How Effective were Spears Against Cavalry?

[Domen]

a good example of trained horses not shy of getting into a melee

Indeed, it should also be mentioned that horses fight in melee between themselves.

For example during breeding seasons, stallions fight in a very aggresive way.

I think the greatest advantage spears have on cavalry is their reach.

Exactly.

But this is why a cavalry lance was developed - and why it was later becoming longer and longer.

Probably longest lances in history were used by Polish-Lithuanian Hussars, to counter enemy pikes.

As Macedon already wrote - this issue was discussed in many threads before (Polish Hussars as well).

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Let's quote everything from that Chinese text which I quoted in the thread about chariots:

Something from a Chinese source - the Six Secret Teachings:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Secret_Teachings

King Wu asked Tai Gong: "What about battle chariots?"
Tai Gong replied: (...) In general, in chariot battles, there are ten types of situations on which demise is very likely and eight on which victory can be easily achieved."
King Wu asked:"What are the ten fatal situations like?”
Tai Gong replied:”If after advancing, there is no way to withdraw, this is a fatal terrain for chariots.
Passing beyond narrow defiles, to pursue the enemy some distance, this is terrain which will exhaust the chariots.
When the land in front makes advancing easy, while that to the rear is treacherous, this is terrain that will entrap the chariots.
Penetrating into narrow and obstructed areas from which escape will be difficult, this is terrain on which the chariots may be cut off.
If the land is collapsing, sinking, and marshy, with black mud sticking to everything, this is terrain which will ‘labor’ the chariots.
To the left is precipitous while to the right is easy, with high mounds and sharp hills. This is terrain contrary to the use of chariots.
Luxuriant grass runs through the field, and there are deep, watery channels throughout. This is terrain which thwarts the use of chariots.
When the chariots are few in number, the land easy, and one is outnumbered by enemy infantry, this is terrain on which the chariots may be defeated.
To the rear are water filled ravines and ditches, to the left deep water and to the right steep hills. This is terrain on which chariots are destroyed.
It has been raining day and night for more than ten days without stopping. The roads have collapsed so that it is not possible to advance or to escape to the rear. This is the terrain that will sink the chariots.
These ten are deadly terrain for chariots. Thus they are the means by which the stupid general will be captured and the wise general will be able to escape."
King Wu asked:"What about eight conditions of terrain that result in victory?"
Tai Gong replied:"When the enemy’s ranks - front and rear - are not yet settled, strike into them.
When their flags and pennants are in chaos, their men and horses frequently shifting about, then strike into them.
When some of their officers and troops advance while others retreat; when some move to the left, others to the right, then strike into them.
When their battle array is not yet solid, while their officers and troops are looking around at each other, strike them.
When in advancing, they appear full of doubts, and in withdrawing they are fearful, strike them.
When the enemy’s whole army are suddenly frightened, all of them rising up in great confusion, strike into them.
When you are fighting on easy terrain and twilight has not ended, strike into them.
When, after traveling far, at dusk they are camping and their whole army are terrified, strike into them.
These eight situations constitute conditions in which the chariots will be victorious.
If the general is clear about these ten fatal situations and eight situations where victory is almost certain, then even if the enemy surrounds him on all sides - attacking with one thousand chariots and ten thousand cavalry from the front and the flanks - he will invariably be victorious."
"Excellent!" said King Wu.

