Ancient Logistics and ancient warfare

[Paralus]

It's two fifteen in the morning George and I'm going to bed. Aside from your predilection for splitting my argument, can you show me where I used the word "impossible"?

Perhaps I'll rejoinder later.

[Macedon]

You did not. I, maybe mistakingly, assumed you meant so when you wrote :

"The numbers are not credible and even those who defend them (Wallinga the prime example) have to invent ingenious ways of explaining them (the fleet was “undermanned”)."

Why would you write such a thing if you did not deem them impossible? Why would one need invent ingenious arguments to support something that is not impossible? Yet, if you do not, I apologize.

What do you mean by me splitting your argument? I tried, as we do often, to answer point by point.

Have a good night. It is still afternoon here and I have a lot of writing to do...

[Paralus]

Busy as all get out George. I'll get back to you - maybe in a day or two (Should not nave been watching golf/cricket from England in the wee hours...)

Everything might be possible; it's just whether it's credible. On the "splitting", I'll get to that with time.

[Sean Manning]

200 for the Greeks, probably a bit more for the Persians. Around what you say. Of course the fleet numbers attested would be those that started the campaign. There were considerable losses among the Persians before Salamis. If there were 1,000 triremes (Aeschylus), then 200,000 would be a good number.

Somewhere in the interminable discussions of Persian numbers I’ve addressed the notion of 1,207 or 1,000 triremes. The numbers are not credible and even those who defend them (Wallinga the prime example) have to invent ingenious ways of explaining them (the fleet was “undermanned”).

Wallinga would have it that there was a standing Persian “navy” of 600 fighting ships. This, he supposes, doubled to 1,200 after the “standing navy” of 600 defeated the Ionians and took their fleet. The notion of a permanent Persian fleet is not supportable; these were landlubbers and no direct (or even decent indirect) evidence can be found to suggest otherwise. Unlike the Lacedaemonians (famous Greek landlubbers), who had terms for naval commands, the Persians have none. What is clear – especially by the endlessly attested figure of 300 triremes and the many attestations of their having to be “assembled” – is that the King ordered what he wanted from his subject allies in the Levant when he needed it. The size of those armaments seems to be a regular 300 ships or so (Cimon felt secure enough to sail east with 250 ships – he wasn’t expecting 600 or more to oppose him).

I would think that Xerxes sailed to Greece with something similar; possibly a little larger but nothing like 1,207. Even Herodotus, when it comes time for the smaller Greek fleet to engage at Artemesium and Salamis has to resort to “managing” the figures. Firstly, Herodotus has over 400 Persian ships destroyed in a storm (7.190 - these are clearly triremes; the cargo ships were destroyed beyond number.) Then, rather than using the superior numbers, Herodotus dispatches 200 Persian ships around Euboea (some 250 nautical miles) to complete destruction. Scratch 600 and, voila(!), we are back to the Danube expedition numbers and Wallinga’s “standing Persian Navy”. Clearly even Herodotus, writing at a time of Athens’ naval pomp, felt the need to reduce the embarrassment of the numbers.

As well, he states that at least half the Athenian ships at Artemesium – where “they had a rough time” of it – were damaged (8.18.1) although they seem all to be present at Salamis. A wonderful repair job that even the legendary Starfleet engineer Scotty would be proud of.

Peter Green's suggestion in The Greco-Persian Wars that the 1207 triremes could have included those which were used as pontoons has a lot of merit. A fleet of 650 or so Persian triremes and a few hundred roundships and light galleys is just within the bounds of possibility.

[hoplite14gr]

The hopites assult on bowmen was mentioned earlier and I feel that there are misconseptions here. Ita rather unlikely that in Marathon hoplites run 1500 meters,

What probably happened was shown in the 15th Austalasian Historical Conference in 2009.

Please see here:
http://www.koryvantes.org/koryvantes/sho....jsp?key=2

Kind regards

[Lyceum]

That doesn't prove anything about anything at all Stephane...its just...whatever. The website assumes an awful lot and has no sense of methodology.

Also. Herodotos is always right. ALWAYS. RIGHT.

Now that doesn't mean he was factually accurate or anything like that, but that's not his job...these men were hardly trying to be historians in our sense of the word (which is only very, very, recent) and you have to place them in context. In Herodotos' case that is the slowly burgeoning epichoric investigative genre around Ionia which had links with epos (mainly genealogy)and had, amongst other things, a performative and collaborative element to it.

In other words Herodotos is 100% great at what he's setting out to do.

[Jugibar]

It was subdued years before the invasions. They were forced allies as were the Macedonians. Both unwilling according to the sources. The Thracians wreaked havoc to the forces that retreated through their lands after Plataea having learned of their defeat. As for the garrisons, I see them securing safe harbors only. No other place was really of real strategical value. These could be temporary stations built by the Persians in the multitude of small and large bays along the Greek coastline or certain Greek cities with organized harbors. I did not yet speak of any actual supply system, just that it was based on naval superiority. About the Persian expeditions into the Balkans before the invasion of Greece you can read Herodot.

Yes you're right, my chronology is off. Although I don't understand why any further revolts were attempted because of psychological reasons. Obviously if your sovereignty is being threatened it doesn't make any sense to back down. There were multiple satraps in Asia Minor that had to maintain the forces there, and the small Greek fleet was mobile enough so that it may be necessary to keep garrisons for any surprise amphibious landing. This is, of course, speculation and assumption. Perhaps we should expand on Plataea and why the Greek phalanx was so successful against the Persians.

The tactical doctrines for a secure march are analyzed by Xenophon in his Anabasis. They include preoccupation of strong points, scouting etc. All columns, especially one as long, are vulnerable during their march, especially their rear. A covering force adds much to its security. I repeat, no such evidence occurs in the texts. They would be traveling back and forth through the countless valleys, small roads, fields and hills, practically patrolling the area. The roads and routes along the coast where most cities were located were much more favorable and better known. IF a covering column did exist, I doubt that it would march further than 10-15 kms inland. Sometimes, when an equally favorable alternative route was at hand, I am certain that the Persians would take both, effectively forming two columns. Of course this would not make the march quicker. It would just double the amount of troops reaching the specified position for the next camp at any given time.

