06-11-2006, 01:01 AM
Okay folks, here is the review I want to send to the Bryn Mawr Classical Review. If you're a native speaker of the English language, and like to contribute, please write me about any errors you spot!
Adrian Murdoch, [amazon]Rome's Greatest Defeat, Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest[/amazon] (Sutton Publishing. 2006. Pp. xiv, 234. ISBN 0-7509-4015-8. £20.00)
The two last chapters in Rome's Greatest Defeat are dedicated to the development of Western ideas about the Varian disaster. Murdoch carefully describes the opinions of Renaissance scholars, German nationalists, Altertumwissenschaftler, Nazis, and recent archaeologists, and leaves the reader with the impression that so much has already been said about the famous battle that it is no longer possible to say something new. However, a good book in English [1] was overdue. Murdoch's publication now fills the lacuna and leaves nothing to be desired. I would be surprised if another historian still tackles the same subject. Of course new archaeological discoveries are possible, but for the time being, Rome's Greatest Defeat is the definitive book on the Battle in the Teutoburg Forest.
Those familiar with the massive output of German publications in the past decade will find little that is new in Rome's Greatest Defeat. The finds at the Kalkriese have solved all major puzzles and created several minor ones, for which Murdoch offers plausible solutions.
As to the responsibility for the disaster, he does not agree with those who say that the German policy of Augustus was misguided from its very beginning. Instead, Murdoch stresses that Varus could reasonably assume that he could start to organize the new province's governmental infrastructure. As he was to discover, this was based on too optimistic a view on the extent to which the Germans had become pro-Roman, but the Roman was a careful man. He did in fact have "what can loosely be called a counter-intelligence network of his own" (page 101), and received a warning, which he misinterpreted. Although this identification of the cause of the disaster is clearly inspired by the failure of the American intelligence services in the present war in Iraq (as Murdoch indicates on page 194), it is almost impossible to disagree.
In short, this book is almost perfect. Almost: no writer is omniscient and no reviewer can resist the temptation to split some hairs. In the first place: Alexander the Great was not halted by the Jhelum but by the Beas (page 36). In the second place, Flavius Josephus can not have been a rabbi (page 59). A rabbi was (and is) a religious teacher, well-versed in the study of the Scriptures. As far as we know, the title was only used by the Pharisees, something that Flavius Josephus was not.[2] As 'rabbi' was not a formal title until after 70, the two vandals mentioned by Murdoch on page 60 can not have been rabbis either. Finally, the Batavians did not occupy "the area at the mouth of the Rhine around which the modern town of Leiden is now situated" (page 144). This was the territory of the Cananefates. The Batavians lived more to the east, with Nijmegen (Batavodurum or Oppidum Batavorum) as their capital.[3]
This topographical error is related to another one, Murdoch's misunderstanding of what he calls "the Drusus Ditch" that "connected the Rhine with the Zuider Zee and the North Sea via the River Vecht" (page 32). This hypothesis has been abandoned since the tombstone of one Marcus Mallius, a legionary who wanted to be buried near one of Drusus' hydraulic projects, has been dredged out of the Rhine east of Arnhem. Most archaeologists now agree that the Fossa Drusiana is identical to the upper IJssel, northeast of Arnhem. To guard the entrance of the canal, the Romans built Castra Herculis, a satellite of the major legionary base at Nijmegen.
This little problem is more complex, however, and Murdoch weakens the point he is trying to make: that the Roman fleet wanted to avoid the open sea. If a Roman ship would have left Castra Herculis and sailed down the canal and the IJssel, it reached Lake Flevo (the Zuider Zee), which was only connected to the North Sea in the west.[4] Digging a canal to Lake Flevo did nothing to make the voyage to Germany safer. The point is that Drusus created a second outlet to the north that gave access to the Wadden Zee, which is protected by a line of islands.[5] The Romans never had to sail on the treacherous North Sea at all. Murdoch's statement that the Romans "hit open sea" (page 148), appears to be based on Tacitus (Annals 2.23-24), who is clearly exaggerating but does in fact mention the protection offered by the islands.
I already said that I was splitting hairs. Murdoch could only have known the details of Batavian topography and Dutch hydrology if he had access to several rather obscure Dutch publications, which is more than one can reasonably expect. He has written a fine book that can sincerely be recommended.
===
[1]
Of course, there are bad books on the subject. Peter Wells, the author of The Battle That Stopped Rome (2003), appears to belong to those historians who believe that writing for a more general audience is a license to be inaccurate.
[2]
The counter-argument is of course Josephus, Life 2 §12. But see John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Volume 3 (2001 New York), page 301-305, especially 303.
[3]
See Willem Willems, Romans and Batavians. A Regional Study in the Dutch Eastern river Area (1986 Heerhugowaard).
[4]
Murdoch's map on page xi is not based on an adequate reconstruction of the ancient landscape such as W.H. Zagwijn, Nederland in het Holoceen (1986 Den haag).
[5]
Suetonius (Claudius 1) states that there was more than one canal; Murdoch quotes this line (page 209, note 20) but appears to have ignored the plural. Cf. Kerst Huisman, "De Drususgrachten: een nieuwe hypothese", in: Westerheem 44 (1995) 188-194.
