quote from Nikantor. He categorized the ships by what size they were, which is neccesary because the invading fleet was diverse.

Of course it is. It is all in Herodot, as long as one trusts in his numbers. The triremes taking part in the battle of Salamis on both sides is a matter of a debate. Some prefer to follow Aeschylus who gives a bit smaller numbers.

So you're saying that 205 to 210 men total were on each trireme, right? Since there was 1,200 triremes, 1200*(205-210)=246,000 to 252,000 crewmen in total. Does that sound right, or is it false and there were less trireme? At the Battle of Salamis, the Persians had attacked the Greek fleet in the straits of Salamis. Supposedly they had numerical superiority, but the Greek ships were of better quality. I have a hard time believing that Xerxes and Mardonius agreed to the attack because the Allies feigned rifts in the command system and Sicinnus reported Themistocles had wanted to join the king. Based off the engagements at Artemisium, storms at Magnesia and Euboeia, and potential reinforcements it's possible that the size was smaller. Your thoughts?

200 for the Greeks, probably a bit more for the Persians. Around what you say. Of course the fleet numbers attested would be those that started the campaign. There were considerable losses among the Persians before Salamis. If there were 1,000 triremes (Aeschylus), then 200,000 would be a good number. I reckon that any additional infantry boarded for the battle would be allocated from the infantry units following on land. The Greek triremes were not better built. They were as good as the Persian ones although some of the Persian ships might have been a bit bigger. Most ships on the Persian fleet were not different to those of the Greeks, many were Greek. The Greeks had superior training and probably tactical doctrines regarding naval battles. Not so much because they were better "sailors" than the Phoenicians, the Ionians or the Egyptians for example, but because they were much more experienced in war, the rest living in a much more "stable" and "peaceful" environment, at least regarding maritime warfare. Forcing the Persians to attack by feigning flight is not strange at all, If Xerxes wanted then destroyed there and there, confident in his superior numbers, it was indeed a very good opportunity. Any number of Persian triremes (1,000 or 1,200) is to me probable, no real difference tacticalwise which number is closer to the truth.

Most of the ships were stationed in the Nile, and Tyre as well. Do you have a source for why 50-100 ships would need a space of 1 km assuming that it was in one line? I don't live in Greece, so do you know where islands can be found to support even a little section for the fleet? Wikimedia has this map here: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/co...try-fr.jpg So what about the Cyclades or the Dodecanese?

Nile? Tyre? You mean before the campaign? Of course the Persian fleet in Greece was not stationed in Tyre or the Nile. No source, just take into account that triremes were usually, for safety, drawn onto the shore. Each one was about 6m wide and some empty space among the ships would have been necessary. I just assumed that this space wold be 4-14 m wide. 4 m in extremely favorable conditions, 14 m in unfavorable conditions. The Aegean is dotted with small and "large" (for Greek standards) islands. Yet, they are usually very rough with only a few, relatively small favorable shores that would hold only squadrons. Euboea is larger, it can be more favorable. Normally, islands would be not preferred for a big fleet because they would be unsupported by the army, there would be difficulty in finding water and they would be easy prey for Greek squadrons who knew the sea-lanes very well.

Yes, I know his work isn't lost. Ok, let's assume Herodotus' numbers are correct, and that 4 million men were fielded in the marching column. 4,000,000*.8=Less than 3,200,000 men reaching Thessaly. Nowadays, Thessaly is a huge agricultural area, lots of cattle and sheep I hear. But I don't think it was until recently that flooding was controlled. Do you think the Thessaly region can supply the army with about 50% of its food required?

No, Thessaly would not be able to support them, nor would the Macedonian plains. They would be able to secure supplies if necessary for a considerable amount of time (maybe some weeks) but they would certainly not be able to rely on the domestic surplus. They needed imported supplies from the east to be able to operate without laying waste to their allies' lands. Do not forget that the Thessalians did give water and earth as did many of the Boeotians.

Actually yes you're probably right. I recall that the distance between the Persian and Greek line was about a mile. At what point did they charge?