Thanks for the reference I will take a look at it. Sure they traveled through difficult geographic boundaries such as valleys and hills but the Hellenistic doctrine of warfare was bound to the element of surprise and massing a large portion of your army on detachments of the enemy's. How do you think the columns dispersed once they reached Thrace?

Nile? Tyre? You mean before the campaign? Of course the Persian fleet in Greece was not stationed in Tyre or the Nile. No source, just take into account that triremes were usually, for safety, drawn onto the shore. Each one was about 6m wide and some empty space among the ships would have been necessary. I just assumed that this space wold be 4-14 m wide. 4 m in extremely favorable conditions, 14 m in unfavorable conditions. The Aegean is dotted with small and "large" (for Greek standards) islands. Yet, they are usually very rough with only a few, relatively small favorable shores that would hold only squadrons. Euboea is larger, it can be more favorable. Normally, islands would be not preferred for a big fleet because they would be unsupported by the army, there would be difficulty in finding water and they would be easy prey for Greek squadrons who knew the sea-lanes very well.

Yes obviously they weren't stationed in the Tyre or the Nile, my point was that the main geographic features that produced ships and offered plenty of supplies (even the Levant as Paralus mentions) were so far away from the front lines and battles that the Persian fleets had to operate on exterior lines, meaning it was harder to reinforce each successive tactical body and the Greeks could operate with more speed and concentration. So, in your opinion, was the Euboea the only favorable site for docking of ships, or did they have to spread out to avoid any effects the Greek squadrons could've had?

No, Thessaly would not be able to support them, nor would the Macedonian plains. They would be able to secure supplies if necessary for a considerable amount of time (maybe some weeks) but they would certainly not be able to rely on the domestic surplus. They needed imported supplies from the east to be able to operate without laying waste to their allies' lands. Do not forget that the Thessalians did give water and earth as did many of the Boeotians.

Maybe, as you said, the Mesopotamian farmlands would be more suitable for sustaining the war effort. However, these supplies had to be paid for from the farmers. I don't have a background in the ancient Persian economy, but if most of the land was controlled by a monopoly these purchases would be very expensive.

By the way... I missed that according to Herodot (7.121) the Persian army marched in 3 columns. One long the shore, one inland and one between the two.

This is going to change the calculations considerably.

[Macedon]

Yes you're right, my chronology is off. Although I don't understand why any further revolts were attempted because of psychological reasons. Obviously if your sovereignty is being threatened it doesn't make any sense to back down. There were multiple satraps in Asia Minor that had to maintain the forces there, and the small Greek fleet was mobile enough so that it may be necessary to keep garrisons for any surprise amphibious landing. This is, of course, speculation and assumption. Perhaps we should expand on Plataea and why the Greek phalanx was so successful against the Persians.

Do you mean "were not attempted"? Surely, substantial local garrisons would have been maintained. The obligatory Persian muster made sure that Xerxes would have enough "hostages" to keep peace. It is not easy to rebel if you have 10,000 of your youths in Xerxes' train... After the campaign there were revolts. Of course the Greek fleet was not small... just smaller. The problem with the triremes though was that they required safe haven as they very seldomly they spent the night on sea. As long as the islands and the northern shores were secure for the Persians, the danger was not that great, since local garrisons would be able to deal with the crews of small fleet and anyways they presented only small threats since the only thing they could do was limited raids. Yet, once the Aegean was not controlled any more, when fleets of 200 triremes plus transports could be employed, things were different. And from the Persian fleet, some 400 + were Greek too, expected or feared to revolt too...

At Plataea, it was Mardonius' rashness that was mainly to blame. He thought the Greeks were fleeing and sped to attack their rear guard... Thus, unsupported and hastily, he attacked with the Persians and was killed. Once he fell, everything was lost... I regard Platea more like a series of battles than one co-ordinated instance. It was highly unconventional action...

Thanks for the reference I will take a look at it. Sure they traveled through difficult geographic boundaries such as valleys and hills but the Hellenistic doctrine of warfare was bound to the element of surprise and massing a large portion of your army on detachments of the enemy's. How do you think the columns dispersed once they reached Thrace?

I don't understand these questions. What do you mean with the "Hellenistic doctrine of warfare"? About Thrace, do you mean the return after Plataea?

Yes obviously they weren't stationed in the Tyre or the Nile, my point was that the main geographic features that produced ships and offered plenty of supplies (even the Levant as Paralus mentions) were so far away from the front lines and battles that the Persian fleets had to operate on exterior lines, meaning it was harder to reinforce each successive tactical body and the Greeks could operate with more speed and concentration. So, in your opinion, was the Euboea the only favorable site for docking of ships, or did they have to spread out to avoid any effects the Greek squadrons could've had?

No. Xerxes prepared this expedition for 5 years. He would have already amassed all necessary provisions at his bases at Hellespont. He would have expected the campaign to last maybe a year in total, so such provisions would have been in storehouses ready to ship in the cargo fleets. As long as the fleets kept sailing back and forth there would be no problem until the storehouses were empty. I also doubt that he expected any reinforcements from Asia once in Greece. None is reported to have arrived. When some mention reinforcements, they mean the troops of the European vassals/allies that joined the campaign, not any from Asia.

I do not see him dock in Euboea. Boeotia was allied and the fleet had to stay near the army. Next stop.. Athens!

Maybe, as you said, the Mesopotamian farmlands would be more suitable for sustaining the war effort. However, these supplies had to be paid for from the farmers. I don't have a background in the ancient Persian economy, but if most of the land was controlled by a monopoly these purchases would be very expensive.

Surplus and tribute would have been gathered from all over the empire and shipped to Sardis or other safe storehouses in the west. Assuming (many would debate that) that the Empire sustained 50,000,000 inhabitants, only 2% tribute a year for 5 years would store enough provisions for 5,000,000 men for 1 year. Of course tax on produce was much larger but that would be required to set aside for the campaign for men and steed, assuming a whopping 5 mil number of dependents... Most possibly, even if Herodot's numbers are correct, far less provisions would have been necessary. Half the train, half the requirements... And all that with the assumption that all provisions were provided by the Empire. Tribute, markets and forage would always have been options.