King Wu asked Tai Gong: "When chariots and infantry engage in battle, one chariot is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot? When cavalry and infantry engage in battle, one cavalryman is equivalent to how many infantrymen? How many infantrymen are equivalent to one cavalryman? When chariots and cavalry engage in battle, one chariot is equivalent to how many cavalrymen? How many cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot?"
Tai Gong replied: "Chariots are the wings of the army, the means to penetrate solid formations, to press strong enemies and to cut off their flight. (...) after the masses of the army have been arrayed in opposition to the enemy, when fighting on easy terrain, the rule is that one chariot is equivalent to eighty infantrymen, and eighty infantrymen equal to one chariot. One cavalryman is equivalent to eight infantrymen; eight infantrymen is equivalent to one cavalryman. One chariot is equivalent to ten cavalrymen; ten cavalrymen is equivalent to one chariot.
The rule for fighting on difficult terrain is that one chariot is equivalent to forty infantrymen, and forty infantrymen are equivalent to one chariot. One cavalryman is equivalent to four infantrymen; four infantrymen are equivalent to one cavalrymen. One chariot is equivalent to six cavalrymen; six cavalrymen are equivalent to one chariot.
Now chariots and cavalry are the army’s strong weapons. Ten chariots can defeat one thousand men; one hundred chariots can defeat ten thousand men. Ten cavalrymen can drive off one hundred men, and one hundred cavalrymen can drive off one thousand men. These are the approximate numbers."
King Wu asked: "What are the numbers for chariot and cavalry officers and their transformation?"
Tai Gong replied: "For the chariots - a leader for five chariots, a captain for ten, a commander for fifty and a general for one hundred.
For battle on easy terrain five chariots comprise one line. The lines are forty paces apart, the chariots from left to right should be ten paces apart, with detachments sixty paces apart. On difficult terrain the chariots must follow the roads, with ten comprising a company and twenty a regiment. Front to rear spacing should be twenty paces, left to right six paces, with detachments thirty-six paces apart. If they venture of the road more than two li in any direction, they should return to the original road.
As for the number of officers in the cavalry: a leader for five men; a captain for ten; a commander for one hundred; a general for two hundred.
The rule for fighting on easy terrain: Five cavalrymen will form one line, and front to back their lines should be separated by twenty paces, left to right four paces, with fifty paces between detachments.
On difficult terrain, the rule is front to back, ten paces; left to right, two paces; between detachments, twenty-five paces. Thirty cavalrymen comprise a company; sixty form a regiment. For ten cavalrymen, there is a captain. In action, they should not move out of the range of one hundred paces, after which they should circle back and return to their original positions."
"Excellent!" said King Wu.

And a further fragment from the Six Secret Teachings about chariots:

"(...) As for the basic numbers when employing the army, if commanding ten thousand armed soldiers the rules for [the various types of equipment and their] employment are as follows.
Thirty-six Martial Protective Large Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers - total of twenty-four for each flank [and the rear]. The chariots have eight foot wheels. On it are set up pennants and drums which, according to the Art of War, are referred to as 'Shaking Fear.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat strong enemies.
Seventy-two Martial-Flanking Large Covered Spear and Halberd Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers comprise the flanks. They have five foot wheels and winch-powered linked crossbows which fire multiple arrows for self protection. They are used to penetrate solid formations and defeat strong enemies.
One hundred and forty Flank-supporting Small covered Fu-hsu Chariots equipped with winch-powered linked crossbows to fire multiple arrows for self-protection. They have deer wheels and are used to penetrate solid formations and defeat strong enemies.
Thirty-six Great Yellow Triple-linked Crossbow Large Fu-hsu Chariots. Skilled officers, strong crossbowmen, spear bearers, and halberdiers compromise the flanks, with 'flying duck' and 'lightning shadow' arrows for self-protection. 'Flying duck' arrows have red shafts and white feathers, with bronze arrowheads. 'Lightning's shadow' arrows have green shafts and red feathers, with iron heads. In the daytime they display pennants of red silk six feet long by six inches wide, which shimmer int he light. At night they hang pennants of white silk, also six feet long by six inches wide, which appear like meteors. They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat infantry and cavalry.
Thirty six Great Fu-hsu Attack Chariots. Carrying Praying Mantis Martial warriors, they can attack both horizontal and vertical formations and can defeat the enemy.
Baggage Chariots [for repelling] mounted invaders, also called 'Lightning Chariots.' The Art of War refers to their use in 'lightning attacks.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cavalry.
One hundred and sixty Spear and Halberd Fu-hsu Light Chariots [for repelling] night invaders from the fore. Each carries three Praying Mantis Martial knights. The Art of War refers to them as mounting 'thunder attacks.' They are used to penetrate solid formations, to defeat both infantry and cavalry... [continues to other equipment that has nothing to do with chariots] ..."

And from another Ancient Chinese source - Wuzi attributed to Wu Qi (aka Wu Ch'i):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wuzi

Marquis Wu asked: "In general are there methods for taking care of the chariots and cavalry?"
Wu Ch'i replied: "Now the horses must be properly settled, with appropriate grass and water and correct feeding so as to be neither hungry nor full. In the winter they should have warm stables, in the summer cool sheds. Their mane and hair should be kept trimmed and their hooves properly cared for. Blinders and ear protectors should be used so as to keep them from being startled and frightened. Practice their galloping and pursuit, exercise constraint over their advancing and halting. Men and horses must be attached to each other; only thereafter can they be employed. "
"The equipment for the chariots and cavalry - such as saddles, bridles, bits, and reins- must all be complete and durable. Normally, the horses do not receive their injuries near the end of the battle but invariably they are injured at the start. Similarly, they are not injured so much by hunger as by being overfed. When the sun is setting and the road long, the riders should frequently dismount for it is better to have the men weary than to overlabor the horses. You should always direct movements so as to keep some strength in reserve against the enemy suddenly turning on us. Anyone who is clear about this can traverse the realm without hindrance."