The sources are not clear. If we take Herodot to the letter and IF we assume that when he says "run" he means "run like hell" then they did so for a mile... The whole thing lies in the verb "to run". A slow, ordered run, like modern military do when they are training, is much more probable as far as I am concerned.

Yes, but there was a standard deployment method for the phalanx and cavalry, we know the topography of Marathon then, and although the Persians had no standard deployment we can calculate precisely where the Persian were based on how accurate the archers were, since they deployed behind the infantry and needed the infantry to amass in a small depth and large frontage for the archers to be within effective range.

We do know the topography, although then the distance to the sea would have been even smaller but we do not know where exactly they deployed and with what facing. It is interesting to note that knowing the exact position of a battle, even those most major, important and well known, is very rarely the case... It generally is a relatively narrow place.

[Paralus]

200 for the Greeks, probably a bit more for the Persians. Around what you say. Of course the fleet numbers attested would be those that started the campaign. There were considerable losses among the Persians before Salamis. If there were 1,000 triremes (Aeschylus), then 200,000 would be a good number.

Somewhere in the interminable discussions of Persian numbers I’ve addressed the notion of 1,207 or 1,000 triremes. The numbers are not credible and even those who defend them (Wallinga the prime example) have to invent ingenious ways of explaining them (the fleet was “undermanned”).

Wallinga would have it that there was a standing Persian “navy” of 600 fighting ships. This, he supposes, doubled to 1,200 after the “standing navy” of 600 defeated the Ionians and took their fleet. The notion of a permanent Persian fleet is not supportable; these were landlubbers and no direct (or even decent indirect) evidence can be found to suggest otherwise. Unlike the Lacedaemonians (famous Greek landlubbers), who had terms for naval commands, the Persians have none. What is clear – especially by the endlessly attested figure of 300 triremes and the many attestations of their having to be “assembled” – is that the King ordered what he wanted from his subject allies in the Levant when he needed it. The size of those armaments seems to be a regular 300 ships or so (Cimon felt secure enough to sail east with 250 ships – he wasn’t expecting 600 or more to oppose him).

I would think that Xerxes sailed to Greece with something similar; possibly a little larger but nothing like 1,207. Even Herodotus, when it comes time for the smaller Greek fleet to engage at Artemesium and Salamis has to resort to “managing” the figures. Firstly, Herodotus has over 400 Persian ships destroyed in a storm (7.190 - these are clearly triremes; the cargo ships were destroyed beyond number.) Then, rather than using the superior numbers, Herodotus dispatches 200 Persian ships around Euboea (some 250 nautical miles) to complete destruction. Scratch 600 and, voila(!), we are back to the Danube expedition numbers and Wallinga’s “standing Persian Navy”. Clearly even Herodotus, writing at a time of Athens’ naval pomp, felt the need to reduce the embarrassment of the numbers.

As well, he states that at least half the Athenian ships at Artemesium – where “they had a rough time” of it – were damaged (8.18.1) although they seem all to be present at Salamis. A wonderful repair job that even the legendary Starfleet engineer Scotty would be proud of.

The Greek triremes were not better built. They were as good as the Persian ones although some of the Persian ships might have been a bit bigger. Most ships on the Persian fleet were not different to those of the Greeks, many were Greek.

Most – if not the great majority – will have been Phoenician. It is clear that these are the core of Persian fleets and the invasion of Greece will have been no different. I view Herodotus’ “naval list” with the same jaundiced eye I view his “army list”. Cyrus conquered Egypt with the Phoenician fleet and Xerxes would do Greece with a fleet where this contingent was the largest.

The Phoenician ships were, in some way, “larger” than the Greek. They were certainly decked so as to carry a full complement of marines (cf the battles which followed in the Aegean under Cimon). What we do hear of the battle of Salamis clearly describes the Greeks ramming their opposites. This likely speaks to the Greek tactics and likely their “smaller” triremes. Just why they went back to land battles at sea afterward is anyone’s guess (this is just the “old style” naval warfare Thucydides later disparages by implication.)