This is going to change the calculations considerably.

Cuts the length of the columns to 1/3 or 1/2 that initially assumed each.

[Jugibar]

Macedon I am looking over references and will respond in detail in a few days but regarding the following..

I don't understand these questions. What do you mean with the "Hellenistic doctrine of warfare"? About Thrace, do you mean the return after Plataea?

What I mean by the Hellenistic doctrine of warfare, is that the general methodology used by Hellenistic/Greek generals was to place more men at the point of attack, inflicting more casualties and formations of large depth.

Do you mean "were not attempted"?

Yes.

He would have already amassed all necessary provisions at his bases at Hellespont.

As long as the fleets kept sailing back and forth there would be no problem until the storehouses were empty.

I tried to bring this up earlier, what supply depots were used according to the primary sources, and what carrying capacity did they have?

Matt

[Macedon]

What I mean by the Hellenistic doctrine of warfare, is that the general methodology used by Hellenistic/Greek generals was to place more men at the point of attack, inflicting more casualties and formations of large depth.

So, you are talking about pitched battle tactics... Not really, not THE "Hellenic doctrine of warfare". It was one tactic that was used in some cases (additional depth at the striking point). There were a number of ways to "strengthen" a part of your phalanx or/and use it as your main offensive effort.

I tried to bring this up earlier, what supply depots were used according to the primary sources, and what carrying capacity did they have?"

Well... I cannot say what the exact bases that he would have built were, Sardis surely being one, but as far s capacities were concerned, storehouses could be really huge... A large amount of Egypt's grain was stored in such, Mesopotamia's too. The technology was there, so was the manpower. A network of comlpexes of granaries throughout the Empire would have been constructed/utilized and linked with caravans that would keep the flow of grain towards the sea.

[Paralus]

Getting to the other stuff George, but, a quickie before bed...

Well... I cannot say what the exact bases that he would have built were, Sardis surely being one, but as far s capacities were concerned, storehouses could be really huge... A large amount of Egypt's grain was stored in such, Mesopotamia's too. The technology was there, so was the manpower. A network of comlpexes of granaries throughout the Empire would have been constructed/utilized and linked with caravans that would keep the flow of grain towards the sea.

There's a lot of assumption there George (as with some other of your earlier points). Babylonian tablets testify to the major depredations of Alexander's army (steep grain prices and grain shortages) as well as during the Diadoch battles. It doesn't do to simply assume "big empire" so "big resources" and networks of "complexes" to explain everything. You would claim the sources (Herodotus for the great part) truthful and the basis for the discussion. Where is the source material for this?

[Macedon]

Still... my assumptions are closer to the sources than... what exactly is the alternative? Anyways, assumptions we make to assume, not to prove, so if you've got other assumptions of how things would work you can write about them. Plus, what I wrote about how a large army, one that would not rely on forage (set here whatever number of forces you like), would have been supplied is the norm for such expeditions. The evidence you suggest has nothing to do with a)the period and b)the circumstances nor does it have to do with the capacity of the Empire to amass provisions.

Dareius was not preparing for 5 years to fight Alexander. To fight a war with increased forces, ones that he would regularly not have to supply, the royal granaries would have suffered much and taking from the market would have been mandatory. Even for Xerxes, should something have gone wrong (maybe it did and we do not know), this would have been a valid option and prices would again inflate... Your argument has nothing to do with the supply provision system. If you only mean to say that there wouldn't have been enough food, this is a completely different issue. For some reason, much of Greece and later Rome were supplied from the broader region with huge quantities of grain and yes... numbers here are comparable even to the highest numbers proposed by Herodot.

Do you want to discuss possible reasons why the prices of food would have been inflated in Mesopotamia at the time of Alexander's anabasis?

As for granaries... well, I do not suppose you argue with their existence...

What I propose is not complex nor difficult to do or operate. It is normal for the era. Why would there be a problem for the Achaemenid Empire, an Empire with a functional administration, guards, fortresses, satrap armies, mustering centers, a working tax collection system an organized road system, tolls, import taxes etc have troubles transporting grain from inland to the coast? Why would it have been complex to build additional royal granaries and expand on those existent? This is what I mean by vastly underestimating states of the ancient times...

[Paralus]

Improbable? To a certain degree of course. Impossible? No. Triremes were easy and quickly to build, the numbers attested are very down-to-earth for all nations mentioned. The argument of "low manpower" is much weaker here than this regarding the land force, since the totals here are much much less anyways and fully within the capabilities of these nations and of the Empire.

The argument of “low manpower” is Wallinga’s. I do not agree with it. Essentially he argues that the Persian invasion navy was 1,200 strong. Wallinga then considers just where the experienced manpower comes from and what drainage – in trained crews – this might have created. His answer it that the fleet was “undermanned”. That is, he argues that a substantial number of triremes sailed with something well below full compliment. Interestingly, he argues this for Athenian fleets. He is clearly wrong for Athens (outside of the closing days of the Peloponnesian War when crews and money were short) who would launch fleets of 20, 40, 60 or 100+ depending upon requirements. Given that there is little point in putting into battle a half manned trireme, I’d argue he’s wrong with the invasion fleet as well.

Wallinga has been severely criticized for his views, which I also find to be a poor reconciliation attempt. If the Persian Empire with all those major maritime nations under its sway could not muster as many triremes, I guess that you also hold the quinquereme fleets of later Rome and Carthage as an absurd impossibility.

It’s not a matter of could or could not, it’s a matter of practicality. If 1,207 triremes (241,000 men) formed the navy, what then of the “beyond counting” supply ships? These, plus the fictional number of land troops (1,700,000), will have meant a constant “gravy train” stretching across the Aegean (a veritable Hellespontine bridge). It is far, far more sensible to see the regular 300 (or the 400 Arrian sees Persia sailing against Alexander in the supreme crisis of Empire). Such are well attested fleet sizes and, more importantly, sizes permitting command and control.