[Domen]

More info regarding Ancient Chinese chariots:

Here user HackneyedScribe posted info from Han Dynasty period Donghai commandery Military Inventory:

http://historum.com/asian-history/45323-...ntory.html

As you can see, there were in total 7174 chariots of various types in that inventory in year 13 BC.

[Domen]

Some great cavalry vs tercios (Spanish-style pike-shot infantry) actions:

In the battle of Turnhuot (1597) 800 Dutch and English cavalry defeated Spanish cavalry and then charging from the front and from the rear simultaneously, destroyed 4 tercios (one Spanish, two Walloon and one German) under count Varas.

In the battle of Nieuwpoort (1600) a charge of few squadrons of Dutch cuirassiers (which also included units consisting of soldiers from England, Scotland, France and Germany) destroyed the tercio of the Spanish right wing.

In the battle of White Mountain (1620) two cavalry squadrons under Anhalt destroyed one tercio under Breuner-Tefrenbach.

In the battle of Rocroi (1643) some Spanish tercios were also defeated by French cavalry charges.

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When it comes to examples of other-than-tercio infantry defeating tercios:

- battle of Heiligerlee (1568) - tercio lured into ambush by Dutch cavalry and defeated in an ambush by Dutch infantry

- battle of Breitenfeld (1631) - tercios defeated by Swedish combined arms tactics (artillery, infantry, cavalry)

- some battles of the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), when Dutch infantry used checkered formations and superior firepower

- Rocroi (1643) again, in case of some of Spanish tercios, defeated by French infantry

[Domen]

One of the greatest lance-wielding shock cavalry charges in history was that at Gembloux in 1578.

In that battle 1,200 Spanish lanza under Alexander Farnese annihilated a Dutch army of 20,000 men.

Casualty exchange ratio in the battle of Gembloux in 1578 was staggering.

Over 6,000 Dutch infantrymen were killed by Spanish cavalry. Farnese's cavalry lost 12 killed soldiers.

This beats even greatest victories of Polish-Lithuanian hussars of that period.

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Cases of victorious charges of heavy cavalry vs pikemen were also in the English Civil War. Perhaps the most famous unit of heavy cavalry (cuirassiers) of the ECW were parliamentarian cuirassiers under Sir Arthur Haselrig (man famous for being repeatedly shot by muskets and pistols, stabbed by pikes, cut by swords - and surviving all of that). His cuirassiers charged and defeated pikemen in at least two battles:

- battle of Lansdowne on 5 July 1643, where his men defeated Sir Bevil Grenville's pikemen
- battle of Roundway Down on 13 July 1643

In both those battles Sir Arthur Haselrig was wounded, but not seriously.

Picture from that period showing Sir Arthur Haselrig in his armour:



An example of early 17th century cuirassier's armor (capable of withstanding firearms and pikes):



Sir Bevil Grenville, whose pikemen were utterly beaten by Haselrig's cuirassiers at Lansdowne:

[Domen]

By the way, cuirassiers as a type of cavalry date back to 1484, when they were first established in Austria. They eventually evolved (during the 16th and 17th centuries) into the heaviest cavalry in history, at least when it comes to armour of soldiers (their horses were usually unarmoured as far as I know) - average weight of cuirassier's armour in the 17th century was 40 kg and it was designed to withstand musket shots from very close range, when it comes to breastplates (each breastplate, before being issued to soldiers, was tested by firing to it with a musket from close range). They were armed with long bladed weapons and a pair of pistols each. Their tactics included cold steel charges and caracole. During the 18th and 19th centuries armour of cuirassiers was reduced to breastplates and helmets (compared to full plate armour which can be seen on the photo in my post above). Most of them eventually abandoned armour in the early 20th century.

They were perhaps the longest surviving heavy cavalry in history - until World War 1.

At the beginning of World War 1 German, French and Russian armies still used traditional cuirassiers, who still fought as heavy cavalry (Germany had 10 regiments, France 12 regiments and Russia 4 regiments of cuirassiers). French cuirassiers continued to exist even after the end of WW1, but no longer as heavy cavalry. They also continued to transform into mounted infantry and eventually - during the 1930s - they were the first units of French cavalry to be mechanized, abandoning horses and adopting motor vehicles.