The Greeks had superior training and probably tactical doctrines regarding naval battles. Not so much because they were better "sailors" than the Phoenicians, the Ionians or the Egyptians for example, but because they were much more experienced in war, the rest living in a much more "stable" and "peaceful" environment, at least regarding maritime warfare.

I’d really like to see some hard facts to support this notion. For a start the Persians had just defeated the Ionians – and had done so at sea. There was no great Greek experience of war on sea. Aside from the desultory Aegina-Athens war (waged by small numbers of ships) there is no real evidence to show that the Greeks were “much more experienced at war” – especially at sea. Indeed, Herodotus makes plain the fear the Greeks had of the Phoenician ships.

You might argue this was because the Phoenicians were “better sailors” and not “more experienced in war”. This is not a cogent argument and only plays to the gestalt of the valorous, virtuous and superior Greek soldier meme. As Athens continually demonstrated in the following decades, Spartan “excellence” in war meant absolutely squat all on water. The fleet with the better sailors almost always prevailed:

Diod. 13.40.1
For although the Peloponnesians had the advantage in the number of their ships and the valour of their marines, the skill of the Athenian pilots rendered the superiority of their opponents of no effect. For whenever the Peloponnesians, with their ships in a body, would charge swiftly forward to ram, the pilots would manoeuvre their own ships so skilfully that their opponents were unable to strike them at any other spot but could only meet them bows on, ram against ram.

And this after the depredations of the disastrous Sicilian expedition. Nothing was any different some seventy years earlier.

[Macedon]

Somewhere in the interminable discussions of Persian numbers I’ve addressed the notion of 1,207 or 1,000 triremes. The numbers are not credible and even those who defend them (Wallinga the prime example) have to invent ingenious ways of explaining them (the fleet was “undermanned”).

You say impossible, I say possible but certainly not certain. You think that the population of the area could never sustain such numbers and/or that their supply and logistical methods were insufficient, I believe they were quite sufficient although sufficiency does IN NO WAY guarantee that they would be stretched to such proportions. 1,200 warships is nothing really difficult to amass at the time and no "ingenious ways" are necessary to defend them. Improbable? To a certain degree of course. Impossible? No. Triremes were easy and quickly to build, the numbers attested are very down-to-earth for all nations mentioned. The argument of "low manpower" is much weaker here than this regarding the land force, since the totals here are much much less anyways and fully within the capabilities of these nations and of the Empire. Wallinga has been severely criticized for his views, which I also find to be a poor reconciliation attempt. If the Persian Empire with all those major maritime nations under its sway could not muster as many triremes, I guess that you also hold the quinquereme fleets of later Rome and Carthage as an absurd impossibility.

The notion of a permanent Persian fleet is not supportable; these were landlubbers and no direct (or even decent indirect) evidence can be found to suggest otherwise. Unlike the Lacedaemonians (famous Greek landlubbers), who had terms for naval commands, the Persians have none. What is clear – especially by the endlessly attested figure of 300 triremes and the many attestations of their having to be “assembled” – is that the King ordered what he wanted from his subject allies in the Levant when he needed it. The size of those armaments seems to be a regular 300 ships or so (Cimon felt secure enough to sail east with 250 ships – he wasn’t expecting 600 or more to oppose him).

What do you mean by a "permanent" Persian fleet. The nations of the Empire carried the burden of providing the services that make the presence of a warfleet necessary. It was they who formed the "permanent" Persian fleet. And of course, there would be no problem in amassing such a fleet, especially if subsidized by the Persian treasury, as was the norm, and given 1-2 years warning (it seems Persia was preparing for more). It does not matter that Persia was a landbound nation with no naval background. This is why it had its Egyptians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Cypriots, Ionians etc, all populous nations of maritime tradition. Cimon sailed with a victorious Greek fleet against a beaten opponent, who would need time to reorganize its naval defenses, build new ships, repair damages and of course with an eye to keep control over prospective rebellious vassals. The Persians themselves would not build any ships, they would have ordered/asked their vassals to do so, peoples who surely needed time, were in a much weaker position than 5 years ago etc. They would only be able to muster their current forces at short notice and the 200 ships Conon seems to have fought (maybe they were 50?) shows that they still were considerable but not as many as they would have been had they not been relatively drained by the war. By the way, in the analysis of the ship ownership that Herodot provides for the Persian fleet, which numbers particularly strike you as impossible?