Aside from the practicality of command and control and supply, Xerxes had no reason to suspect any sizeable Greek fleet. The Athenians only commenced building ships well after Xerxes had begun assembling his fleet. He could well have assumed a Persian fleet of 400 will have dealt with whatever the Greeks put into the water. And, on what Xerxes knew when ordering his fleet, that will not have been many. Without the silver strike how many less ships will the Greeks have had minus the “Laurion triremes”?

What do you mean by a "permanent" Persian fleet. The nations of the Empire carried the burden of providing the services that make the presence of a warfleet necessary. It was they who formed the "permanent" Persian fleet. And of course, there would be no problem in amassing such a fleet, especially if subsidized by the Persian treasury, as was the norm, and given 1-2 years warning (it seems Persia was preparing for more).

Ah, splitting arguments! I meant, pace Wallinga, that there was never a standing Persian fleet; that is, a permanent fleet at anchorage or harbour awaiting battle or training for such (as say the “standing” Spartan army or the Sacred Band of Thebes). My whole point was that the King assembled a “navy” as and when he required one. This fleet was always core manned and supplied by the Levant and generally “forgotten” about after it had been used. The fleet reported to Sparta (below) is such a critter.

Cimon sailed with a victorious Greek fleet against a beaten opponent, who would need time to reorganize its naval defenses, build new ships, repair damages and of course with an eye to keep control over prospective rebellious vassals. The Persians themselves would not build any ships, they would have ordered/asked their vassals to do so, peoples who surely needed time, were in a much weaker position than 5 years ago etc. They would only be able to muster their current forces at short notice and the 200 ships Conon seems to have fought (maybe they were 50?) shows that they still were considerable but not as many as they would have been had they not been relatively drained by the war.

Ignoring the sarcastic “maybe they were 50?”, if we are writing of Eurymedon (and I was) then none of the above apply. The last attested action is Mycalae in 479 (aside from Pausanias’ action in Cyprus in 478 when, it is notable, there was no enemy fleet after the disasters of Salamis and Mycalae). Eurymedon is ten years later (hence the 200 triremes). I note your “need time to reorganize its naval defenses, build new ships, repair damages”. That’s interesting because you also claim:

Actually, triremes could be repaired very quickly. They were built from scratch in a matter of a few months and repairs, if not terribly extensive, would only require days, a few weeks if really serious.

One can’t have it both ways. Clearly Phoenician naval power had been resurrected in the intervening decade. Also, it is reasonably clear that the construction (or “supply”) of a fleet notoriously took time – not the “few months” you would have. The winter of 397/6 saw a Syracusan return from the Levant to Sparta telling tales of the building of a fleet. It was likely aimed at recovering Egypt but Sparta saw it otherwise and sent Agesilaos to Asia. The Persian response was to use it against her ally to bring Sparta to heel. Pharnabazus and Conon did this at Cnidus in 394. Clearly the fleet took some time in assembling – especially if it were originally aimed at Sparta (which I doubt).

All the arguments against the numbers of Herodot are actually given by Herodot himself when he has Artabanos trying to dissuade Xerxes.

Reported “conversations” of Xerxes with his high command should be treated with the utmost scepticism. There is no way Herodotus can have known what Xerxes and his inner court discussed and, like many a speech in ancient histories, these should be treated as fictitious.

To reconciliate such difference, I would personally be more prepared to accept that the losses reported during the two storms were lighter than the numbers Herodot gives, a number which certainly constitutes a product of huge speculation.

A ray of light! Herodotus’ numbers are, indeed, “huge speculation”. You are prepared to look at the reported loss of 600 to storms as huge speculation but the not less than 1,200 are rock solid fact.

Then you agree on the basics (at least regarding proportions) with Herodot. I asked you above which of the numbers of ships provided by each nation you think is impossible. It is interesting to note that the Greek ships are described as "heavier" than those of the Persian fleet by Themistocles (8.60), but I still do not see a real difference between the two fleets in terms of "heaviness", especially nothing that has to do with these sci-fi images of sleek Greek ships ramming huge Persian galleys I often see in certain books on the Persian Wars. Which comment of Thucydides are you referring to?

Sybota (1.49.1):

As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. The fighting was of a somewhat old fashioned kind since they were still behindhand in naval matters, both sides having a large number of hoplites aboard their ships, together with archers and javelin throwers.

Clearly the old way was to deck the trireme and fight using infantry. This likey explains the “heavier” or “larger” Phoenician triremes: these were loaded with infantry whereas we hear only of ramming by the Greeks at Salamis. The diekplous, as practised by the Phoenicians at the time of Salamis, was designed to catch up enemy ships (grappling hooks, et al) and bring the on-board infantry to bear. This is clearly what Cimon did when he sailed east: decked his ships and loaded them with hoplites (Plut.Cim.12.2). By 450 the Athenians seem to have changed tactics for Diodorus (12.3.3) tells us that they “sank” many enemy ships. Here is possibly the classic diekplous of driving through, turning and ramming rather than catching?

The Greek seas have nothing to do with the rest of the Mediterranean Sea. Their wars had to entail naval action. This is not the case for the Phoenicians and all other non-Aegean populations of the Empire, whose wars were mainly land-bound and thus their tactical doctrines would not be as advanced. You may have misunderstood my "superior training" comment, which only had to do with taking part in naval action, something very different to the vast experience of the Phoenicians, the Cilicians, the Egyptians etc which would mostly have to do with peacetime action.

Again, I’d love to see the source material that describes the constant warring of the Greeks at sea. It matters little that your “marines” are the most experienced belligerents in the Mediterranean if you cannot sail the ships upon which they fight. Seamanship is paramount: pilots, rowers and captains must all know what they are doing.

That is a most remarkable assertion regarding the Phoenicians. “Non-Aegean” and whose wars were “mainly land-bound”!? This is one of the most famous of seafaring peoples of the ancient world and always the core of any “royal fleet”. To imply that they were somehow inexperienced compared to the Greeks at this time is incredible to me. Clearly the Greeks thought not. Aeschylus (Persae, 341 ff) describes 207 of the Persian ships as “arrogant in speed”. These are almost certainly Phoenician. At Artemesium the Greeks sought to test the Phoenician’s tactics – including the diekplous which they were clearly aware of and concerned about. Having done so, Themistocles was in no mood for a repeat and so pushed for the confines of Salamis to remove the luxury of space.