Adrian Murdoch, [amazon]Rome's Greatest Defeat, Massacre in the Teutoburg Forest[/amazon] (Sutton Publishing. 2006. Pp. xiv, 234. ISBN 0-7509-4015-8. £20.00)
The two last chapters in Rome's Greatest Defeat are dedicated to the development of Western ideas about the Varian disaster. Murdoch carefully describes the opinions of Renaissance scholars, German nationalists, Altertumwissenschaftler, Nazis, and recent archaeologists, and leaves the reader with the impression that so much has already been said about the famous battle that it is no longer possible to say something new. However, a good book in English [1] was overdue. Murdoch's publication now fills the lacuna and leaves nothing to be desired. I would be surprised if another historian still tackles the same subject. Of course new archaeological discoveries are possible, but for the time being, Rome's Greatest Defeat is the definitive book on the Battle in the Teutoburg Forest.
Those familiar with the massive output of German publications in the past decade will find little that is new in Rome's Greatest Defeat. The finds at the Kalkriese have solved all major puzzles and created several minor ones, for which Murdoch offers plausible solutions.
As to the responsibility for the disaster, he does not agree with those who say that the German policy of Augustus was misguided from its very beginning. Instead, Murdoch stresses that Varus could reasonably assume that he could start to organize the new province's governmental infrastructure. As he was to discover, this was based on too optimistic a view on the extent to which the Germans had become pro-Roman, but the Roman was a careful man. He did in fact have "what can loosely be called a counter-intelligence network of his own" (page 101), and received a warning, which he misinterpreted. Although this identification of the cause of the disaster is clearly inspired by the failure of the American intelligence services in the present war in Iraq (as Murdoch indicates on page 194), it is almost impossible to disagree.
In short, this book is almost perfect. Almost: no writer is omniscient and no reviewer can resist the temptation to split some hairs. In the first place: Alexander the Great was not halted by the Jhelum but by the Beas (page 36). In the second place, Flavius Josephus can not have been a rabbi (page 59). A rabbi was (and is) a religious teacher, well-versed in the study of the Scriptures. As far as we know, the title was only used by the Pharisees, something that Flavius Josephus was not.[2] As 'rabbi' was not a formal title until after 70, the two vandals mentioned by Murdoch on page 60 can not have been rabbis either. Finally, the Batavians did not occupy "the area at the mouth of the Rhine around which the modern town of Leiden is now situated" (page 144). This was the territory of the Cananefates. The Batavians lived more to the east, with Nijmegen (Batavodurum or Oppidum Batavorum) as their capital.[3]
This topographical error is related to another one, Murdoch's misunderstanding of what he calls "the Drusus Ditch" that "connected the Rhine with the Zuider Zee and the North Sea via the River Vecht" (page 32). This hypothesis has been abandoned since the tombstone of one Marcus Mallius, a legionary who wanted to be buried near one of Drusus' hydraulic projects, has been dredged out of the Rhine east of Arnhem. Most archaeologists now agree that the Fossa Drusiana is identical to the upper IJssel, northeast of Arnhem. To guard the entrance of the canal, the Romans built Castra Herculis, a satellite of the major legionary base at Nijmegen.
This little problem is more complex, however, and Murdoch weakens the point he is trying to make: that the Roman fleet wanted to avoid the open sea. If a Roman ship would have left Castra Herculis and sailed down the canal and the IJssel, it reached Lake Flevo (the Zuider Zee), which was only connected to the North Sea in the west.[4] Digging a canal to Lake Flevo did nothing to make the voyage to Germany safer. The point is that Drusus created a second outlet to the north that gave access to the Wadden Zee, which is protected by a line of islands.[5] The Romans never had to sail on the treacherous North Sea at all. Murdoch's statement that the Romans "hit open sea" (page 148), appears to be based on Tacitus (Annals 2.23-24), who is clearly exaggerating but does in fact mention the protection offered by the islands.
I already said that I was splitting hairs. Murdoch could only have known the details of Batavian topography and Dutch hydrology if he had access to several rather obscure Dutch publications, which is more than one can reasonably expect. He has written a fine book that can sincerely be recommended.
===
[1]
Of course, there are bad books on the subject. Peter Wells, the author of The Battle That Stopped Rome (2003), appears to belong to those historians who believe that writing for a more general audience is a license to be inaccurate.
[2]
The counter-argument is of course Josephus, Life 2 §12. But see John P. Meier, A Marginal Jew. Rethinking the Historical Jesus. Volume 3 (2001 New York), page 301-305, especially 303.
[3]
See Willem Willems, Romans and Batavians. A Regional Study in the Dutch Eastern river Area (1986 Heerhugowaard).
[4]
Murdoch's map on page xi is not based on an adequate reconstruction of the ancient landscape such as W.H. Zagwijn, Nederland in het Holoceen (1986 Den haag).
[5]
Suetonius (Claudius 1) states that there was more than one canal; Murdoch quotes this line (page 209, note 20) but appears to have ignored the plural. Cf. Kerst Huisman, "De Drususgrachten: een nieuwe hypothese", in: Westerheem 44 (1995) 188-194.