I would think that Xerxes sailed to Greece with something similar; possibly a little larger but nothing like 1,207. Even Herodotus, when it comes time for the smaller Greek fleet to engage at Artemesium and Salamis has to resort to “managing” the figures. Firstly, Herodotus has over 400 Persian ships destroyed in a storm (7.190 - these are clearly triremes; the cargo ships were destroyed beyond number.) Then, rather than using the superior numbers, Herodotus dispatches 200 Persian ships around Euboea (some 250 nautical miles) to complete destruction. Scratch 600 and, voila(!), we are back to the Danube expedition numbers and Wallinga’s “standing Persian Navy”. Clearly even Herodotus, writing at a time of Athens’ naval pomp, felt the need to reduce the embarrassment of the numbers.

I do not think that fixing the numbers is what Herodot did. He wrote of the accounts he was given of what had happened at Artemisium. The probability of him being wrong or better reporting wrong numbers has nothing to do with any "embarassment" he felt, which of course is certainly not "clear". Had he really thought that the numbers reported were incredible he would have simply said so. All the arguments against the numbers of Herodot are actually given by Herodot himself when he has Artabanos trying to dissuade Xerxes. It is not that Herodot lacked "common sense", that he didn't understand the dangers and problems of a huge expeditions. It is just that this is what his sources/tradition etc believed to have been reality. Regarding the actual number of ships taking part on the Persian side, Herodot does not provide a number but says that in his opinion they should be no less than 1,200, not because of any reinforcements from Asia but because of the further ships that joined him from Europe. This sounds, to me, strange, since I do not see 600+ triremes being supplied by the Greeks of the north. He mentions 120, maybe another 80 from Thessaly and Boeotia? That would still leave about 400 triremes unaccounted for. So, if the initial number of 1,200 triremes is accepted, again I see about 800 reaching Salamis. Nevertheless, all sources speak of 1,000+ triremes, which again clearly shows what was universally held as the truth in ancient Greece. To reconciliate such difference, I would personally be more prepared to accept that the losses reported during the two storms were lighter than the numbers Herodot gives, a number which certainly constitutes a product of huge speculation. Furthermore, a great number of the ships that suffered in the storms would have been damaged instead of wrecked. Some would be shortly operational, others would need more extensive repairs although being able to sail to Attica, even if not battle-worthy.

As well, he states that at least half the Athenian ships at Artemesium – where “they had a rough time” of it – were damaged (8.18.1) although they seem all to be present at Salamis. A wonderful repair job that even the legendary Starfleet engineer Scotty would be proud of.

Actually, triremes could be repaired very quickly. They were built from scratch in a matter of a few months and repairs, if not terribly extensive, would only require days, a few weeks if really serious. Although I do not really disagree with your arguments about the problem regarding the total number of triremes minus reported wreckages, as I hope is clear, repair time would not be a real problem for most ships, as long as Xerxes had supplies of the necessary tools, equipment and skilled personel, which I am sure he had aplenty.

Most – if not the great majority – will have been Phoenician. It is clear that these are the core of Persian fleets and the invasion of Greece will have been no different. I view Herodotus’ “naval list” with the same jaundiced eye I view his “army list”. Cyrus conquered Egypt with the Phoenician fleet and Xerxes would do Greece with a fleet where this contingent was the largest.

The Phoenician ships were, in some way, “larger” than the Greek. They were certainly decked so as to carry a full complement of marines (cf the battles which followed in the Aegean under Cimon). What we do hear of the battle of Salamis clearly describes the Greeks ramming their opposites. This likely speaks to the Greek tactics and likely their “smaller” triremes. Just why they went back to land battles at sea afterward is anyone’s guess (this is just the “old style” naval warfare Thucydides later disparages by implication.)