[Macedon]

The argument of “low manpower” is Wallinga’s. I do not agree with it. Essentially he argues that the Persian invasion navy was 1,200 strong. Wallinga then considers just where the experienced manpower comes from and what drainage – in trained crews – this might have created. His answer it that the fleet was “undermanned”. That is, he argues that a substantial number of triremes sailed with something well below full compliment. Interestingly, he argues this for Athenian fleets. He is clearly wrong for Athens (outside of the closing days of the Peloponnesian War when crews and money were short) who would launch fleets of 20, 40, 60 or 100+ depending upon requirements. Given that there is little point in putting into battle a half manned trireme, I’d argue he’s wrong with the invasion fleet as well.

There actually might be some truth in the assumption, since Herodot is quite clear that the epibatae were Persians. So, something like 7-10% of the total manpower requirements could be excused on that premise.

It’s not a matter of could or could not, it’s a matter of practicality. If 1,207 triremes (241,000 men) formed the navy, what then of the “beyond counting” supply ships? These, plus the fictional number of land troops (1,700,000), will have meant a constant “gravy train” stretching across the Aegean (a veritable Hellespontine bridge). It is far, far more sensible to see the regular 300 (or the 400 Arrian sees Persia sailing against Alexander in the supreme crisis of Empire). Such are well attested fleet sizes and, more importantly, sizes permitting command and control.

Aside from the practicality of command and control and supply, Xerxes had no reason to suspect any sizeable Greek fleet. The Athenians only commenced building ships well after Xerxes had begun assembling his fleet. He could well have assumed a Persian fleet of 400 will have dealt with whatever the Greeks put into the water. And, on what Xerxes knew when ordering his fleet, that will not have been many. Without the silver strike how many less ships will the Greeks have had minus the “Laurion triremes”?

So, starting from a simple “they could”, we can discuss practicality: In my opinion, it is everything but sensible to send against the Greeks a fleet of only 300-400 ships. The Persians were fully aware of the naval numbers that Greece could muster. From the 1,200 triremes, more than 300 are also essentially Greek (whatever that might mean as to the military planning of the Persians) and another 120 were added besides from Greek Thrace and the Greek isles. Xerxes would have been prepared for all contingencies. 1,200 ships is a very sensible number to sail against 400 Southern Greek ships plus any that might come from Magna Graecia, from a possible hostile, unruly Boeotia or Aegean islands in order to keep the sea routes under control. Had Xerxes only sailed with 400 warships, the Greeks would more probably have found the courage to sail in the open sea. This is what he absolutely had to guard against. Also, such a number would have made it more difficult to keep Greek allies under control and it would only take one natural disaster to destroy any hopes of success for the whole campaign. Having undisputed naval superiority was of utmost importance and the easiest part of the expedition. The “beyond counting” supply ships, 3,000 or any other number do not require a great number of sailors and are no number to wonder at. This would only be a fragment of the round ships sailing the eastern Mediterranean. What you propose has nothing to do with “well-attested” sizes, comparable numbers are attested in matters of tonnage/crew number etc. Once one agrees that the means were there, it is indeed a matter of practicality and I do not see Xerxes risking so much while it would be relatively easy to secure naval superiority.

Fleet construction could not be concealed in Greece. Any of the thousands of merchants frequenting Athens and the Pireus (or any other Greek city) during those years of preparation would have given the necessary information, especially since the Athenian fleet was built on public decree some 3 years before the expedition. Now, without the 200 Athenian silver ships, Herodot mentions another 320 ships of the Greeks that either eventually joined in with the Persians or did not arrive for any reasons. That again would bring the total at 500 ships+. Xerxes knew very well of the minimum and maximum Greek fleet power. He would also prepare for contingencies such as storms, deserters etc.

Ah, splitting arguments! I meant, pace Wallinga, that there was never a standing Persian fleet; that is, a permanent fleet at anchorage or harbour awaiting battle or training for such (as say the “standing” Spartan army or the Sacred Band of Thebes). My whole point was that the King assembled a “navy” as and when he required one. This fleet was always core manned and supplied by the Levant and generally “forgotten” about after it had been used. The fleet reported to Sparta (below) is such a critter.

Yep, it was the service of the ships that the Empire required. Not the ships themselves. It was the maritime states who were required to provide ships at short notice (as also troops), secure trade routes, patrol against enemies etc.

Ignoring the sarcastic “maybe they were 50?”, if we are writing of Eurymedon (and I was) then none of the above apply. The last attested action is Mycalae in 479 (aside from Pausanias’ action in Cyprus in 478 when, it is notable, there was no enemy fleet after the disasters of Salamis and Mycalae). Eurymedon is ten years later (hence the 200 triremes). I note your “need time to reorganize its naval defenses, build new ships, repair damages”. That’s interesting because you also claim:

Actually, triremes could be repaired very quickly. They were built from scratch in a matter of a few months and repairs, if not terribly extensive, would only require days, a few weeks if really serious.

One can’t have it both ways. Clearly Phoenician naval power had been resurrected in the intervening decade. Also, it is reasonably clear that the construction (or “supply”) of a fleet notoriously took time – not the “few months” you would have. The winter of 397/6 saw a Syracusan return from the Levant to Sparta telling tales of the building of a fleet. It was likely aimed at recovering Egypt but Sparta saw it otherwise and sent Agesilaos to Asia. The Persian response was to use it against her ally to bring Sparta to heel. Pharnabazus and Conon did this at Cnidus in 394. Clearly the fleet took some time in assembling – especially if it were originally aimed at Sparta (which I doubt).

So.. against the Ionians at Lade, they brought 600 ships and fought against some 350. This was before the expedition of Xerxes and we already see a sum of 950 ships from within the Achaemenid Empire, from the same nations that would supply the fleet that would sail to Greece.

At Mycale, the Persians fought with 300.