French cuirassiers marching to the frontline in August 1914 (breastplates can be seen):



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When it comes to Polish husaria lancers - the first known fully confirmed unit of husaria was recorded in the Polish army in 1500, last unit was disbanded (transformed into light cavalry) in 1775.

So the rough time-frame of existence of Polish husaria is 1500 (but maybe earlier) - 1775.

Casimir Pulaski - the same who later fought in the American War of Independence - still had around 200 - 300 heavy hussars under his command during the siege of Lwów on 25 May 1769.

That was one of last times when they were used in combat.

[Domen]

Let's quote some excerpts from primary sources (Polish and Russian) from the battle of Klushino in 1610.

I quoted some of them already before, but now "extended versions" of translation to English (these accounts confirm that enemy infantry was steady and resisted Polish cavalry charges bravely, but lost the battle):

Original Polish text:

"Mężnie się nieprzyjaciel stawił, mianowicie lud cudzoziemski, siła pieszo[a?] ich wytrzymał - także z bystrego naszych natarcia, którzy prawie sobą płoty łamali, i na spisy końskimi piersiami wpadali, ledwo im nie w boki muszkiety nieprzyjaciel kładł."

Translation:

"Enemies stood bravely, namely the foreign people, the infantry who endured a lot - also some of rapid attacks by ours, who were breaking fences just by themselves, and running into pikes with chests of horses, while enemy muskets were almost touching their sides."

Source: "Account about the defeat of Dmitri" (Library of the National Museum of Czartoryscy in Krakow, rps 105, No 41).

Original Polish text:

"Sieła nasi w koniach przez mężne natarcie znosząc płoty, któremi zdradą nieprzyjaciel założył w obronie, a na spisy piersiami wpadając szkody odnieśli."

Translation:

"Ours in a brave charge ramming fences, with which the enemy treacherously strengthened their defence, and plunging into pikes with chests, suffered a lot of damage in horses."

Source: Anonymous account from the battle of Klushino ("Primary sources to history of the Polish art of war", volume 5, Ed. Zdzisław Spieralski, Jan Wimmer, Warsaw 1961, p. 190).

Original Russian text:

"Польские войска понемногу тают, но снова свежими силами пополняются и безбоязненно наступают, насмерть стоят и доблестно на полки нападают и пики железные ломают, а в них у немцев вся надежда на спасение."

Translation (a Russian friend helped me in accurate translation):

"Polish troops gradually melt away but then replenish with fresh vigor and come back again, fight to the death and bravely attack and break pikes, which are the only hope for saving the Germans."

Source: ЛЕТОПИСНАЯ КНИГА (link: http://old-ru.ru/08-58-1.html).

As you can see Russians - enemies of Polish cavalry in that battle - confirm what Polish accounts say. Germans mentioned above, are German-style infantry units of the Russian-Swedish armies.

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Now about fences:

Original Polish text:

"[Husarze] Zniósłszy piersiami prawie wszystkie, których nieprzjaciel na starcie użył fortele, mężnie się o wojsko jego uderzył".

Translation:

"[Hussars] Ramming with chests almost all defences, which were initially used by the enemy, bravely plowed into his army".

Source: Anonymous account from the battle of Klushino ("Primary sources to history of the Polish art of war", volume 5, Ed. Zdzisław Spieralski, Jan Wimmer, Warsaw 1961, p. 189).

Original Polish text:

"Podawszy kilka razy, do sprawy przychodząc, obracając się znowu do nich, ledwo ich znowu rozerwali, bo naszym przez opłotki przyszło się potykać i płoty końmi łamać zarazem."

Translation:

"After attacking and retreating several times, [ours] turned against them again, and barely teared them apart again, because ours had to charge across hurdles and to break fences with use of horses at the same time."

Source:

"History of the False Dmitri" by Józef Budziłło, [in:] "Moscow in Polish hands. Memoirs of commanders and officers of the Polish garrison of Moscow in years 1610 - 1612. Ed: Marek Kubala, Tomasz Ściężor, Kryspinów 1995, p. 444.

Józef Budziłło was a Polish soldier and diarist who fought in Russia between 1607 and 1612 (then in 1612 he was captured by Russian forces and liberated from captivity in 1619).

Original Polish text:

"Gdy już do potkania przyszło, natarli naszy tak mężnie, że z sobą płoty znieść musieli."