Then you agree on the basics (at least regarding proportions) with Herodot. I asked you above which of the numbers of ships provided by each nation you think is impossible. It is interesting to note that the Greek ships are described as "heavier" than those of the Persian fleet by Themistocles (8.60), but I still do not see a real difference between the two fleets in terms of "heaviness", especially nothing that has to do with these sci-fi images of sleek Greek ships ramming huge Persian galleys I often see in certain books on the Persian Wars. Which comment of Thucydides are you referring to?

I’d really like to see some hard facts to support this notion. For a start the Persians had just defeated the Ionians – and had done so at sea. There was no great Greek experience of war on sea. Aside from the desultory Aegina-Athens war (waged by small numbers of ships) there is no real evidence to show that the Greeks were “much more experienced at war” – especially at sea. Indeed, Herodotus makes plain the fear the Greeks had of the Phoenician ships.

Greeks were, then and later, at a perpetual war against each other. Sea-battles were very common although certainly not of a magnitude such as Salamis. They had to because of the geophysical reality of their lands. The Greek seas have nothing to do with the rest of the Mediterranean Sea. Their wars had to entail naval action. This is not the case for the Phoenicians and all other non-Aegean populations of the Empire, whose wars were mainly land-bound and thus their tactical doctrines would not be as advanced. You may have misunderstood my "superior training" comment, which only had to do with taking part in naval action, something very different to the vast experience of the Phoenicians, the Cilicians, the Egyptians etc which would mostly have to do with peacetime action. Even the Ionians were not as militarily active in the Aegean and would be inferior in experience and tactical competence. There was a relative stability in the Persian Empire for decades and this surely affects the military competence of its nations, especially at sea. Hard evidence is nothing anyone can provide if you choose to disregard the Greek accounts and descriptions. If you do not, then, for example, Herodot is full of direct and indirect evidence pointing to this exact conclusion. Fearing and respecting an enemy are not what my argument is about nor do they speak as to anyone's relative competence. The description of the battle itself, for one, is much more eloquent.

You might argue this was because the Phoenicians were “better sailors” and not “more experienced in war”. This is not a cogent argument and only plays to the gestalt of the valorous, virtuous and superior Greek soldier meme. As Athens continually demonstrated in the following decades, Spartan “excellence” in war meant absolutely squat all on water. The fleet with the better sailors almost always prevailed:

Diod. 13.40.1
For although the Peloponnesians had the advantage in the number of their ships and the valour of their marines, the skill of the Athenian pilots rendered the superiority of their opponents of no effect. For whenever the Peloponnesians, with their ships in a body, would charge swiftly forward to ram, the pilots would manoeuvre their own ships so skilfully that their opponents were unable to strike them at any other spot but could only meet them bows on, ram against ram.

And this after the depredations of the disastrous Sicilian expedition. Nothing was any different some seventy years earlier.

Experience in warfare is not the only one but certainly a very determining factor. The same applies for sea battles. Naval action was not that different in many aspects from land battles in principal. The training of the rowers was important, the training and experience of the sailors were important, the training and experience of the commanders/captains were important, the ability to co-ordinate, keep the line, choose the right tactic at the right moment were also very important. A strong, trained rower without skilled sailors was nothing. Experienced, top sailors without an equally capable captain were nothing, a capable captain without knowledge and experience of naval warfare and tactics made his ship a nothing. Ten captains who did not know how to co-operate at sea, co-ordinate their movements and keep their formation made a squadron of capable ships a nothing. So, as I said, superior sea-battle experience and knowledge of superior naval warfare tactics were a crucial factor where in my opinion, and according to the sources, the Greeks were better. What Diodorus writes on this specific extract only reinforces these exact arguments. Only that these mariners were not better "sailors" in general, they were better at naval warfare tactics.



By the way... I missed that according to Herodot (7.121) the Persian army marched in 3 columns. One long the shore, one inland and one between the two.