It is also interesting that at Eurymedon, there may have been 200 Phoenician ships awaiting another 80 from Cyprus which would bring the toral to 280, but also that two more numbers are given, namely 350 (Euphoros) and 600 (Phanodemos). And all that with many former lands out of the Empire’s control. So, where exactly is the problem again? Even the smallest numbers (280 Phoenician warships) seem to actually give more credit to Herodot.

For the Persians (and everyone else) to launch another great fleet in a matter of months would have been no real problem. The problem was to man the fleet as fast with crews that would have been adequately trained to face the victorious Greeks. And of course, their number one problem would now be to actually keep the provinces that supplied the ships under control and that would also require more limited manpower drainage
As for the time necessary to launch a fleet (provided that money, manpower and supply of materials were secured), it was indeed a matter of months, as all sources attest. It won't take you long to find many examples of ships being "ordered" during the year to be used next spring or summer. The examples of fleets that were raised after war season to be ready at the next one are “notoriously” many, even for greater ships than triremes.

Reported “conversations” of Xerxes with his high command should be treated with the utmost scepticism. There is no way Herodotus can have known what Xerxes and his inner court discussed and, like many a speech in ancient histories, these should be treated as fictitious.

So? I just wrote that Herodot gave the arguments against such numbers himself. Whether these words were actually spoken or not, it is of no importance. Herodot also wrote that the “train” calculation was of his own making and that no sources were quoted on that. He wrote that the numbers on the Persian army he got from Persian sources and of the very inaccurate method that was implemented in order for the Persians to come to those numbers. But all this only serves as an argument against those who want to discredit him as a man who did not care of the veracity of his numbers or/and a man who only wanted to glorify the Greeks by grossly and deliberately inflating the Persian numbers.

A ray of light! Herodotus’ numbers are, indeed, “huge speculation”. You are prepared to look at the reported loss of 600 to storms as huge speculation but the not less than 1,200 are rock solid fact.

First, I never said anything about any “solid facts”. You keep making the same mistake of arguing that Herodot’s numbers ARE wrong as if my position is that they ARE right. No, our HUGE difference is that I claim that they MAY be right whereas you that ?. I have theories of my own which I personally hold as more or less probable but I am very reluctant to disregard Herodot as a fairytale just because some numbers “sound” inflated/ridiculous etc to some. Scholars often work with minimums and maximums, and even these are often self-accepted as personal estimations. In my opinion, Herodot’s numbers of Xerxes’ land army and fleet are my maximum, not my minimum. And since I am baffled as to your position.. please, tell me clearly where you stand as regards Herodot's numbers on the Persian fleet at th start of the campaign and at Salamis.

Sybota (1.49.1):

As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined battle. The fighting was of a somewhat old fashioned kind since they were still behindhand in naval matters, both sides having a large number of hoplites aboard their ships, together with archers and javelin throwers.

Clearly the old way was to deck the trireme and fight using infantry. This likey explains the “heavier” or “larger” Phoenician triremes: these were loaded with infantry whereas we hear only of ramming by the Greeks at Salamis. The diekplous, as practised by the Phoenicians at the time of Salamis, was designed to catch up enemy ships (grappling hooks, et al) and bring the on-board infantry to bear. This is clearly what Cimon did when he sailed east: decked his ships and loaded them with hoplites (Plut.Cim.12.2). By 450 the Athenians seem to have changed tactics for Diodorus (12.3.3) tells us that they “sank” many enemy ships. Here is possibly the classic diekplous of driving through, turning and ramming rather than catching?

Yes and no. It was indeed an older mode of sea-fighting to have more hoplites on board based more on boarding tactics, but that doesn't mean that there was no ramming on the Persian side during the 2nd Persian War. Where did you find this information on the “Phoenician diecplous”? I think that you use the word “clear” very freely. At Lade, Herodot reports that many ships of the Chians were damaged. This points to ramming tactics being implemented by the Imperial fleet too. At Salamis, we also see action that resembles ramming among the Imperials in both Herodot and Aeschylus. Having more hoplites on board did not mean that there was only boarding to be employed and do not forget that, as I wrote in a former post, it is the Greek ships that are described to be heavier... What seems to be described in the accounts is a mix of ramming and boarding tactics on both sides, as was deemed most effective by the captain of each trireme. Herodot also describes something that might be a periplous, an even more complex maneuver to be employed by the Greeks. And of course we cannot say how common were tactics like the diekplous or the periplous. To ram you do not have to employ any of the above. Maybe the imperials used less ramming, the Greek more. Fact is that ramming tactics require higher expertise than boarding tactics, and yet one could easily maintain that boarding should have been more effective than ramming in what was supposed to have been very confined space.

Again, I’d love to see the source material that describes the constant warring of the Greeks at sea. It matters little that your “marines” are the most experienced belligerents in the Mediterranean if you cannot sail the ships upon which they fight. Seamanship is paramount: pilots, rowers and captains must all know what they are doing.

You did not understand what I wrote. Seamanship is paramount BUT :
Experience and training in trireme fighting is the seamanship needed here. Take the best captain and crew of any merchant ship and give them charge of a warship… It is a completely different thing. Experience in trireme fighting does not only have to do with the “marines”. It also has to do with the rowmen, the sailors, the captains and the generals. If I have 20,000 rowmen that are experienced in trireme fighting, I will have the upper hand against someone whose rowers have less such experience. If my captains have more experience in trireme fighting, they will have the upper hand. If my generals have better tactical knowledge and experience in trireme fighting…. Well I hope that you get my meaning now. It is one thing to have HUGE experience in merchant sailing and another to have that experience in sea combat. And I am sure you know that triremes were combat vessels, they were not used for trade or casual traveling.

And of course I do not say that the Phoenicians or the Ionians, the Cypriots etc were incompetent or something. I simply stated that in my opinion it is very possible for the sources to be right regarding the mainland Greeks' relative superiority. Being better, of course does not mean that the opponent is not good...

What source material? That the hundreds of Greek independent states warred against each other? That they fought in sea too since maybe half of them were island or maritime states with sea trade interests?