Translation:

"When the battle finally began, ours attacked so bravely, that they had to ram fences during their attack."

Source:

"Diary of the route of His Majesty the King Sigismund III since his fortunate departure from Vilna up to Smolensk in year 1609 on 18th of August and fortunate success for two years until capturing the Smolensk castle in year 1611", Ed. Janusz Byliński, Wrocław 1999, p. 158.

Original Polish text:

"Naszy, przez kilkanaście płotów przebijając... "

Translation:

"Ours, breaking through over a dozen fences... "

Source:

Account of Piotr Kulesza, written in Tsaryovo-Zaymishche on 05.07.1610 (Library of the National Museum in Krakow)

Original Polish text:

"Panu Podolskiemu koń szarżował na płocie i zginął ze wszystkim."

Translation:

"A horse of Sir Podolski charged on a fence and was lost with all equipment."

Source: "Casualty Registery of the Companions in the battle of Klushino, 2 miles behind Tsaryovo-Zaymishche, on the day of 4 July 1610" (Library in Kórnik of the Polish Academy of Sciences)

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And two more excerpts, which proof that enemy pikemen fought bravely and were steady:

Original Polish text:

"Wioska do tego trafiła się, na której i dla ciasności pola, rozerwał się on szyk nasz, nad nasze wolą, a potrzebnie, bo jedna część naszych potkała się w czoło na Niemce, którym przyszło przez płoty łamać się do nich, bo rzadka w płotach trafiła się taka dziura, żeby dziesięć koni szeregiem wypaść mogło."

Translation:

"We encountered a village, inside which due to narrowness of the field, our formation got disrupted, against our will but necessarily, because one part of ours attacked the Germans frontally, and we had to break fences to get to them, because there was rarely a hole in fences large enough for ten horses to charge through in one line (...)"

Original Polish text:

"Nie mogę ja naprędce wypisać, jako się nieprzyjaciel stawił mężnie, jako też nasze rycerstwo z nimi się ścierało, co mężnie to mężnie, jako wiedzieć było, przez kilkanaście płotów przebijając, na strzelbę tak wielką, na obóz, wierz mi WM było z obu stron na co popatrzeć tak, że przychodziło podwątpiwać, na którą się stronę noga podwinie i jako na włosku jednym, tak nasze Rzpltej sprawy wisiały."

Translation:

"I cannot hastily point out, how bravely the enemy fought, as well as how our chivalry fought aganst them, so bravely, as could be seen, breaking through a dozen or so fences, against firepower so great, against camp, believe me Your Majesty, there was a spectacle of war from both sides, so that it was doubtful, who was going to win, and matters of our Res Publica hanged on by the eyelids."

Let's add that Polish army in this battle consisted only of cavalry and was hugely outnumbered.

[Timianus]

The rise of cavalry, to me, seems especially cemented not under Alexander but by the Visigoths at Adrianopolis in 378 AD. While the rise of the knight can by no means be attributed to any single event, Adrianopolis marked a battle where the cavalry triumphed against infantry.
.

I think there are many historians that would disagree with that statement. At Hadrianopolis, the Romans simply allowed themselves to get into a poor tactical situation and their scouts did not identify Fritigern's foraging cavalry. I do not think there were any major battles after Hadrianopolis where the Romans lost because of mounted cavalry engaging infantry (as opposed to horse archers). Heck, many of the migration tribes rode to battle and then fought on foot. I think the Victorian-era historians greatly oversimplified things by declaring Hadrianopolis as the start of the era of cavalry reigning supreme over infantry.

[Domen]

David Eltis, "The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe" on page 46 quotes Sir John Smythe, "An answer to contrarie opynions militarie", British Library, Harleian MS 135, f 11 - who wrote, that 1000 cavalry can easily defeat 3000 or 4000 missile infantry unless they are protected by pikes or favourable terrain.

On the same page (46) Eltis quotes Matthew Sutcliffe, "The Practice Proceedings, and Lawes of Armies", STC 23468 (1593), page 109 - who in 1593 wrote that a cavalry charge against melee infantry with swords and shields is devastating for infantry, unless they are protected by pikes, ditches, hedgerows or forests.

On next page - 47 - Eltis quotes Robbert Barret, "The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Wares", STC 1500 (1598), page 69 - who in 1598 wrote that missile infantry deployed in open field, unsupported by pikes and without protection provided by hedgerows, ditches, trenches or ramparts, are not able to hold on against cavalry for a long time, and especially are not able to hold on against lancers cavalry.