That is a most remarkable assertion regarding the Phoenicians. “Non-Aegean” and whose wars were “mainly land-bound”!? This is one of the most famous of seafaring peoples of the ancient world and always the core of any “royal fleet”. To imply that they were somehow inexperienced compared to the Greeks at this time is incredible to me. Clearly the Greeks thought not. Aeschylus (Persae, 341 ff) describes 207 of the Persian ships as “arrogant in speed”. These are almost certainly Phoenician. At Artemesium the Greeks sought to test the Phoenician’s tactics – including the diekplous which they were clearly aware of and concerned about. Having done so, Themistocles was in no mood for a repeat and so pushed for the confines of Salamis to remove the luxury of space.

There is nothing remarkable about this assertion. Sea fights are fought when land fights cannot be fought or when they are not enough. There are very few islands along the Phoenician coast, certainly very few inhabited places that would be fought over. The city of Tyre was one and even in its case, the lands it ruled over were on the mainland, Sea lanes were straightforward, along a single coast and into the open sea. You just cannot compare the opportunities and necessities for sea fights in that area with that in the Aegean which is a unique peculiarity in the Mediterranean and not only. Sea faring, again I will say, has nothing to do with trireme fighting. And “clearly”, since you clearly like the use of this word, the Greeks believed so too and the sources also tell us so (of course the Greek sources). Your comment about ships which are “arrogant in speed” and for some reason “almost certainly Phoenician” I do not understand. How can something like that indicate that the Phoenicians were or were regarded as equal to the Greeks in trireme fight? At Lade, the Persian fleet was supposedly (Herodot) very alarmed for having to fight against the 350 Ionian triremes with only 600 ships. Yep, might be a boastful lie… the thing is that our (Greek) sources mainly present the mainland Greeks better at sea fight than the Ionians and the Ionians better than any other non-Greek. We may argue about that, but this is what the sources say. We also have to somehow account for the Persian defeat… Even if no source is taken into account, inferiority in trireme fighting would be a very valid guess as to why a smaller fleet beat a larger one. What is this about the diekplous and the Phoenicians in your posts? I do not get it. Have you read in any sources that the Phoenicians performed the diekplous (which is a ramming tactic when used as a tactical term) whereas the Greeks did not? What is that about the Greeks being terrified at the prospects of facing the Phoenicians because of this diekplous and so pushing into space where the Phoenicians would not use this tactic?

[Jugibar]

Do you want to discuss possible reasons why the prices of food would have been inflated in Mesopotamia at the time of Alexander's anabasis?

Sure, I don't see any reason not to. But to go on discussing it, we must understand the microeconomics situation at the time. Reason why is due to how food would be priced, e.g. in a Capitalist economy prices conform to the laws of supply and demand, in a monopoly the business is free to set prices, and in a socialized economy the government sets the price.

Why would there be a problem for the Achaemenid Empire, an Empire with a functional administration, guards, fortresses, satrap armies, mustering centers, a working tax collection system an organized road system, tolls, import taxes etc have troubles transporting grain from inland to the coast? Why would it have been complex to build additional royal granaries and expand on those existent?

I don't know, but perhaps you can expand on why. Government was divided based on satraps, ergo it was more decentralized where decisions to take war would lag to its implementation. Sure they had import taxes but the revenue reaped from it depends on the volume of trade/exports. On the additional royal granaries, it simply required labor, which was immobile at the time.

He thought the Greeks were fleeing and sped to attack their rear guard... Thus, unsupported and hastily, he attacked with the Persians and was killed.

Hence an example of a feigned retreat by the Greeks. His incompetence with this decision depends on the intel he had leading to pursue them. Or it was a psychological reason, follow up any perceived success.

The obligatory Persian muster made sure that Xerxes would have enough "hostages" to keep peace. It is not easy to rebel if you have 10,000 of your youths in Xerxes' train... After the campaign there were revolts. Of course the Greek fleet was not small... just smaller. The problem with the triremes though was that they required safe haven as they very seldomly they spent the night on sea. As long as the islands and the northern shores were secure for the Persians, the danger was not that great, since local garrisons would be able to deal with the crews of small fleet and anyways they presented only small threats since the only thing they could do was limited raids.

Yes, but how would the garrisons deal with the crews of small fleets?

I do not see him dock in Euboea. Boeotia was allied and the fleet had to stay near the army. Next stop.. Athens!

Why would it be Athens? Surely it had a huge political and cultural significance in the Greek world, but the same could be said of Sparta due to its superior army or Corinth for its shipping and logistical considerations.

It was one tactic that was used in some cases (additional depth at the striking point). There were a number of ways to "strengthen" a part of your phalanx or/and use it as your main offensive effort.

Examples are Leuctra, Gaugamela, Issus, and even in Philip's campaigns. This is all explained by Dodge.

Well... I cannot say what the exact bases that he would have built were, Sardis surely being one, but as far s capacities were concerned, storehouses could be really huge... A large amount of Egypt's grain was stored in such, Mesopotamia's too. The technology was there, so was the manpower. A network of comlpexes of granaries throughout the Empire would have been constructed/utilized and linked with caravans that would keep the flow of grain towards the sea.

True. Going back to your reference on Herodotus 7.121, I have an article that could eliminate some elements of speculation we have here. www.iranicaonline.org/articles/herodotus-vii

“The army. The size of the army, with its contingents coming from all countries, exceeded all dimensions. They arrived in Sardis, then moved towards the Hellespont (7.40-41; on the army’s route in Asia see Müller 1997). In front was the supply train; in the center were the Persians; and the rear consisted of the tribes of the empire. The Persians were already marching in formation (7.40.2-4). The king was followed by 1,000 select spearbearers and horsemen (7.41; Kienast, 1996). After reaching Abydos, the fleet sailed in formation for maneuvers at the Hellespont (7.44). The king enjoyed the sight of his gigantic army. The Hellespont was crossed near Doriscus, where Herodotus placed the great military review (7.59-100). This account clearly shows a connection with the great catalogue of the Iliad (Armayor, 1978c). First the size of the land army is determined, which comprised 1,700,000 fighting men (7.60). Then the army is presented by nation (7.61-80). Herodotus here focuses on clothes and equipment; the information he gives significantly differs from the iconographic record of the Persepolis reliefs (Armayor, 1978c, pp. 5 f.; Calmeyer, 1987). Noticeable, too, is the attempt to call many of the commanders by name. The Achaemenids play a special part (Schmitt, 1987; Briant, 1990, pp. 89 ff.). Here Herodotus may have referred in part to trustworthy information (Lewis, 1985, pp. 113 f.). The entire geographic extent of the empire is presented.
Next Herodotus adds an excursus, naming the highest commanders and describing their rich equipment (7.81-83). There follows a description of the cavalry, which Herodotus estimates at 80,000 men, not including camel riders and baggage train (7.84-88). Since he enumerates 10 cavalry nations, he must have calculated contingents of 10 times 8,000 men. In addition, there were the Arab camel riders (7.86.2). Next he lists the catalogue of ships (7.89-99). Herodotus adopts Aeschylus’s figure of 1,207 boats (Persae 339 ff.), which on their part represent homage to the 1,186 ships of the Iliad. However, Herodotus divides these among twelve nations, whereby he again shows the geographic dimensions of the Persian Empire. Here Greek contingents also play an important part, besides Phoenicians, Syrians, and Pamphylians. Certain naval commanders then are named, among whom a woman, Artemisia, receives particular attention (7.99). The size of the entire force according to Herodotus consisted of 1,700,000 infantrymen, 80,000 horsemen, 1,207 animals, and 3,000 cargo ships. The king inspected a great review on sea and land and had the contingents recorded (7.100).
Through Thrace to Thessaly. Afterwards, the army marched in three parallel columns through Thrace towards Athos (7.121.2-3). (About the possible march routes in Hellas, cf. Müller, 1987.) It grew even larger, and Herodotus appears particularly eager to record the newly recruited troops (7.110, 115.2). The fleet passed through the Athos canal to Therma, where the towns of Chalcidice (carefully listed, 7.122-23) kept their ships. Xerxes covered the route to Therma on land (7.124-27). So far the Persians were moving on already conquered ground, for Darius had pushed the border forward to Thessaly (7.108.1). In Therma, the king was informed of which Greeks had complied with the Persians’ demand to offer earth and water (7.131-132.1). Herodotus here adds a digression about the Hellenic communities which had rejected the demand, whereby he particularly underlined Sparta’s and Athens’s love of freedom (7.134-44). Xerxes sent no more messengers to either one, since they had already refused to pay tribute under Darius (7.32). There follows a further section showing the vain search for allies against the Persians (7.148-71; Bichler, 1985a sees in the inefficiency of the search an indication of lack of historicity; Zahrnt 1993 disagrees). Herodotus uses this opportunity to describe the Persian urge for expansion and to show the potential maximum option for the defenders. Already on this occasion Herodotus looks ahead and records the synchronism between the battle of Salamis and that of Himera in Sicily (7.166).
Calculating the Persian forces. Herodotus expressly exonerates the Thessalians from the reproach of Medism; their country could not have been defended (7.172-74; cf. already 7.128-30). The Greeks took up their defensive positions at the pass of Thermopylae and Cape Artemisium (7.175-78). So far Xerxes’ fleet had not suffered any military losses (7.184.1). This provided Herodotus with an occasion to once more take stock of the Persian forces (7.184-87). He estimated 200 men per trireme and reported the force of the fleet as amounting to 214,000 men (7.181.1). In addition, each ship had a special fighting troop consisting of Persians and Medes and amounting to 36,210 men (7.184.2). For the 3,000 transport boats, he estimated a crew of 80 men per boat, altogether amounting to 240,000 men (7.184.3). The fleet thus had a total strength of 517,610 men (7.184.4).
Regarding the army, Herodotus repeats his previous data, but he now summarizes the force of the Arab camel riders and the Libyan charioteers, reporting them as 20,000 men. Thus the army altogether amounted to 2,317,610 men (8.186.5), in addition to hangers-on and European allies (7.186.5). Hence the Persians had more than 2,641,610 infantrymen fit for action (7.185.3), without counting the Thessalians and the allies of central Greece. The supply train was almost equally great, counting altogether 5,283,220 men—excepting women, eunuchs, and animals (7.187.1). It is not surprising that an army of that size would drink up entire rivers and lakes (7.21.1; 187.1) and that the communities doomed to provide for them would face ruin (7.118-120). A third of the land forces deforested the mountain woods of Macedonia, so that the army could get through (7.131).


Anways, I found the following from Wikipedia that may be of relevance (Achamenid Empire).

“The Achaemenid high naval command had established major naval bases located along the Shatt-al-Arab, Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen. The Persian fleet would soon not only be used for peace-keeping purposes along the Shatt al-Arab but would also open the door to trade with India via the Persian Gulf.[57] Darius's navy was in many ways a world power at the time, but it would be Artaxerxes II who in the summer of 397 B.C.E would build a formidable navy, as part of a rearmament which would lead to his decisive victory at Knidos in 394 BCE, reestablishing Achaemenid power in Ionia. Artaxerxes II would also utilize his massive navy to later on quell a rebellion in Egypt.[58]

The construction material of choice was wood, but some armored Achaemenid ships had metallic blades on the front, often meant to slice enemy ships using the ship's momentum. Naval ships were also equipped with hooks on the side to grab enemy ships, or to negotiate their position. The ships were propelled by sails or manpower. As far as maritime engagement, the ships were equipped with two mangonels that would launch projectiles such as stones, or flammable substances.[57]

Xenophon describes his eye-witness account of a massive military bridge created by joining 37 Persian ships across the Tigris river. The Persians utilized each boat's buoyancy, in order to support a connected bridge above which supply could be transferred.[57]Herodotus also gives many accounts of Persians utilizing ships to build bridges.[59][60] Darius the Great, in an attempt to subdue the Scythian horsemen north of the Black sea, crossed over at the Bosphorus, using an enormous bridge made by connecting Achaemenid boats, then marched up to the Danube, crossing it by means of a second boat bridge.[61] The bridge over the Bosphorus essentially connected the nearest tip of Asia to Europe, encompasing at least some 1000 meters of open water if not more. Herodotus describes the spectacle, and calls it the "bridge of Darius":[62]