Raimondo Montecuccoli in "Sulle battaglie" - basing on experiences from the Thirty Years' War (1618 - 1648) - on pages 106 and 150 wrote that cavalry can very quickly destroy musketeers deployed in dense formation (read: density of infantry formation formation is not an obstacle for cavalry in destroying this infantry), unless they are protected by pikes. He also wrote, that pike is "the only defence" of musketeers.

Also Kampenhausen wrote in 1737, that it very rarely happens, that lancers cavalry sustain more damage than they inflict (i.e. lancers almost always inflict higher casualties upon the enemy than they suffer).

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Marcin Bielski (born 1495 - died 1575) - soldier, historian and writer - wrote about cavalry charges:

"Quality is more important than quantity, and terrain is more important than quality."

So whether the terrain was favourable for cavalry or not, was very important for the outcome of a charge. Another important condition for the charge to suceed, was quality of the charging cavalry - men and horses.

Regarding infantry, Marcin Bielski wrote the following thing:

"If you have infantry against enemy cavalry, deploy your men in rough terrain, deploy your men in wetlands, in thickets, in terrain surrounded by depressions. (...) infantry needs ditches, fences, rivers, hills."

[FarDarter]

That's true, I apologize. As I rethink that statement, it would seem to me that the bigger problem lay in raising and maintaining a professional army, capable of standing up to heavy cavalry.

[Domen]

I would say that raising a professional and good quality heavy cavalry was also a problem.

[FarDarter]

Well, yes, but remember, the heavy cavalry were pretty generally nobles, "equestrians". They could afford a horse and armour, and generally didn't have to fend for anyone but themselves, unless they intended to lead. It is extremely expensive, by comparison, to raise professional armies - you have to recruit men, train them, feed them, house them, equip them, pay them, promise(and keep to the promises) bonuses to keep them from getting out of the army ASAP. No wonder the US Congress is full of penny-pinchers.

[Domen]

Pretty generally ??? Well I do not think that there are "general rules" in history. For example in Polish husaria (which was a professional, regular military formation) there were towarzysze and pocztowi.

Towarzysze were indeed nobles (because only rich could afford equipment), but among pocztowi people from all social classes were recruited, because they did not have to buy anything on their own.

It is extremely expensive, by comparison, to raise professional armies

That's were mercenaries were popular - nobody had to raise them - you (as a king) just needed to hire them.

Husaria were not mercenaries, but regulars (zaciężni) - which means that a king hired just a captain, and that captain was responsible for recruiting and training the manpower - both towarzysze and pocztowi.

In case of mercenary units, a king hired entire - already existing - unit, rather than just its captain.

Mercenaries bought their gear on their own, only later they sold their "services" to various kings.

[Flavivs Aetivs]

IMO, saying Congress is full of penny-pinchers is like saying space is full of air.

Late Roman Heavy Cavalry were professional soldiers who recieved their gear - it was taken out of their paycheck, sure, but their physical paycheck of 10.5 Solidi (according to Hugh for a Comitatensian Cavalryman) was not reduced to pay for armor - it was a section of their pay already accommodated in the expenses.

That probably sounded confusing.

[Domen]

In case of housing - you don't always need barracks for your professional troops.

They can house in civilian houses or in provisional camps - that was frequent in history.

Late Roman Heavy Cavalry were professional soldiers who recieved their gear

Historically many professional soldiers were responsible for buying their gear on their own (either or soldiers or just commanders of units and sometimes also NCOs). But of course they received payment for their service, so they could use that money to buy the equipment (or to cover the expenses of previously buying it). There were often documents which established what was the minimum required equipment that you needed to have if you wanted to become a soldier of a particular unit. For example: "to serve in this unit, you need a horse worth at least 20 florins, a sword, (...)" etc. If men could afford it, then they had more than just "minimum".

It was in their interest to have more than what was required as "minimum". For example better armor.

[FarDarter]

I apologise; lately I've been reading up a lot on Crusades and Renaissance warfare, where heavy cavalry were almost entirely nobles(i.e. knights), I got them mixed. In antiquity, many cavalrymen could be nobles; for example, Eastern cataphracts suits of armor costed a fortune and thus were only used by nobles. In Classical Greece, horses were extremely expensive merely to own, I believe the same is true for Rome though perhaps less so. After all, the word 'equestrian' does not have multiple meanings for no reason! There are obviously exceptions, I'm just saying what I know.